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PERSONAL IDENTITY AND HUMAN ANIMALS 
A NEW HISTORY AND THEORY 
Nicholas Charles James Southgate 
ABSTRACT 
The contemporary personal identity debate has divided into two entrenched positions. 
One supports the supposedly naive and unpopular Bodily Criterion (the view that 
personal identity requires physical continuity). The other school is the Psychological 
Criterion (the view that personal identity requires psychological continuity). This has 
acquired the status o f virtual orthodoxy. 
The British Empiricists, John Locke and David Hume, are both supposed to give 
historical weight to this orthodoxy. This thesis argues this is a dramatic 
misrepresentation o f history. Locke is supposed to found the personal identity debate in 
his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, arguing that personal identity is sameness 
of consciousness. It is argued that Locke in fact responds to a prevalent Cartesian 
View, called here the Compositional Account. The Compositional Account is the belief 
that a Human Being is composed o f a Mind and a Body. Hume, in responding to Locke, 
is also responding to the Compositional Account. In opposition to widely established 
readings both philosophers are argued to be highly sympathetic to the Compositional 
Account. 
Chapter 1 establishes Descartes' version o f the Compositional Account and explains 
why Descartes needs no philosophical treatment o f personal identity. These problems 
emerge only for the Empiricists, Locke and Hume. Locke's sympathies for the 
Compositional Account are established in Chapter 2, drawing on material prior to the 
Essay and normally uncited passages in the Essay. Chapter 3 argues that Hume 
presumed the Compositional Account in his Treatise Concerning Human Nature. This 
is argued to explain Hume's famous later recantation o f his theory. 
The thesis concludes by sketching a role for the Compositional Account in 
contemporary debate. The Compositional Account is argued to give strong support to a 
recently developed position known as Animalism. This provides the conceptual 
materials to move beyond the orthodox dichotomy between the Bodily Criterion and the 
Psychological Criterion. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Historically, there have been two (allegedly) popular criteria of personal 
identity. The simpler of these takes it to be a necessary (conceptual) truth that 
people are to be reidentified in terms of their bodies. This criterion is much 
talked about, but I am unaware of any recent philosopher who has endorsed it, 
and I am inclined to regard it as a straw man. The only genuinely popular kind 
of criterion of personal identity is a mentalistic one.1 
When Pollock wrote this ten years ago he was largely correct. Psychological accounts of 
personal identity were, just about, the only ones pursued by philosophers.2 What is more 
this outcome was justified, indeed inevitable, given the history of the subject. Locke, 
regarded as the progenitor of the whole debate, held a theory identifying the person with 
consciousness.3 Hume, Locke's extremist successor, though disagreeing with Locke on so 
much, held a theory in which each person was merely a bundle of perceptions." History and 
Modern debate did indeed seem to concur. Pollock seemed correct. No-one took the 
physical criterion of personal identity seriously. What is more, no-one ever had. 
In the last ten years a few philosophers have started to take the Physical Criterion of 
Personal Identity seriously. Bernard Williams had argued for a Bodily Criterion as long ago 
as 1959s, while Peter Strawson's Individuals6 contained influential arguments that suggested 
our notion of person had an irreducible physical component. These arguments have been 
1 Pollock (1989) p. 30. Olson also cites this passage, Olson (1997a) p. 19. For a similar approach to the 
problem see Penelhum (1967) p. 95ff. Noonan also writes "the Bodily Criterion of personal identity has not 
proved popular with philosophers." Noonan (1989) p.3 
1 Writers who pursued personal identity in terms of the soul are one possible exception (e.g. Swinburne) for it is 
not clear that the soul is a psychological entity in the same way persons are for subscribers to the Psychological 
Criterion of Personal Identity. The Brain Criterion is not an exception. The Brain Criterion is merely a (bad) 
mix between Physicalism in philosophy of mind and the Psychological Criterion of Personal Identity. The 
Brain Criterion is the assertion that a person is just a psychological entity that must be embodied as a certain 
sort of thing (e.g. a brain). Such an account remains a psychological one despite the embodiment restriction. 
For arguments I largely agree with see Olson (1997a), chap. 1. The situation is no better if embodiment must 
occur in a whole human being. This merely produces the New Dualism See van Inwagen (1997), Burke 
(1997b), Olson (1997a). 
3 Writers who think this of Locke always cite Essay 335:11-14 (Book II, Chap XXVII, §9). There Locke 
defines a person as "a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider it self as it 
self, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness, which is 
inseparable from thinking, and as it seems to me essential to it". For a full discussion of this passage see 
Chapter 2, §V 
4 E.g. Waxman (1994) n7p. 330 "Hume's account... is framed in exclusively psychological, subjective terms", 
Green (1999) p. 104 "Hume assumed that personal identity over time is equivalent to the identity of a person's 
mind over time. He paid no attention at all to the possibility that personal identity over time might consist in 
the identity of a human body over time.", Fang (1984) p. 59 "It is well-known that Hume has a quite unusual 
theory of personal identity. For him, personal identity is but the identity of mind." 
5 See Williams (1956). For further development of Williams' argument see Williams (1961b), (1966), (1970a), 
and (1973b). 
6 Strawson (1959). For a contemporary response see Williams (1961a). For a more recent, and lengthier, 
response see McCall (1990). Smart (1977) also raises some interesting points. 
further advanced by Paul Snowdon7, Peter van Inwagen8 and Eric Olson'. These writers, 
normally known as Animalists, replace the notion of body with that of animal. The 
difference between these writers and their Bodily Criterion predecessors rests in this 
emphasis on persons as biological entities as opposed to merely physical entities. 
These writers find themselves ranged against two broad camps within those who subscribe 
to the Psychological Criterion. Those who follow Locke's insights are the Neo-Lockeans. 
Those who follow Hume's insights are the Neo-Humeans. The Neo-Lockeans prefer to 
attempt to offer a definition of person, and then attempt to provide non-circular identity 
conditions for this definition. The most well known Neo-Lockean is David Wiggins.1 0 
Although some feel Wiggins is some sort of Animalist, his writings are in the spirit of 
Locke. Wiggins suggests our notion of person contains a lengthy (and indeterminate) list of 
conditions, some of which are physical, but the core of which are psychological." 
The Neo-Humeans believe they follow Hume in denying that persons are independent 
entities of the sort Wiggins and the Neo-Lockeans investigate. Persons are bundles or 
constructions of some sort. The aim of philosophical investigation of personal identity is to 
elucidate what bundles together the more basic constituents of persons. The most 
influential Neo-Humean writer is without doubt Derek Parfit. Indeed the theories put 
forward in his Reasons and Persons" have the status of established orthodoxy in some 
quarters. 
Neo-Lockeans and Neo-Humeans alike often proclaim that they only write in the spirit of 
their philosophical muses. However, it seems implicitly assumed that Locke and Hume 
would not be appalled by what has been propounded in their names. Adherents of the 
Psychological Criterion comfortably assume they have not only the arguments but also 
7 See Snowdon (1989), (1991) and (1998). 
8 See van Inwagen (1990) 
' See Olson (1994), (1995a), (1995b), (1997a), (1997b) 
1 0 See Wiggins (1976) and (1980) 
" Those who claim that Wiggins is an animalist regard him as a Neo-Aristotelian. On this interpretation 
Wiggins' theory of personal identity is an attempt to refine the Aristotelian claim that we are rational animals. 
Wiggins' project seems close to the Aristotelian one. Wiggins thinks we are animals with certain typical forms 
of mental behaviour. However, the two are importantly different because Wiggins regards the core qualities of 
personhood as being psychological. Wiggins' is persuaded of the importance of psychological factors for the 
same reasons as other Neo-Lockeans, i.e. causal continuity. Wiggins is therefore a Neo-Lockean who insists 
on embodiment (and further restricts this embodiment in typical cases to animal embodiment). A true Neo-
Aristotelian holds we are animals of a certain kind first and foremost and is unimpressed by issues of 
psychological continuity. The Neo-Aristotelian view is best expressed by the strongest form of Animalism 
which claims that psychology is irrelevant to personal identity (though this is not incompatible with the claim 
that the animals that typically constitute persons are typically rational and exhibit a high-degree of 
psychological continuity). See Olson (1994), (1995a) and (1997a) chap. 1 & 3. 
1 2 Parfit (1984) esp. Part III 
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history on their side. In contrast Animalism looks to be nothing more than a cult among a 
few philosophical refuseniks. 
It is the contention of this thesis that this picture is utterly mistakea The Physical Criterion 
is not the straw man Pollock and his i lk suggest. In fact, the Physical Criterion has guided 
and influenced the entire history of the personal identity debate. In his guide to personal 
identity Harold Noonan is typical in his assertion that the Physical Criterion is a 
philosophically naive position, quickly dismissed after a few moments reflection." This 
slander of naivete dramatically underplays the influence the Physical Criterion has had in 
philosophy's history. I f our pre-philosophical assumption is that each of is simply and 
primarily a human being then this view is worth taking seriously. Argument is needed to 
show that Locke and Hume did not take this position seriously. It seems unlikely that such 
careful and authoritative writers, both well aware of advances in the physical and medical 
sciences, both with a keen interest in Natural History, History and Anthropology, would 
dismiss such a persuasive and natural pre-philosophical view without argument. 
The evidence, upon examination, shows overwhelmingly that they did not. Instead, they 
both attempted to embrace the Physical Criterion with their theories, not, as orthodox 
history would suggest, attack it. The traditional difficulties levelled in interpreting their 
theories arise only because modern commentators have not allowed for this trend in Locke 
and Hume's writings. The consequence of this error has been far reaching. The Physical 
Criterion has been reduced to nothing, and in its place two schools have been founded, 
which bear the names, but do not contain the theories, of Locke and Hume. 
It is also frequently assumed that the personal identity debate only begins with the 
Empiricism of Locke and Hume. The contention of the first chapter is that the Empirical 
philosophy only gave rise to new difficulties about persons, not to the debate itself. Prior to 
Empiricism writers had assumed that person was a primitive notioa This position is 
explored by looking at Descartes' writings. Descartes has no explicit discussion of personal 
identity. However, this is because his philosophy avoids the problems Empiricism raises. 
Descartes assumed that persons were Human Animals. Each Human is composed of a mind 
and a body. By asserting that this union is primitive Descartes avoids the need to provide a 
theory of personal identity.14 
1 3 Noonan (1989) p.2# 
1 4 By primitive Descartes means that experience of the union is available to us unmediated by higher cognition. 
Put differently, the experience of the union necessarily accompanies our thought. For further discussion see 
note 42 below. 
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Personal identity before Locke and Hume, therefore, presumed a Compositional Account. 
The second chapter re-examines Locke's theory as a response to the Compositional 
Account. Locke does not share Descartes' confidence about the knowledge we have of 
substance. However, i f Locke could overcome the difficulties he feels afflict our 
knowledge of substance he would be able to accept the Compositional Account. Chapter 2 
presents an interpretation of Locke that demonstrates how Locke both accepted and 
presumed the Compositional Account. His theory is not a psychological one. Throughout 
Locke gives a role to the physical, and does nothing to exclude physicality from his notion 
of person. 
Hume clearly follows in Locke's footsteps. Yet, whereas Locke attempted to rehabilitate 
and utilise the rationalist notion of substance, Hume rejects it outright. Despite this 
rejection Hume's attempts to explain personal identity still presume that persons are 
composed of both a mind and a body. The third chapter reconstructs Hume's theory of 
identity and personal identity to demonstrate that not only does Hume not exclude the 
physical from his account of persons, he explicitly relies on it. 
It might be asked what profit there is in establishing the Compositional Account. First, 
there is the simple fact that it seems to be the most historically accurate and insightful view. 
Al l three of the writers considered in this thesis have been interpreted so as to exclude an 
important element of their philosophies. Establishing the prevalence of the Compositional 
Account makes the wider theories of these great writers seem far more sympathetic to 
modern readers. These great writers deserve to be considered carefully, and do not deserve 
to carry the weight of convenient and crude caricature. 
However, it is not the aim of this thesis to establish beyond doubt that the Compositional 
Account was held by Descartes, Locke and Hume (although in Descartes' case this seems 
almost incontrovertibly to be true). The Compositional Account should be adopted as a 
background assumption to better both understanding of these writers and the problem of 
personal identity. The Compositional Account serves not just to explain what is present in 
these texts. It also explains key absences; Descartes' neglect of the problem of personal 
identity, Locke's failure to explicitly proclaim a purely mnemonic or psychological theory, 
and the supposedly groundless extremity of Hume's theory. 
The Compositional Account does, as wi l l be demonstrated, fit the texts very well. 
Nonetheless, this thesis is a work of philosophy rather than of the history of ideas. 
Historians may find specifics of context make the Compositional Account seem implausible 
despite the support to be found in the texts. However, it is not the aim of this thesis to 
4 
establish that Descartes, Locke and Hume would have espoused these interpretations of 
their works as the correct ones. Instead the aim is to force a reconsideration of themes 
ignored in existing interpretations of their writings. The weight of evidence presented 
below demonstrates that orthodox views about each writer cannot be complacently 
accepted. The fundamental intention is to present a sympathetic but provocative 
interpretation of these much discussed texts. The Compositional Account is sympathetic 
because it brings all three writers closer to pre-philosophical common-sense than any 
existing interpretation. I f the Compositional Account is accepted none of them can be 
dismissed as mere historical curiosities valued only as mistakes to be used as starting points. 
The Compositional Account is provocative because it obliges a re-evaluation of all three 
writers. 
Secondly, the Compositional Account can add a great deal to current debate about personal 
identity. The division between the Bodily Criterion and Psychological Criterion had 
stultified the debate. The Bodily Criterion, reduced to a parody, left the Psychological 
Criterion effectively unopposed. Yet, it is both ludicrous and philosophically undesirable 
that the physical aspect of personal experience was so easily and commonly ignored. 
Animalism is one possible route beyond this dichotomy. Animalism has the advantage of 
identifying persons with a common and metaphysically robust class of objects, i.e. 
animals.'5 This identity claim is interesting because it can be informative even i f it cannot 
be expressed in a non-circular fashion. Even i f the definition of a person must contain 
reference to an animal on both sides, nothing about this precludes the possibility of animals 
being investigated empirically. For this reason Animalism is sometimes also known as the 
Biological View because biology becomes the science of personal investigation. 
The Compositional Account is of interest because it is the obvious precursor to Animalism. 
Persons and Humans are identified, as with Animalism. However, instead of understanding 
the Human Animal purely (and ultimately) biologically 1 4 a Human Being is understood as a 
composite of a mind and a body. Further, the existence of such Composites can be 
construed as a primitive or fundamental fact about the world." This is interesting because 
1 5 Being metaphysically robust is a relative notion, i.e. some things are more metaphysically robust than others. 
Some metaphysicians talk of objects that are clearly the result of gerrymandering the borders of the universe 
(e.g. mereological sums of the Eiffel Tower and my foot). In comparison animals are more metaphysically 
straightforward and robust. They are also, in comparison, animals are metaphysically well-behaved, i.e. there 
are non-arbitrary conditions for their survival. The same cannot be said for gerrymandered objects and many 
artefacts. Some of these (e.g. Theseus' Ship) are notorious for being metaphysically badly behaved. 
1 6 As it must be to avoid the New Dualism. See van Inwagen (1997). 
" Strawson (1959) argues along these lines. 
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persons are everyday obj ects in our ontology that we usually understand without 
complication. Persons should therefore be uncomplicated parts of any ontology to reflect 
the uncomplicated place they have in our folk practice; The Compositional Account 
captures this, and as wi l l emerge, is adopted for just these reasons by Descartes, Locke and 
Hume. The implications for contemporary debate are sketched in a concluding postscript. 
6 
C H A P T E R 1 
DESCARTES ON PERSONAL IDENTITY 
To many writers it would seem almost absurd to look to Descartes for a theory of personal 
identity.18 There is no explicit theory of personal identity to be found in any of Descartes' 
texts. Indeed Descartes barely addressed the issue of identity," let alone personal identity, 
and never uses the term 'person' in any sort of philosophical or technical sense. 
This void of explicit theory has been filled by a widely accepted version of likely Cartesian 
theory. Personal identity is identity of the thinking thing that each of us essentially is. It is 
clear how this is straightforwardly derived from the cogito and the Cartesian doctrine that 
thinking is performed by a thinking thing. The Cartesian Mind (or Soul)20 is indivisible and 
indestructible. Consequently its identity is a primitive fact. I f personal identity reduces to 
identity of the Soul then this too is a primitive fact. 
This view has been influential in commentaries. It has become particularly important in 
discussions of personal identity because the 'Cartesian Ego' has been isolated (and 
demonised) by Derek Parfit as the prime exemplar of one flawed conception of personal 
identity. Parfit writes, "besides assuming that every thought must have a thinker, Descartes 
assumed that a thinker must be a Pure Ego, or spiritual substance. A Cartesian Pure Ego is 
the clearest case of a separately existing entity, distinct from the brain and body."21 
Following a tradition owing to Ryle, 2 2 Parfit's accusation is that Cartesian Egos are wrongly 
postulated to explain personal identity.2 3 
One part of this conception of Descartes can be upheld. Descartes does resolve the problem 
of personal identity into something other than questions about persons. Descartes has no 
need for a technical notion of a person. He does not introduce a specific philosophical 
1 8 For example Markie comments "Descartes seems to be insensitive to the distinction between a mind's 
continuing as the same substance through changes in its mental states and its continuing as the same person 
through such changes." Markie (1994) p. 84/J24. This, of course, assumes that minds are persons. 
" See Thiel (1997), especially pp. 356-361, and the references therein, for useful background discussion. 
2 0 Descartes does use the two terms interchangeable, but only on his own terms. He rejects the scholastic term 
anima in favour of mens. Descartes' conception of Soul (Mens), therefore, is interchangeable only with the 
Scholastic notion of the intellective soul. In as much as Descartes has a use for the notion of an animal or 
vegetative soul, he explains these in mechanical terms. 
2 1 Parfit (1984) p. 224. Parfit currently believes there might have been Cartesian Egos, but in fact there are not. 
See Parfit 1995 pp. 16-19. 
1 2 See The Concept of Mind, Ryle (1949) 
2 3 Other examples include Eric Matthews comment "[rjt is an integral part of the Cartesian account that the self 
or person is to be identified with an immaterial substance." (Matthews 1977, p. 11), and Hooker's attempt to 
"reconstruct Descartes' argument for person-body distinctness." (Hooker 1978b, p. 183) 
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apparatus in response to the collection of problems that go up to make the personal identity 
debate. This distinguishes him significantly and interestingly from Locke and Hume. The 
rest of the Parfitian caricature of Descartes is quite wrong. It is the aim of this chapter to 
lay out an accurate account of Descartes' views and demonstrate why Descartes felt no need1 
to explicitly deal with Lockean type problems. 
This wi l l involve four steps. Firstly, it is revealing to map out the Scholastic doctrines 
concerning the soul and persons to understand the influences Descartes inherited. Secondly 
Descartes ' own position can be explored through his o wn account of substance. Third, 
Descartes ' conception of substance can be viewed via his theory of nature. Finally , it wi l l 
become clear that issues of personal identity can be resolved into questions about the; soul, 
the body , and the union of the mind and body (a human animal) without use of the further 
notion of a person. 
8 
I 
SCHOLASTIC INFLUENCES ON DESCARTES 
The problem of personal identity has three elder and more distinguished theological 
brothers, the doctrines of the Resurrection, Immortality of the Soul and the Trinity. The 
first two problems can be seen as the problem of personal identity painted on a more 
expansive canvas. Whereas debate about personal identity primarily concerns itself with 
how one persists through an earthly career, such an account wi l l have implications about 
what happens after death. Given that it is a central tenet of the Christian Church that one 
does survive bodily death Christians are likely to favour a theory of personal identity that is 
compatible with post-mortem existence. Survival of bodily death is a pre-requisite of the 
Resurrection, and Immortality of the Soul provides this most economically. 
The Trinity raises the difficulty of explaining how three things, the Father, Son and Holy 
Spirit can be understood to all reside in one thing, God. The notion of person has been used 
to explicate this. Boethius, for example, claims that God is "one essence, three substances, 
and three persons of the Godhead"." The Trinity is a peculiar problem for Christian 
theology. It is revealing to an account of personal identity only in as much as the notion of 
person is stretched to explain the Trinity. The doctrines of the Immortality of the Soul and 
The Resurrection are more pertinent. For one, they are common to Christian and non-
Christian eschatologies. Secondly, both are concerned with how a person (or whatever 
entity constitutes a person) can be said to persist through a change in mode of existence, i.e. 
from being alive to being dead. The Resurrection adds the problem of a person apparently 
existing intermittently and yet remaining identical. There is significance beyond theology 
to settling whether persons can be said to exist intermittently, and whether persons can 
undergo changes in modes of existence, or substance. 
Scholastic definitions take a person to be the Aristotelian first substance whose essence 
consists in rationality. As substance has both form and matter it is obviously possible to 
claim that either the person is identical with the form, or the person is identical with the 
matter, or only with the combination of both. Aquinas hedges his bets; the soul is the form 
of man, but does not constitute a person on its own. However, unlike other forms the soul 
2 4 In Liber contra Eutychen et Nestorium. Cited in Thiel (1998b) p. 872^ 
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can exist apart from the substance it constitutes." The views of Boethius and Aquinas 
remained influential and well known via Suarez's writings." 
Although the Cartesians broke with the Scholastics on many issues they inherited an 
important principle from them about the nature of humans. The Scholastic view can be 
seen as offering a Compositional Account of a human person. A human person is regarded 
as being composed of a body and a soul, and identified with neither. The Aristotelian 
influence on the Scholastics meant that this composition was understood in terms of form 
and matter. 
Descartes does at times adopt Scholastic terms when discussing the union of mind and 
body." However, his official interpretation of the Aristotelian Scholastic account is clearly 
put in the Fifth Set of Replies: 
[P]nmitive man probably did not distinguish between ... the principle by which 
we are nourished and grow ... [and] the principle in virtue of which we think 
He therefore used the single term 'soul' to apply to both. [... ] L by contrast, 
realising that the principle by which we are nourished is wholly different -
different in kind - from that in virtue of which we think, have said that the term 
'soul', when it is used to refer to both these principles, is ambiguous. I f we are 
to take 'soul' in its special sense, as meaning the 'first actuality' or 'principal 
form of man', then the term must be understood to apply only to the principle 
in virtue of which we think; and to avoid ambiguity I have as far as possible 
used the term 'mind' for this.28 
Where Descartes differed from the Scholastics was that soul and body were related not as 
form to matter, but as two distinct substances brought together in union. It is this union that 
is central to understanding why Descartes believed he faced no difficulty about personal 
identity. This claim runs counter to the prevalent notion that it is the thinking thing of the 
cogito that accounts for personal identity. The following sections, therefore, wi l l defend 
this interpretation of Descartes. §n wi l l sketch the implications of regarding Human Beings 
as a Union of a mind and a body. This introduces Descartes' account of substance. §m 
examines this account, while §IV explains why a current trend in Cartesian exegesis, 
"Thiel(1998b)p. 871 
"Thiel (1998b) p. 871 
" For example in Rules For The Direction of The Mind, Rule 12 (AT X: 411; CSM I: 40) All references are to 
The Philosophical Writings of Descartes (Descartes 1984, 1985 & 1991) edited and translated by Cottingham, 
Stoothoff, Murdoch & Kenny. Each reference takes the following form: Name of Work or Letter and any 
internal subdivision (e.g. Meditation VT) then reference to the standard Adam & Tannery Collected Works, by 
volume then page (e.g. AT X: 411) then reference to the standard English translation by volume and page (e.g. 
CSM 1:40). 
28 Fifth Set of Replies (AT VT1: 356; CSM II: 246). CSM add in a footnote that Descartes uses the standard 
Scholastic terms for 'first actuality' and 'principal form of man' derived from De Anima 11:2. 
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Trialism, should be dismissed. This done §V presents a preferred interpretation of 
Descartes. §VI then explains how the Cogito argument needs to be absorbed! into this new 
framework. Finally, in §VI1, Descartes' commitment to the Compositional Account can be 
asserted and Descartes' conclusions can then be contrasted with his Empiricist successors. 
The account that emerges is a robust and appealing one. It has intuitive appeal and also 
casts a very different light on post-Cartesian developments in thinking about personal 
identity. As Descartes' immediate critics did. not believe Descartes to ibelieve in 'Cartesian 
Egos' their comments will be best understood if we understand Descartes more as they did. 
This is all the more important because key among those critics was Locke. 
II 
O N O U R N A T U R E AS U N I O N O F M I N D AND B O D Y 
It does not seem to me that the human mind is capable of forming a very 
distinct conception of both the distinction between the soul and the body and 
their union; for to do this it is necessary to conceive them as a single thing and 
at the same time to conceive them as two things; and this is absurd.29 
Although it is Descartes' avowed claim that our nature is as a union of mind and body it is 
also clear that he regarded this as an inherently obscure part of his philosophy. It would be 
improper to regard this as a knockdown criticism. Modern science in all its glory is no 
more clear about the nature of human beings; and Descartes has the distinct advantage of 
being clear about why our notions concerning our own natures must be mostly clouded and 
only occasionally penetrated by the light of reason. 
The union of mind and body emerges as an important notion for Descartes in the Sixth 
Meditation and is discussed in replies and letters after that.10 It is the closing and final claim 
of the Meditations. Despite Descartes choosing this as his end point it seems oddly 
neglected that this is his final conclusion. The cogito argument of the Second Meditation 
has generated far more interest as the locus of Descartes' claim as to our existence. This 
has occurred for two reasons. One is the interest of modern commentators in Descartes' 
epistemology31. The cogito is a far more fertile field for criticism than the claim that we are 
by nature human beings. The second is confusion about Descartes' subtle distinction 
between our natures and our essences. Nature and essence are taken to be synonymous by 
most modem writers. For Descartes, however, there is a strict distinction. Our essence is 
that which belongs to us by necessity of being a certain substance, i.e. thinking is essential 
to minds, and extension is essential to matter. Nature, on the other hand, is not understood 
by way of logical or metaphysical enquiry. Nature is the set of laws God has ordained that 
the Universe should run by. 
29 Fifth Set of Objections (AT HI: 693; CSMK III: 227) 
30 The Meditations are primarily about human beings proper status as knowing beings. The union between 
mind and body is discussed in texts prior to The Meditations, but it is only in The Meditations that the union 
takes its fullest place in Descartes' philosophical scheme. Certainly it is The Meditations which is also cited as 
the source for alternative (mis)interpretations of Descartes' opinions. For an exhaustive survey of Descartes' 
mentions of mind-body union prior to the Meditations see the appendix to Voss (1994). 
3 1 See Cottingham's Introduction (1994b), Sorrell (1994), Markie (1994) and also Baker and Morris (1997) for 
criticisms to this effect. 
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At the level of simple substances the difference between nature and essence collapses. I f 
there were only simple substances then nature would always conform to essence. Nature is 
significant in understanding composite substances. It will be discussed next how the union 
of mind and body is for Descartes a composite substance, while still being a single unit. 
However, it is clear that Descartes claims in Meditation I I that our essence is most easily 
known as a thinking thing (thought after all being the medium of knowledge)." This is not 
in conflict with claiming that our nature is one of union of mind and body, and that this 
nature is less easily known than our essence. Descartes' Compositional Account makes it 
consistent that as human beings we have one nature, but two substantial essences. 
1 1 It seems to me that at the heart of Descartes' thought about the immaterial ity of mind is the belief that matter 
cannot know. Executive mental states can never be constituted by even the most complex material states, 
because they are of an essentially different order. This claim seems neither outrageous nor archaic. 
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I l l 
S U B S T A N C E D U A L I S M 
Famously Descartes is a dualist, i f not the dualist. However, as several writers have 
demonstrated, most notably Cottingham, there are several distinct hues of dualism. Firstly, 
one can distinguish dualisms about things and dualisms about stuffs. To be a dualist about 
things would be to claim that all things could be classified as one of two types. It is 
therefore open for the dualist of things to be a monist (or pluralist) about the stuff that goes 
up to make these things." A dualist of stuffs claims that all things are made up of two sorts 
of stuff. It is therefore possible for a stuff dualist to claim that there can be three types of 
thing: two pure types, and one mixed type.54 
This distinction between things and stuffs brings out a significant difference in the aims of 
substance ontologies. The distinction is employed here as a heuristic device to explore 
Descartes' texts. Therefore, one wants to avoid embroiling the distinction in the pursuit of 
metaphysical completeness. What is useful about the distinction is it captures how 
substance ontologies deal with notions of constitution. Stuff ontologies regard what 
constitutes entities to be most revealing of their nature. Conversely, thing ontologies regard 
this as a lesser issue. It is the nature of the things themselves that is of real interest. 
Clearly, the two questions of what constitutes entities and how they are constituted do not 
have to be separate. I f substances are homoeomerous there is no distinction between the 
nature of the whole and the nature of its parts. Conversely, if some entities are meant to 
have no parts (Cartesian minds being one example) it is not clear how they can be said to be 
composed at all. 
It is no surprise to find, therefore, that these confusions are present in Descartes' ontology. 
On the one hand he seems to be a dualist about things. There are only minds and bodies 
and unions of minds and bodies. On the other hand he seems to be a stuff dualist and hold 
that there are minds, bodies, and human beings that are unions of mental and physical 
stuffs. The weight of explicit textual evidence favours Descartes being a thing dualist. 
However, he would have made things easier for himself if he had been an explicit stuff 
dualist. I f the two substances are stuffs, then a combination of the two could still plausibly 
" Russell's neutral monism is one such theory. 
3 4 If the degree of mix can be made to distinguish a type then a pluralistic ontology is possible. Leibniz might 
be an extreme case. Each substance (monad) is a unique mix (reflection) of mental and physical. Hence the 
infinite possibilities of mix provide an infinite number of monads. 
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be regarded as one thing. I f Descartes insists on regarding minds and body as distinct 
things, then he is forced to regard human beings as unions of two distinct things. This 
appears antagonistic to the sort of intimate 'intermingling'" that Descartes suggests typifies 
the union of minds and bodies. Ultimately it would seem to leave no place for human 
beings in Descartes' ontology.34 The apparent equivocation pivots around two things: 
Descartes' definition of substance, and the status of'substantial union' in human beings. 
Matters are further complicated because Descartes defines substances in terms of their 
leading attributes, i.e. thought and extension. Neither of these attributes necessarily implies 
that stuff or things make up the world. This is clearly true of thought. Thought is not a 
thing, although it is things that think. Thought also does not obviously make up a kind of 
stuff. Indeed the terms 'thing' and 'stuff seem best suited to concrete objects, like tables, 
lumps of wax, and human beings. Descartes, of course, is clear that thought is essentially 
unextended. However, it is not clear that Descartes regards extension as being derived from 
concrete objects. Instead extension is the quality of taking up a portion of space. This is 
defined independently of any objects that might be in that space. Further, because 
Descartes is vague about providing identity conditions for material objects, it is not clear 
that he regards them as real in any strict sense. 
Descartes could plausibly be seen as holding that there are merely two modes of 
apprehension available to us. We can either apprehend things as being extended or as being 
mental. This, of course, is the direction in which Spinoza took his metaphysics. Like 
Spinoza, Descartes can be seen as holding that there are no substances other than God. 
Descartes does go part way to accepting this with his doctrine that all substances are 
dependent ultimately on God. 
However, to interpret Descartes as a witless Spinozist would be wrong. While Descartes 
may not have pursued all his principles to exhaustion, it is clear that he maintained a 
common-sense view about concrete objects. His lack of attention to these issues is itself 
evidence that he felt no need to justify the obvious claim that lumps of wax and tables are 
metaphysically reasonably well-behaved objects." Descartes does not regard his division 
between the material and the immaterial as two ways of regarding some intangible 
" Descartes suggests the mind and body ^termingle' in Meditation VI (AT VII: 81; CSM E: 56). For more on 
this see §IV in this chapter. 
" This is Voss's conclusion. See Voss (1994) 
3 7 For example he talks about mice being entiaper se in his letter to Regius, December 1641 (CSMKIII: 200). 
Also in the Meditations Descartes calls a stone a substance (AT VII: 48; CSM U: 30). For a discussion of the 
notion of being metaphysically well-behaved see note 15 above. 
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unknowable substratum. Descartes is clear that the mind is more distinctly known than the 
body.38 However, both body and mind can both come to be known fully and properly once 
their natures are properly conceived. One can have clear and distinct knowledge of both 
minds and bodies. Lack of clarity or distinctness is caused not by any inherently 
obfuscating factors between substance and ourselves, nor any intangibihty about 
substance.39 
It is this insistence on the possibility of clear and distinct knowledge of minds and bodies 
that means Descartes is best understood via the distinction between stuff and thing 
dualisms. Our knowledge of substances should allow us to know whether they are things or 
stuffs. As a consequence one would be better able to understand how they can be said to be 
in union. 
It might be objected that while this investigation is plausible for material objects it might 
not be so obviously applicable to minds. Minds are not obviously things, at least not in the 
way hatboxes are. Likewise, thought is not obviously a kind of stuff, at least not in the way 
treacle is. However, one simply has to accept the idea of unextended, immaterial things or 
stuff. This is no more vague than Descartes' frustrating definition of thinking substance in 
negative contrast to material substance. This presumption seems to be most in tune with 
Descartes' intuitions. The other alternatives involve mystifying the objects of our 
knowledge, and that is counter to Descartes' aims. 
The next section uses this distinction to explore a recent development in Cartesian 
scholarship. This is the debate between interpretations that accept Descartes' official 
dualism and those that suggest this official position is fundamentally strained or even 
flawed. 
3 8 For discussion see §VI in this chapter. 
3 9 Although, Descartes does express reservations about the union of the substances however clearly they are 
known. See the quote at the beginning of §11 above. 
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IV 
T W O ' S COMPANY, T H R E E ' S A C R O W D : T H E P L A C E O F SENSATIONS. 
Cottingham40 has suggested that Descartes was tempted towards, and should have embraced, 
an explicitly Trialistic as opposed to Dualistic ontology. Cottingham therefore concludes 
that Descartes' dualism is fundamentally in unresolved tension as Descartes has left it. 
Baker and Morris41 suggest that properly understood there is no tension in Descartes' 
substance ontology and that if one recognises Descartes' equivocal use of 'necessity' and 
'independence' in defining substances Descartes' Dualism is coherent. Clearly these 
writers cannot all be correct. Yet it is paramount to settle this issue for on it rests the 
coherence of Descartes' plausible claim that human nature consists in being a union of mind 
and body. Descartes adopts a number of principles to define substance, and these are often 
apparently at odds with each other. Once these principles are bought into line with each 
other it will be possible to outline how Descartes understood the union of mind and body. 
The key to Descartes' difficulties is his adherence to the Scholastic principle that a property 
can only inhere in one substance. Despite their differences the Scholastic and Cartesian 
conceptions of substance have enough in common to both embrace this rule. It would seem 
nonsensical that a single instance of a quality could be shared by two substances (at least, if 
qualities are not universals). Two substances may instantiate exactly similar qualities, but 
this would involve two instances of the quality. The problem arises because human beings 
are substance-like and we are therefore prone to ascribe qualities to human beings as i f they 
were substances. Descartes' claim that human beings are a union of two substances obliges 
him either to allow that we can ascribe qualities to a union of substances or to explain how 
this mistaken practice arises and offer a systematic account of how these ascriptions belong 
to two substances. Although there are other conceptions of substance available Descartes 
does not consider them. Given the Cartesian conception of substance (and its Scholastic 
heritage) abandoning the rule would be tantamount to rejecting the notion of substance 
itself. It is not, therefore, an option. This creates particular difficulties in Descartes' 
treatment of sensations. Unlike pure actions of the intellect (such as willing to love God) or 
purely reflex physical actions (such as pulling one's hand away from the fire) sensations are 
seemingly both mental and physical events. Having a pain in one's foot is both an episode 
that is about physical damage to the foot and the mental episode of judging oneself to have 
4 0 In his article 'Cartesian Trialism' Cottingham (1985) and also Cottingham (1986), pp. 127-32 
4 1 In Baker & Morris (1997) 
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a pain. Whereas willing to love God can be predicated only to the mind, and reflex actions 
only to the body, sensations seem to need to be ascribed to both mind and body. 
Cottingham suggests that Descartes should have solved the problem by introducing a third 
substance. Each Cartesian substance has a defining attribute. For minds this is thought, and 
for material things extension. Sensation should be the defining attribute of animals. This 
would preserve the need to have each predicate terminate in only one substance. 
Cottingham feels that sensations are an irreducible part of our experience. Any attempt to 
parse sensations into either mental or physical episodes (or some combination of the two) 
will lose some part of what it is for an episode to be a sensation. Yet, Cottingham's 
interpretation is unsatisfactory. Sensations, though central, are not fundamental in the same 
manner as thought and extended matter. The category of sensation and the notion of a 
human being although tightly interrelated are too loosely connected to provide a definition 
of substance in the way thought and extension can. Indeed Descartes derives his notion of 
sensation from the division of mind and body, and has no metaphysical notion of sensation 
in itself." Whereas bodies could not exist without extension, and thoughts could not exist 
without thinkers, this does not seem to necessarily hold for human beings and sensations. 
Sensations could belong to creatures other than human beings, and human beings might 
exist without having sensations.43 Descartes does link human beings and sensations together 
but not by necessity of substance. Instead sensations arise because of the natural necessity 
of the union of minds and bodies. Appealing to the natural order makes a state of affairs 
dependent on God's grace.44 Although Descartes is happy to use this device (most 
notoriously in the alleged Cartesian Circle) he prefers to offer proofs that are independent of 
God's direct concurrence. The two definitions of substance are of this order (hence they 
can be introduced in the Meditations before God's existence is proved). The union of mind 
4 2 In the letter to Elizabeth in which Descartes describes the union of mind and body as a 'primitive notion', 
sensations also appear to be thus defined. See Letter to Princess Elizabeth, 28th June 1643 (AT HI: 690/1; 
CSMK UJ: 226). However, here 'primitive notion' is an epistemic and not a metaphysical principle. We know 
we have sensations immediately and without inference, and in this sense our knowledge of them (and the union 
they are produced by) is a primitive notion. Thus, although Descartes believes we have an innate capacity to 
understand sensations, he does not believe that sensations are metaphysically primitive. That he reserves for 
general material extension and minds. 
4 3 If animals existed without sensations then Descartes would have a problem distinguishing animals from 
plants. However, Descartes does not have to consider this possible because God has not lent his concurrence to 
such a natural order (I owe this point to Jonathan Lowe). Equally it is not entirely clear how Descartes 
distinguishes plants from mere bodies. He seems obliged to do so by order or mechanical complexity. Clearly, 
though, artefacts can approach (and maybe) even surpass the complexity of simple plants. It is disappointing 
that Descartes did not further consider these matters, and surprising given his interest in automata and other 
complex machines. 
4 4 Hence for the human body to exist without a soul is possible but would require a miracle. See the Letter to 
Regius, December 1641 (CSMKIII: 200) 
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and body, though, and with it sensations, are not in Descartes' opinion capable of this 
independent proof. Therefore it seems highly unlikely that Descartes would accept 
sensations as the defining attribute for a third substance. 
As Cottingham notes Descartes at all times explicitly espouses dualism. Trialism makes 
most sense i f Descartes is a stuff dualist. It is also clear that Descartes is not thoroughly 
enough committed to a stuff dualism to make adopting Cottingham's trialism acceptable.'" 
Descartes always speaks of a union between mind and body and typifies this union as close, 
intimate, natural and complete.44 This makes sense for a union of two things, but less so for 
a union of three things. I f Cottingham is right human beings consist of thinking substance, 
material substance and sensing substance. I f Descartes is a stuff dualist some sense could 
be made of these substances being mixed together. However, if they are things, then it is 
not clear how three things can be united in the intimate manner that two things can be. 
Each substance i f in complete union with one cannot be in union with the third." Sensing 
substance might take the role of the vegetative soul or animal spirits and be the mode by 
which soul and body are meant to connect. However, it is quite clear this merely generates 
another quite unnecessary level of explanation that Descartes neither needs nor desires.48 
4 5 Indeed, part of the problem with Cartesian Trialism as Cottingham has it is that it blurs the virtues of stuff 
and thing dualisms. A stuff dualism does produce a useful trialism, and this Descartes might be claimed to 
have held in some form. Cottingham, however, takes Descartes explicit claim that sensations (in humans at 
least) emerge from the union of mind and body to generate a third stuff, sensing stuff. This then gives a nine-
fold series of possible stuff combinations. Descartes does seem to be ultimately a thing dualist. It may be the 
case that Descartes should have been a thing trialist. However, by favouring a stuff ontology Cottingham 
produces not a trialism, but a nonalism! 
4 6 Not that Descartes is particularly consistent in this matter. In Meditation VI Descartes talks of "the union 
and, as it were, mtermingling of the mind with body." (AT VII: 81; CSMII: 56). However, when discussing 
matters with Mersenne Descartes argues that "[S]ince our soul is not double, but single and indivisible, it seems 
to me that the part of the body to which it is most immediately joined should also be single and not divided into 
a pair of similar parts. I cannot find such a part in the whole brain except this gland [the conarium or pineal 
gland]." Letter to Mersenne, 30 July 1640 (CSMK HJ.: 149). Insisting on a single location seems in stark 
contradiction with the 'intermingling' position of Meditation VI. The same inconsistency affects Descartes 
analogy between the union of mind and body and gravity (Fifth Set of Objections (AT HJ: 693; CSMK HI: 227-
8); for discussion see Mattem 1978). However, Descartes seems to prefer dispersed metaphors, suggesting 
mteirningling is his preferred interpretation. The phrase "most immediately joined" suggests that Descartes 
does not regard the pineal gland as either the only point of connection, or if it is the only join between soul and 
body, that this doesn't exclude the possibility of'mtermingling' or some other sort of close and intimate 
mixing. 
4 7 The Trinity is, of course, a union of three things. However, even if this union is comprehensible, it is not 
clear how it might offer any analogy for the union of substances in a human being. It would seem likely that 
claiming so probably constitutes some sort of heresy. 
4 8 "There is only one soul in human beings, the rational soul; for no actions can be reckoned human unless they 
depend on reason. The vegetative power and the power of moving the body, which are called the vegetative and 
sensory souls in plants and animals, exist also in human beings; but in the case of human beings they should 
not be called souls, because they are not the first principle of their actions, and they belong to a totally different 
genus from the rational soul." Letter to Regius, May 1641 (CSMK HI: 182). Although Descartes does use the 
notion of animal spirits in the usual sense of an animating force in living bodies, he never understands them as 
being anything other than physical. 
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Further there are exegetical problems concerning Descartes' treatment of animals. 
Officially Descartes claims that animals do not in the strict sense think. However, he does 
allow that animals do have sensations.'" Animals can therefore sense pain but cannot judge 
themselves to be in pain. I f such intellection is to distinguish humans from animals, 
Descartes must maintain that humans have a thinking component animals do not have. As a 
consequence while animals are unions of two substances (extended substance and sensing 
substance) humans will be unions of three substances (extended, sensing and thinking 
substances). Triahsm's attraction is that it removes the complications of unions between 
substances, particularly in the case of sentient beings. Instead it only adds the complication 
of adding five new possible substance combinations to the furniture of the world, two of 
which (sensing but unextended and sensing and thinking but unextended) have no putative 
examples. 
Baker & Morris30 outline a different interpretation of Descartes that preserves the need to 
have every predication terminate in one substance, and a strict dualist account. Under this 
interpretation every sensory predicate is systematically ambiguous. Thus to say one has a 
pain is in fact always bivocal. In one sense to say one is in pain is to make a claim about 
the state of one's body. This claim is fallible, as in the amputee's claim to feel a pain in 
their absent limb.51 This part of pain is ascribed solely to the body. The second sense of a 
pain is the mental episode of judging that one has a pain. This second claim, that one seems 
to have a pain, is infallible. Although one cannot be wrong in judging oneself to have a 
pain this does not necessarily imply the pain has the normal or claimed cause. Amputees 
may judge themselves to have pain in a phantom limb. The claim to be in pain is infallible 
despite the fact that the normal mechanical cause of physical attachment to the limb is 
absent. This remains the case despite the fact that the amputee might verbally assert that the 
pain is in the missing limb (if, for example, at that point in time the amputee is unaware of 
the loss of the limb). 
This account is obviously not without difficulty. Certainly it does not seem to have a place 
for qualia. Judging one has a pain is not itself painful. And surely one cannot make a pain 
4 9 Much is made of Descartes apparently cruel attitude towards non-human animals. Descartes does maintain 
that animals do not think, however, this does not mean that he believes they do not suffer pain. Non-human 
animals do sense pain, but they do not ever judge themselves to be in pain. It is this distinction that separates 
humans from other animals. That Descartes regards pain in non-human animals as purely mechanical and a 
result of the disposition of their organs and the flow of animal spirits does not necessarily demean the pain non-
human animals suffer. Pain is a primarily a bodily experience, and is painful whether or not contemplated. 
That non-human animals cannot contemplate their pain does not make it any less painful. 
5 0 Baker & Morris (1997) 
3 1 Meditation VI (AT VII: 77; CSM U: 53) 
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painless by refusing to judge that one has a pain." This suggests that pains are genuinely 
mental events, in as much as we experience them, but that they are not conscious events. 
This seems to force Descartes into a dilemma. Either he refuses to admit we have pains, 
which is surely to be rejected. Otherwise he admits that pains are singular episodes which 
belong to the mind and body equally, instead of there being two singular but related events 
that belong one to the mind and one to the body. 
However, it is not clear that this criticism can be levelled at Descartes. The range of events 
that Descartes regards as purely mental is far more restricted than the range currently 
assumed by philosophers. For Descartes pains are confused thoughts that the mind has as a 
consequence of the actions of the inner senses." The inner senses and sensations arise 
because of the union of the mind to a body. The natural union of mind and body means that 
as long as the body is working properly the unclear thought of a pain will always arise in 
the mind. Inevitably the thought will be unclear as a consequence of the limited and finite 
nature of our minds.54 However, the union is best served and preserved if such constant 
conjunctions operate. Therefore to be aware of a pain as a pain in one's foot is to make a 
confused thought a clear thought (or at least a clearer thought). The choice then is not 
between pains being conscious and painful or unconscious and painless. All pains originate 
as physical events that the mind is made aware of via the inner senses, at first in a confused 
manner, and then possibly in a clear manner (though never distinct). All pains therefore 
have a mental correlate that may be confused or clear. 
As to whether it is the foot that is painful or the thought of the pain Descartes can answer 
quite clearly. It is the foot that is painful, the thought merely informs the mind that this is 
so. So while it is true that all pains are related confusedly to the mind via our nature as 
union of mind and body, it is also true that it is the body that is in pain. Descartes' claim 
that the link between certain physical events and certain mental events is arbitrary is not as 
preposterous as it might seem. God has ordained that the 'universal machine' of the body 
will best function i f certain links are made. However, there is nothing inherent about pain 
5 1 The exertions of fakirs offer only a partial counter to this. We are all familiar with the possibility of ignoring 
pain. However, ignoring pain, even when elevated to an art form does not amount to the dissolution of pain. 
5 3 The notion of Inner Senses is, of course, itself a difficult one. However, these difficulties will not be pursued 
here. 
3 4 There is some conflict here with Descartes' claim that angels would know their bodies perfectly, given that 
angels are surely also finite minds. Presumably it is not finiteness that limits knowledge, but being in union 
with a body. Angels would instead observe a body. However, this somewhat undermines the value of the 
comparison. If observing a body is comparable to being in union with a body it is unclear why God did not 
create humans along these lines. If, however, there is not comparison, then it is not clear what is gained by 
describing an angel as 'having' a body as a consequence of observing it This does not approximate even 
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that makes it painful, of makes pleasure pleasant. It is enough for Descartes that these 
states succeed in preserving the union of mind and body to each other's mutual benefit. To 
ask further questions is nonsensical. Either there are no answers, or it is to second guess the 
mind of God." 
vaguely to what it is like to sense a body. Surely it is sensing a body that really denotes its 'possession' by a 
finite mind. 
" "God could have made the Nature of man such that this particular motion in the brain indicated something 
else to the mind; it might, for example, have made the mind aware of the actual motion occurring in the brain, 
or in the foot, or in any of the intermediate regions . . . But there is nothing else which would have been so 
conducive to the continued well-being of the body." (AT VII: 88; CSMII: 60-1) 
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V 
D E S C A R T E S ' S U B S T A N T I A L P R I N C I P L E S 
Hopefully the discussion above shows that sensations do not create a complication for 
Descartes' official dualism. Nonetheless this strict thing dualism surely creates greater 
difficulties for Descartes, for the union of mind and body is now surely either a fiction or as 
contrary and mysterious as the traditional problems of Cartesian Interactionism suggest. 
To bridge this gap Descartes claims a substance can be complete or incomplete 
insofar as it is referred to some other substance in conjunction with which it 
forms something which is a unity in its own right. . . the mind and the body are 
incomplete substances when they are referred to a human being which together 
they make up." 
This statement is normally taken to be highly paradoxical." Descartes claimed that by a 
substance we understand something that needs no other thing for its existence. Although 
this independence claim has to undergo some qualification (i.e. that all substances are 
dependent on God) it seems that a substance cannot be both independent and incomplete. 
The following passage from The Principles states the general Cartesian conception of 
substance. 
By substance we can understand nothing other than a thing which exists in such 
a way as to depend on no other things for its existence. And there is only one 
substance which can be understood to depend on no other thing whatsoever, 
namely God. In the case of all other substances, we perceive that they can exist 
only with the help of God's concurrence. Hence, the term 'substance' does not 
apply univocally, as they say in the Schools, to God and to other things; that is, 
there is no distinctly intelligible meaning of the term which is common to God 
and his creatures . . . {In the case of created things, some are of such a nature 
that they cannot exist without other things, while some need only the 
concurrence of God in order to exist. We make this distinction by calling the 
latter 'substances' and the former 'qualities' or 'attributes' of those 
substances.} 
54 Fourth Set of Replies (AT VII: 222; CSM II: 157) 
" In, for example, Markie (1994) 
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But as for corporeal substance and mind (or created thinking substance) these 
can be understood to fall under this common concept: things that need only the 
concurrence of God in order to exist." 
The Independence rule of The Principles is a weakened form of qualification for 
substancehood. Writing about Scholastic debates in a letter to Regius59 Descartes says that 
"It is inconceivable that a substance should come into existence without being created de 
novo by God".60 This would seem to exclude all material objects from being substances. 
The soul, on the other hand, "is thought to be immediately created by God".41 These two 
principles, as they stand, would utterly undermine any claim human beings have to be 
substances themselves. Even i f human beings are not substances, but substantial unions, 
these principles would undermine the union being understood as Descartes intends. 
Although the soul is obviously still an individual substance, being created by God, the body 
is no longer an individual substance. A human being is, instead, a union between a soul (a 
substance) and an amount of matter (a non-substance). This would seem to be a surrender 
to Scholasticism by making the soul a substance governing a non-substantial body. 
Descartes could be seen to make this very capitulation when he writes, "This is confirmed 
by the example of the soul, which is the true substantial form of man."" 
The effects of this passage can be ameliorated i f it is read not as an adoption of 
Scholasticism, but an attack on it. Descartes wishes to attack the Scholastic doctrine that all 
things have substantial form. Indeed, he wishes to illustrate the notion that form cannot 
isolate any true substance. The strictness of the principle of divine genesis excludes all 
material objects from being substances. I f divine genesis is the mark of substancehood only 
a material object that has existed perpetually since the first moment God created the 
universe could qualify as a substance. Presumably there is no such material object." This 
favours Descartes' version of substance where a prime attribute rather than form defines 
each substance. Extension is the only necessary and perpetual quality of the material. 
Therefore, when Descartes says that man's proper substantial form is the soul he should be 
understood to be claiming that when Aristotelians speak of the substantial form of man they 
mean no more than the soul as he, Descartes, defines it. Descartes is attempting a reductio 
58 Principles, pt. I, arts. 51-2 (AT VHIA: 24; CSM I: 210, section in curved brackets added in French edition 
AT K B : 47) 
3 9 Letter to Regius, January 1642 (AT HI: 503-9; CSMK HI: 205-209) 
6 0 Letter to Regius, January 1642 (AT HI: 505; CSMK IE: 208) 
" Letter to Regius, January 1642 (AT IU: 505; CSMK ffl: 208) 
6 1 Letter to Regius, January 1642 (AT HJ: 505; CSMK HI: 208) 
6 3 Other th«n the mereological sum of all material objects that have existed since the universe began. However, 
Descartes does not consider this possibility. 
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ad absurdum. He claims "Al l the arguments to prove substantial forms could be applied to 
the form of a clock, which nobody says is a substantial form."44 The result of the Scholastic 
approach is a difficulty in saying what is unique about man, as having substantial form will 
not differentiate man from machine. This problem is solved, again, by the adoption of a 
Cartesian analysis of substance. What is unique about man is the union of extended matter 
with a mind. The interrelating of mind to body as form to matter Descartes demonstrates 
cannot work. Instead each must be independently conceived of as substances in their own 
right. 
Both the Principle of Divine Genesis and the Independence Principle seemingly exclude 
animal bodies from being substances. In a Letter to Mesland65 Descartes offers an account 
of Transubstantiation developing from the one offered in his replies to Arnauld." The 
account is obscure (maybe unsurprisingly given that it explains a miracle). However, 
Descartes explains that we can understand that the bread becomes the body of Christ 
because here numerical identity consists in having the same dimensions, even i f the 
substance is itself changed." It is by this same principle that we can call a river the same.69 
Descartes claims difficulty arises because the term 'body' is "very ambiguous"."9 
Descartes adduces the standard principle that when we designate something as body this 
means that removal of even the smallest part of that body would prevent it from being the 
same.70 This is not the case with the body of a human. This remains the same "so long as it 
remains joined and substantially united with the same soul"." However, Descartes is 
careful to distinguish this from the notion of substantial form. The body itself must retain 
"the dispositions required to preserve that union."" This requirement does not demand that 
the body is itself a substance in the sense that would contravene the Principle of Divine 
Genesis. Descartes notes that our bodies never do remain numerically identical from one 
moment to the next given the constant movement of particles within them. Considered as a 
portion of space the body has no strict identity conditions. It is only individuated as a 
64 Fifth Set of Objections (AT IE: 505; CSMK HI: 208.) See also Descartes attack on the attempt to define man 
as a 'rational animal' in Meditation II (AT VTI: 25-6; CSMII: 17). Descartes is always scathing of any attempt 
to define individual substances. Substance can only be understood as substance-in-general. 
" Letter to Mesland, 9 February 1645 (AT IV: 162-75; CSMK III: 241-6) 
64 Fourth Set of Replies (AT VII: 248-56; CSM II: 173-8) 
6 7 Hence the consecration of the sacrament should not alter the shape of the bread and wine. As Descartes 
remarks in the Fourth Set of Replies (AT VII: 255; CSM II: 177) if the bread is replaced with "some flesh, or a 
tiny child" (things of obviously variant shape) then this is a different miracle. 
4 8 Letter to Mesland, 9 February 1645 (AT IV: 165; CSMK III: 242) 
6 9 Letter to Mesland, 9 February 1645 (AT TV: 166; CSMK III: 242) 
7 0 Letter to Mesland, 9 February 1645 (AT IV: 166; CSMK IE: 243) 
" Letter to Mesland, 9 February 1645 (AT IV: 166; CSMK QT: 243) 
n Letter to Mesland, 9 February 1645 (AT IV: 166; CSMK III: 243) 
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portion of space like all material objects. However "qua human body"" it can remain the 
same because the preservation of this union, being fit for the union with a soul, is enough to 
identify a human body. 
Even though only the soul itself can be regarded as a substance, the body is not 'informed' 
by the soul. Descartes instead emphasises that certain portions of matter can be suited to 
union with a soul. This is possible because of the way God has predetermined matter to 
operate. Hence Descartes can regard a human body as being "indivisible; because i f an arm 
or a leg of a man is amputated, we think that it is only in the first sense of 'body' that his 
body is divided."74 Descartes regards the power to preserve the union as also resting with 
matter and not exclusively with the informing substantial power of the soul. This is caught 
in his conclusion: 
Altogether then, provided that a body is united with the same rational soul, we 
always take it as the body of the same man, whatever matter it may be and 
whatever quantity or shape it may have; and we count it as the whole and entire 
body, provided that it needs no additional matter in order to remain joined to 
this soul"1' 
Descartes takes himself to have demonstrated the separateness of material and spiritual 
substances. However, his attempt to explain how two separate substances nonetheless form 
a true substantial union is not complete. Descartes contrasts a substance's being 
independent with its being complete (or incomplete). As noted above this is normally 
regarded as paradoxical. However, Descartes can respond robustly to these accusations. 
Firstly it is not clear that independence and completeness should be said to go hand in hand. 
Descartes often treats artefactual objects such as cups and saucers as substances.76 Now it is 
clear that there is nothing about the cup that requires the saucer to exist and vice versa. 
7 1 Letter to Mesland, 9 February 1645 (AT IV: 167; CSMK ITI: 243) 
7 4 Letter to Mesland, 9 February 1645 (AT IV: 167; CSMK III: 243) Locke echoes these sentiments at Essay 
336:33-337:9 (Book H\ Chap. 27, §11) and Essay 341:14-33 (Book II, Chap. 27, §17). 
7 5 Letter to Mesland, 9 February 1645 (AT IV: 167; CSMK III: 243) Emphasis added. This has clear 
implications for change in the human body if Descartes literally means no matter can be added. However, he 
surely means that body must be 'whole and entire' in the sense of being able to function as a body without 
needing any additional matter. If this is the case addition (or subtraction) of matter is consistent with the body 
being 'whole and entire'. Descartes cannot, of course, appeal to the notion of completeness here, because the 
body is by definition an incomplete substance. Hence he uses the phrase 'whole and entire' to avoid having to 
speak of the completeness of an incomplete substance. This linguistic dodge may not ultimately be entirely 
satisfactory if Descartes cannot explain how the bodies 'wholeness' differs from completeness. If there is no 
difference a human body is both complete and incomplete, and this is clearly absurd. Parallel difficulties arise 
for the mind, though conversely because the mind lacks parts and therefore is hard to conceive of as ever being 
incomplete. 
7 6 It is not, of course, clear that artefacts should count as substances. However, it is clear that living bodies, 
minds, and human beings are good candidates for substances. As these are the crux of the matter and the 
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Both are therefore independent as good Cartesian substances should be. However, it is also 
clear that cups and saucers belong together, and in another sense, which in no way 
compromises the claim to be substances, one is incomplete without the other." Therefore 
Descartes can claim that "the body and the soul, in relation to the whole human being, are 
incomplete substances; and it follows from their being incomplete that what they constitute 
is an ens per se."ia 
Further, it is not clear that completeness or incompleteness can apply to substances when 
assessed under The Principles rule. For a substance to count as a substance we have to be 
able to understand that a world could exist in which God had chosen only to create that one 
substance. In such a world only two things exist, God and the substance. Now it seems 
likely that all things being dependent on God's concurrence are incomplete in relation to 
God. This makes the relation trivial. The only meaningful use of the term, therefore, is in 
comparisons between non-divine substances. However, the test for substancehood is to be 
able to exist in a world where the only other substance is God. As such the issue of 
completeness is excluded. 
Secondly Descartes is not claiming that the distinction between minds and bodies is of the 
same order as distinctions between various bodies or various minds. Correctly understood a 
mind and body can be truly distinct under one criterion, and a true unity on another. Hence 
Descartes' claim 
[E]ven i f we suppose that God has joined some corporeal substance to such a 
thinking substance so closely that they cannot be more closely conjoined, thus 
compounding them into a unity, they nonetheless remain distinct." 
This needs to be squared with the claim that 
The body and the soul, in relation to the whole human being, are incomplete 
substances; and it follows from their being incomplete that what they constitute 
is an ens per se."w 
analogy holds between natural and non-natural kinds here fairly uncontroversially, this matter can be put aside 
for the moment. 
" It is in this manner Descartes claims that we can have the idea of a mountain or a valley, though each is 
incomplete without the other, in a Letter to Gibieuf, 19 January 1642 (AT HI: 477; CSMK III: 202) 
7 8 Letter to Regius, December 1641 (AT 01: 460; CSMK UI: 200) 
79 Principles, pt. I, art 60 (AT VTIIA: 29; CSM I: 213) 
8 0 Letter to Regius, December 1641 (AT III: 460; CSMK IE: 200) Compare Descartes discussion of adequate 
and complete knowledge in The Fourth Set of Replies (AT VII: 220ff, CSM II: 155$. 
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The independence condition for substances means that minds and bodies are substances. 
There could be a world that contained only a body, or only a mind. Difficulties occur in 
extending this to the union of a mind and body. Clearly a world could exist that only 
contained a union of mind and body. However, surely this union is not independent of its 
constituents, a mind and a body. Hence unions of minds and bodies fail the independence 
test. The parts of the unions, however, pass the test, and hence the test properly reveals the 
distinct nature of mind and body. 
Nonetheless, we have just seen that completeness offers a second definition of substance 
distinct from independence. Descartes can be claimed to be making metaphysical 
distinctions of different orders. The independence test relies on postulating the existence of 
a world that God has not created. In the world God has created there are many things, and 
as such none of them are independent. However, they could be complete or incomplete. 
One might suggest that the two tests are to establish different things. The independence test 
shows why God must create two substances, minds and bodies that can be said to be really 
distinct. The completeness test shows how these created substances exist together. This 
lines up with Descartes' appeals to nature to understand the world. The independence test 
gives a metaphysical test for substance, the completeness test a natural test. A proper 
natural substance is one that is complete, even i f it could not itself be independent. Thus its 
unity is not a fiction, despite having truly distinct parts. 
It is not, however, necessary for something that has parts that its parts be practically or 
obviously separate. Descartes claims the concurrence of God was necessary to create a 
world in which we are unions of minds and bodies. Equally, only by the concurrence of 
God could the two actually separate or combine. However, by use of the natural light it is 
possible to realise one's nature is that of a union. Although one realises that one is a union 
by use of the mind, this no more means one is solely a mind anymore than one would 
believe one was just one's ears in a world which only contained audio experiences. The 
method of discovery surely does not determine the nature of the discoverer. 
This surely is Descartes' target with his famous comment that " I am not merely present in 
my body as a pilot is present in a ship, b u t . . . am very closely joined and as it were, 
intermingled with it, so that I and the body form a unit."8 1 I f the mind were united to the 
body in a simple abutment, then the mind should perceive its body in a manner that 
8 1 Meditation VI (AT VII: 81; CSM Q: 56). This has echoes for those writers on personal identity who claim 
that we are essentially our brains. For just as surely as we do not experience ourselves as pilots in ships, we do 
not experience ourselves as merely brains in bodies. 
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reflected this.8 1 Descartes does here use T to refer to the thinking part of the union rather 
than the union itself. However, this is only to be expected, and does not entail that T must 
refer to a Cartesian Ego. Human beings are necessarily unions of minds and bodies. This 
union is not typified by the mind having perfect knowledge of the body. The mind knows 
itself with immediate distinctness. Although the body can be known distinctly this is not 
achieved immediately. The mind's natural light of reason iUuminates outwards and 
therefore always reveals itself first and most distinctly. When discussing the 
phenomenology of being such a union it is inevitable that Descartes uses T to refer to the 
thinking part of the union. To use T to refer to the union would preclude discussing the 
experience of being a union of mind and body in the manner of a human being. 
As quoted earlier Descartes claims the human mind must "conceive them [mind and body] 
as a single thing and at the same time to conceive them as two things; and this is absurd."91 
The intermingling between mind and body means we experience ourselves as a unit. Yet 
this intermingling implies we are not one substance (one substance would hardly need to 
intermingle with itself) but two substances. Therefore, when Descartes comes to discuss the 
experience of human first-person thought he finds himself at something of a loss. It would 
be wrong to condemn Descartes for finding the expression of this phenomenon difficult. 
Equally, given this systematic difficulty (arguably the systematic difficulty that underwrites 
Phenomenology as a distinct philosophical movement) one should avoid building 
interpretations on Descartes' use of T in this passage. The broader picture at this pivotal 
moment in the Meditations is more revealing. These issues are further examined in the next 
section. 
The distinction between independent and complete substances also goes some way to 
settling vexations about the nature of Cartesian Res Extensa. Considered as an independent 
substance there is only extension. This is a notion of substance-in-generalMand excludes 
individual material objects. However, in the natural world there are many things. Being 
part of a plurality these things must fail the independence test. However, they can pass the 
completeness test. Hence Descartes allows that they can be treated as substances and 
indeed this is his practice. There is a difficulty in explaining why the natural world contains 
many objects rather than one object, but Descartes would most likely have regarded this as 
a Scholastic sophisma given that the world manifestly does contain many objects. 
8 1 This would be the case with Angels if they had bodies. See discussion later in this sectioa 
8 3 Letter to Princess Elizabeth, 28 June 1643 (AT III: 693; CSMK III: 227) 
8 4 What is identified as 'pure-substance' in Markie (1994) pp. 81-86. 
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Descartes' reliance on our nature as union of mind and body is bolstered by his distinction 
between natural reason and natural belief. We learn that our nature is one of union of mind 
and body only by careful direction of the natural light. Reason can, therefore, reveal the 
essences that underlie our nature. However, we also know our nature by way of natural 
belief. Natural belief is an "impulse-to-believe [and] does not directly concern itself with 
speculatively warranted truth, however, or furnish its own guarantee of certainty". This is 
opposed to "the natural light [a] dynamic inclination toward improving our grasp of the 
truth about reality, an inclination which may indeed be weakened and diverted by sense 
prejudices and the pressures of utility and convention, but which cannot be entirely 
quenched without destroying the self in its central act".85 
In a letter to Princess Elizabeth Descartes attempts to explicate his theory by describing the 
union of mind and body as being a 'primitive notion'. 
First I consider that there are in us certain primitive notions which are as it were 
patterns on the basis of which we form all our other conceptions. There are 
very few such notions. First, there are the most general - those of being, 
number, duration, etc. - which apply to everything we can conceive. Then, as 
regards body in particular, we have only the notion of extension, which entails 
the notions of shape and motion; and as regards the soul on its own, we have 
only the notion of thought, which includes the perceptions of the intellect and 
the inclinations of the wil l . Lastly, as regards the soul and the body together, 
we have only the notion of their union, on which depends our notion of the 
soul's power to move the body, and the body's power to act on the soul and 
cause its sensations and passions.86 
Descartes uses primitive notions in a manner closely allied with his notion of natural order. 
Primitive notions are the basis by which we can come to know the natural order correctly. 
Descartes defines a primitive notion as that which "can be understood only through itself."87 
Hence "human knowledge consists solely in clearly distinguishing these notions and 
attaching each of them only to the things to which it pertains. ""Descartes is clear that all 
explanation must be in terms of these notions, and that they are themselves incapable of 
being analysed in terms of each other. Instead it is "in our own soul that we must look for 
these simple notions."89 Indeed, Descartes continues that it is attempting to understand these 
primitive notions in terms of each other that is "the main cause of our errors".90 
8 5 James Collins (1971) pp. 86-7 
8 6 Letter to Princess Elizabeth, 21 May 1643 (AT HI: 665; CSMK HI: 218) 
8 7 Letter to Princess Elizabeth, 21 May 1643 (AT HI: 666; CSMK JH: 218) 
8 8 Letter to Princess Elizabeth, 21 May 1643 (AT III: 666; CSMK HI: 218) 
8 9 Letter to Princess Elizabeth, 21 May 1643 (AT III: 666/7; CSMK IB: 219) 
9 0 Letter to Princess Elizabeth, 21 May 1643 (AT HI: 666; CSMK HI: 218) 
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V I 
T H E R O L E OF T H E C O G I T O RECONSIDERED 
The previous sections have demonstrated that the role of the union of mind and body is 
central to Descartes' philosophical account. Further, it has been shown that this account is 
reasonably robust. However, it still remains the case that the cogito argument of Meditation 
I I does claim that our essence is that of a thinking thing. Clearly this needs to be looked at 
in some detail, i f only to dispel widespread myths about Cartesian Ghosts in the Machine. 
The cogito argument appears not only in Meditation n, but also in the Discourse and The 
Principles. In each case Descartes claims that thinking must confirm to each thinker that 
they themselves exist. However, the role of the argument is quite different in The 
Meditations. Briefly the difference is this: in The Principles the argument is intended as an 
independent logical and metaphysical proof. In The Meditations the cogito is presented as 
an experiential datum by which one can better know one's own nature, for as Descartes 
remarks: 
many more people make the mistake of thinking that the soul is not really 
distinct from the body than make the mistake of adrmtting their distinction and 
denying their substantial union, and in order to refute those who believe souls 
to be mortal it is more important to teach the distinctness of parts in a human 
being than to teach their union." 
The effect of the different presentations of the cogito indicates that the Meditation I I version 
cannot stand alone from its place in The Meditations as a whole. 
Recent writings, particularly those of Amelie Rorty 9 1, have stressed and demonstrated that 
Descartes fully intended The Meditations to be taken seriously as meditative exercises. (It 
would otherwise be puzzling why Descartes chose to put so much effort into presenting an 
argument in this form, when he represents most of the arguments in more conventional form 
elsewhere). As such The Meditations fall into a long tradition of philosophical writings. 
Thus the cogito has to be seen as arriving in the context of Meditation I's doubts, and as a 
first step to the conclusions of Meditation V I . 
Notably Descartes names all the things he wi l l aim to re-establish in his Meditation I attack. 
The Meditations are meant to leave the reader where he started, but with a better 
Letter to Regius, January 1642 (AT UJ: 508; CSMK m:209) 
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understanding of that starting point. Thus just as Descartes ends with the claim that we are 
a union of a mind and a body, so he begins by assuming that we are human beings. This is 
assumed to be known by the senses, but Descartes wishes to show that it is best known, and 
only truly known, by reason of the natural light. 
It is important to note the title Descartes gives Meditation H Although Meditation I I 
distinguishes between the mind and the body it does so only on the grounds that the mind is 
more distinctly known than the body. The cogito is not meant to spring the thinker onto a 
blank ontological canvas. Instead Descartes is removing items from our pre-meditative 
beliefs. The cogito arrives at the point when Descartes discovers that there is one thing that 
cannot be removed: his own thinking being. 
The cogito is contrasted with our pre-meditative belief about our nature as human beings. 
That was known only by the senses, and as such is to be discredited: we must come to know 
this through the natural light. Hence immediately after the cogito passage Descartes returns 
himself to old thoughts "What then did I formerly think I was? A man. But what is a 
man?"" 
At this point Descartes also makes clear that although he can know his own mind and 
guarantee his existence through thought alone it would not then be possible to discover his 
nature through consideration of abstract thoughts and concepts. To this end he dismisses 
the Scholastics who might attempt this: 
But what is a man? Shall I say 'a rational animal'? No; for then I should have 
to inquire what an animal is, what rationality is, and in this way one question 
would lead me down the slope to other harder ones, and I do not now have the 
time to waste on subtleties of this kind. Instead I propose to concentrate on 
what came into my thoughts spontaneously and quite naturally whenever I used 
to consider what I was.94 
It might be thought that Descartes is rejecting the possibility of an animalist or biological 
explanation. What Descartes rejects, though, is that we can understand ourselves by 
providing a definition of what we are.'5 Merely providing a definition would not provide 
the enlightenment for which Descartes is searching. Descartes is interested in how we 
acquire self-knowledge. This does not preclude the possibility that the mode of self-
knowledge does not itself directly reveal the precise constitution of a human being. Instead, 
9 1 See Rorty (1986b) and also Kosman (1986) 
9 3 Meditation H (AT VII: 25; CSM 0: 17) 
9 4 Meditation U (AT VII: 25-6; CSM II: 17) 
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that must be achieved by meditating on the nature of substances and their unions. The 
entire structure of The Meditations reveals this. It is the mind we can know immediately, 
the body only relatively imperfectly via the senses. That we acquire knowledge in this 
manner is a consequence of being a mind and body in union I f we knew our bodies 
perfectly, as an angel might, we would not be in union with a body, merely an observer of 
one.94 However, while angels are endowed with the capacity to perfectly perceive 
everything before them, we are not. It is this unevenness of human self-knowledge and the 
gap between what we experience ourselves to be, and what we actually are, that fascinates 
Descartes and drives The Meditations. 
Immediately following this Descartes re-examines the pre-meditative claim that he is a man, 
and continues 
Well, the first thought came to mind was that I had a face, hands, arms and the 
whole mechanical structure of limbs which can be seen in a corpse, and which I 
called the body.97 
Even in the passage that establishes the cogito Descartes does not neglect the intuition that 
we are embodied creatures. This embodiment, however, is to investigated by the new 
science. The body itself should be examined empirically. It is the aim of The Meditations 
as a whole is to show how correct direction o f reason can give us knowledge of our nature 
as a union of mind and body. In this the cogito is only a stepping stone, and not the central 
claim. 
9 3 What I have defined as the Neo-Lockean approach. See Introduction to this thesis. 
9 6 For Descartes opinion on angels see his Letter to More, August 1649 (CSMK HI: 380) and also the Letter to 
Regius, January 1642 (CSMK HI: 206) 
9 7 Meditation II (AT VH: 26; CSMII: 17) 
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V I I 
SOULS, HUMAN BEINGS & PERSONS 
There are two facts about the human soul on which depend all the knowledge 
we can have of its nature. The first is that it thinks, the second is that, being 
united to the body, it can act and be acted upon along with i t ." 
Descartes wishes the mind to take the role of the soul in a metaphysical system that wi l l 
'please the theologians'.'9 Yet his rational inclination was to provide an account of the soul 
that was accessible to human knowledge. I f the mind is an indivisible substance we can 
have sure knowledge of, then it is a good candidate both for being the soul, and being easily 
known. 
The range of thinking ascribed to the mind is restricted to those modes that might be classed 
as having a moral element: " A thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, is willing, is 
unwilling".' 0 0 This is no accident. The soul is the bearer of guilt and sin that supposedly 
makes it possible to judge each individual on judgement day. Surely then, Descartes' 
avowed belief about personal identity should be that we are essentially, in part at least, a 
mind, and as this part is immortal, surely it is the soul that makes the identity of a person. 
Certainly the 'Cartesian Ego' is taken by many writers on personal identity to be the genesis 
of claims that identity of a person must lie in some unchanging, simple, thing. Yet it does 
not seem obvious Descartes' position has to add up to this. 
This passage in Grosholz's Cartesian Method and the Problem of Reduction"" captures why 
Descartes would not want to identify the person with a 'Cartesian Ego'. 
The shadow of the real, substantial distinction between res cogitans and res 
extensa falls on the Cartesian self and threatens it with a disruption that the 
abstract unity of spirit may not redeem. What kind of self could experience its 
memory and desire, to say nothing of its perception and imagining, as alien and 
as merely contingent? For such a self, history and moral experience, its own 
projects, gratifications, regrets, and creaturely habits would play no role in the 
constitution of its true self. Even the pilgrim souls in Augustine and Dante, 
" Letter to Princess Elizabeth, 21 May 1643 (AT IH: 664-5; CSMK ffl: 217-218) 
9 9 It seems to me right to take Descartes comments on Religion as being sincere. Although he was a cautious 
man who disliked trouble, and at times it is clear he is not beyond a certain amount of dissembling to avoid 
controversy, the commonly made claim that Descartes only pleased the Theologians to stay out of trouble is too 
extreme a claim. In a freer age his faith might have found different expression, but it would still have been an 
expression of faith. Nor does it seem likely that Descartes is a crypto-materialist. 
1 0 0 Meditation 0 (AT VH: 28; CSM H: 19) 
10lGrosholz(1991)p. 142 
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merely passing through on their way to transcendence, are not so thoroughly 
stripped of their earthly particularity. 
Although Descartes attaches the wi l l to the mind, he is explicit in making memory a 
corporeal as well as intellectual process."" I f Descartes did mean 'Cartesian Egos' to be 
persons, then he meant them to be memory-less and unimaginative persons. This 
metaphysically desiccated entity does not f u l f i l the role of person, and it is strange to 
suggest that Descartes might believe that it did. 
One must consider that Descartes rarely uses the term person, and never uses it in a 
technical or philosophically significant sense. It is assumed, therefore, that personal 
identity must then be foisted onto either mind or body. Yet, could it not be the case that 
neither is equivalent to the notion of person that modern writers want? Instead Descartes 
employs the Compositional Account which does all the work he needs to solve what later 
writers would call the problem of personal identity. In the Sixth Set o f Replies he clearly 
defines his notion of a human being: 
In fact I have never seen or perceived that human bodies think; all I have seen 
is that there are human beings, who possess thought and a body. This happens 
as a result of a thinking thing's being combined with a corporeal thing: I 
perceived this from the fact that when I examined a thinking thing on its own, I 
discovered nothing in it which belonged to body, and similarly when I 
considered corporeal nature on its own I discovered no thought in i t . 1 0 3 
Descartes uses this framework: during life, identity goes with the human being. Each 
human is a moral agent, because they have a mind that is a centre of conscious, which is to 
say culpable, behaviour. Moral acts are therefore willed and acted by humans, although it is 
their minds that make their acts moral. The same acts carried out by mindless brutes would 
not be blameworthy because they have no minds, and cannot judge right from wrong. 
The mind, being indivisible, does not decay on the death of the body, and as such is 
immortal and survives. However, the mind although a substance is an incomplete 
substance. It can act as a store for the sins of an individual human, and God can re-unite 
this soul with a body so as to generate a new human being that would be morally identical 
with the previous human being. It is not clear, though, that they would be the same person. 
However, this issue simply does not arise for the Cartesian. Moral acts can be carried out 
1 0 1 Although latterly he does toy with the idea of a purely intellectual imagination. 
,0J Sixth Set of Replies (AT VJJ: 444; CSMII: 299) 
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only by humans, and it is only these acts which can be judged. In as much as persons are 
moral actors, then for Descartes personal identity goes with the union of a mind and body. 
This has the unexpected effect of making Descartes a kind of animalist. Descartes' belief in 
the immortality of the soul does not detract from this. The soul only makes the same person 
in the event of God's intervention to recreate actual human beings for the Day of 
Judgement. In the normal run of nature, however, God has determined that humans are 
identical from birth to death, and are identical as unions of minds and bodies. Descartes' 
faith in the natural order precludes the possibility of the problem cases that fixate theorists 
after Locke.1 0 4 A single mind wil l always be united to one and the same human body for the 
natural life of that person. Descartes' claim for everyday identity would be answered by the 
question "Is this the same human animal?" and surely i f the only thing that can gainsay this 
is divine intervention this is as strong a theory as any (as any account has divine counter-
examples). 
Descartes' account of human beings may not ultimately be coherent or defensible. 
However, for the purposes of this thesis this does not matter. What is clear is that Descartes 
took an uncomplicated view of the world, in which human animals are a natural and 
metaphysically well-behaved part. Descartes is not, then, the founder of a school of thought 
about personal identity that presumes that personhood is constituted by psychological 
continuity (whether guaranteed by a metaphysical simple or otherwise). The reverse is in 
fact true. Further, not only does Descartes focus his philosophy on human beings, he 
effectively excludes the traditional problems of personal identity. The fact of identity is a 
natural one, our knowledge of this identity innate. The traditional problems of personal 
identity are born with Empirical Philosophy. However, the Empirical Philosophy only 
makes sense in light of the prevalence of the Compositional Account. 
1 M Descartes does face the set of problems that beset any claim that the universe is created with a certain 
number of souls. 
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C H A P T E R 2 
L O C K E O N PERSONAL IDENTITY 
Noonan remarks that all philosophical enquiry concerning personal identity is a footnote to 
Locke.1 0 1 Locke's discussion is the first explicit debate of personal identity as an 
independent and significant problem in its own right. As such the study of Locke's theory 
of personal identity remains as pertinent as ever. 
The previous chapter has shown how Descartes adhered to a Compositional Account of 
personal identity. Locke's philosophy at large is a critique of Cartesianism and this is just 
as true for his writings on personal identity. Writers who take Locke to be the founder of 
the philosophical problem of personal identity are obliged to treat Locke as i f he wrote his 
theory onto a philosophical tabula rasa. Instead, the following weaves Locke back into the 
fabric of philosophical history. This makes it clear which problems Locke felt himself to be 
responding to, and makes his philosophical motivations clearer.106 Apart from a reaction 
against Cartesian doctrine Locke was also interested in challenging the intolerance and 
dogma of contemporary theologians. Locke's account of personal identity is also an 
account of moral and legal responsibility. It is constructed not only in opposition to 
prevailing metaphysics but also to prevailing theological disputations.10' A tactic Locke 
uses throughout the Essay is one of under-cutting the value of traditional disputations. 
Where Locke sees an argument that tempts either scepticism or dogma he prefers to show 
that the debate is irrelevant to its putative subject. Thus he does not have to settle 
interminable issues and can provide an account that is free from the dogma and intolerance 
Locke spent his life opposing.108 This tactic is in evidence throughout Locke's comments on 
personal identity. 
1 0 5 Noonan 1989, p. 30. For a similar verdict see also Thiel 1998b, p. 868 
1 0 4 It would also explain why Molyneux urged Locke to add a chapter about identity, and why Locke agreed to 
this (See Letters 1609 & 1620 inDe Beer 1979). The problems were live ones Locke could not afford to 
ignore in a work claiming to be as comprehensive as the Essay does. 
1 0 7 It will not be possible to discuss here the theological implications of Locke's Essay. Harris notes that by 
placing moral worth with the individual consciousness sin is, in consequence, specific to each individual. 
Hence the sin of the Fall does not rest with each and everyone of us. See Harris (1994) pp. 235-6 & 301-305. 
For wider discussion see Tennant (1982). 
1 0 8 A good example of this is at Essay 438:28-30, 439:1-15 (Book III, Chap VI, § 1). Here Locke states that we 
cannot know if there is only one sun, our Sun, and must allow that there might be as many suns as there are 
stars (as he notes some claim). As our sun is just another star, Locke's caution here has paid off! All 
references are to the Nidditch edited edition of the Essay, Locke (1975). References take the form of a page 
and line numbers marking the beginning and ends of the quoted passage (e.g. Essay 438:12-15) followed by 
Locke's own textual divisions (e.g. Book I, Chapter X, §15). 
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This chapter does not aim to defend a Lockean or Neo-Lockean account of personal 
identity. Locke is normally taken to present a psychological criterion of personal identity. 
This is naturally antagonistic to the animalist position. However, just as one can ponder i f 
Descartes is a Cartesian one can equally wonder i f Locke is actually a Lockean, at least 
concerning personal identity. Locke can be interpreted in a manner that shows he was 
highly sympathetic to the Compositional Account. When Locke's motives are properly 
understood this can be seen clearly. In this context i t is possible to see that Locke could 
hold an animalist theory with very little adaptation to his explicit theory. Reading Locke in 
this way means there is no need to labour over the circularity objection, made famous by 
Bishop Butler, that supposedly dogs Locke's theory. Although Locke's memory theory has 
an intuitive appeal that has made it undeniably popular, and the circularity objection has 
likewise been as rigorously pursued (most notably giving us the contemporary debate 
concerning those mysterious things, Q-memories), this is not what makes Locke's writings 
of lasting importance and relevance.109 
1 0 9 Quasi-memory was introduced by Shoemaker (see Shoemaker 1959 & 1963) and made much use of by 
Parfit (see Parfit 1984). For interesting discussion see Wiggins (1980). All these writers believe themselves to 
be writing in a Lockean spirit. Schechtman provides arguments against q-memory which I regard as 
devastating. See Schechtman (1994a) and (1994b). 
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I 
A R E L O C K E A N PERSONS SUBSTANCES? 
Locke is taken to define persons as being distinct from souls and distinct from human 
beings. The person (or self) is equated with consciousness. The person (or self) is therefore 
equated with a psychological continuity, most typically of memories, and this continuity 
assumed to be causal. Locke's theory is therefore taken to imply that persons are non-
substantial psychological entities. This foists an untenable position on Locke by way of a 
selective reading of the text and is at best a caricature of Locke's intentions in the Essay. 
Writers who want to adopt a Lockean theory for positive reasons assume Locke wished to 
do the same. This ignores the negative aspect of Locke's theory, and the manoeuvres that 
lead Locke to his final position. 
Most writers accept that Locke explicitly denies that persons are substances.110 What is 
strange is that many progress to treat persons as quasi-substantial entities, against both their 
own and Locke's claims. Also, having maintained that persons are not substantial, there is 
a general failure to place persons in a category that Locke would accept, i.e. a mode or a 
relation, as Locke takes this tripartite division to be exhaustive.1" This interpretative 
malaise arises because of a lack of sympathy with Locke's aims. It is true that Locke sees 
personal identity as a specific problem that cannot be settled by the traditional apparatus of 
soul and body. However, it is not clear that Locke sees personal identity as the problem 
modern philosophers do. Locke did regard identity itself as a metaphysical principle 
worthy o f explanation and investigation. However, the problem of personal identity does 
not represent for Locke a peculiar metaphysical problem. Personal identity is a problem of 
moral ascription, given our restricted state of knowledge about the identity of substances. 
This amounts to the claim that Locke sees identity as a metaphysical problem, but personal 
identity as an empirical problem. 
The rejection of a substantial basis for personal identity is normally taken to commit Locke 
to a psychological theory of personal identity. The most famous and often propounded 
version of this is to interpret Locke as holding a memory theory of personal identity. " J Yet 
Locke has not only denied that persons are substances he has also denied that persons are 
identical with any one spiritual substance. There is a confusion here, for Locke also defines 
1 0 For a contrary view see Alston & Bennett (1988) p. 25ff 
11 Essay 164:29-35 (Book II, Chap XH, §3) 
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a person (in part, at least) as "a thinking intelligent Being"." 3 It would seem to be obvious 
that a soul does constitute 'a thinking intelligent Being' and so qualifies as a persoa"4 Yet 
Locke ignores this consequence. Otherwise i f a person did have more than one soul in the 
course of a life, each soul would be a person in its own right. Yet Locke does not regard 
persons as possible constructs of other smaller person-parts. Locke regards the notion of 
personal as maximal, although he does not state this explicitly anywhere (it is fair to assume 
he took the point to be too obvious to need stating). 
I f Locke does not regard individual substances as persons (unless the substance and the 
maximal person coincide) Locke cannot define persons as collections of 'personal 
substances'. This would suggest that the person would instead have to be either a mode or a 
relation. Locke asserts that all modes and relations are "ultimately terminated in 
Substances"."5 I f persons are modes or relations, then they could not exist without 
substances. I f persons are not substances, but necessarily depend on substances they must 
be either collections of modes or a relation, or even a relation of relations or a relation of 
modes. 
Locke does not think persons are relations. It would have been simpler i f he had, for as he 
remarks "The Ideas then of Relations are capable at least of being more perfect and distinct 
in our Minds, than those of Substances.""6 However, Locke does not once claim persons 
are relations in either of the two chapters on Relation or in the chapter on personal 
identity."7 I f Locke does not regard persons as substances or relations then he might regard 
them as modes. Yet he does not explicitly claim this either. To some extent Locke did 
think of persons as collections of modes. Certainly the extension of consciousness implies a 
collection of thoughts. Thoughts are modes of substances, and Locke even famously allows 
that thought, although mostly likely a mode of the soul, God might "superadd""8 to body. 
Hence Locke could see a series of thoughts being supported by any series of substances, 
whether solely spiritual, solely material, or most likely a combination of the two. In this 
Locke accepts a Compositional Account of Man 
It might be objected that to talk of a collection of modes is to talk of a way modes are 
related. Certainly the Neo-Humeans, and many Neo-Lockeans, believe that providing a 
See discussion in §V of this chapter. 
115 Essay 335:10-11 (Book II, Chap XXVII, §9) 
1 1 4 Although, as is argued in §JU below the role of body may well preclude this. 
Essay 329:25-26 (Book JJ, Chap XXVII, §2) 
116 Essay 322 (Book II, Chap XXV, §8) 
'"Essay 319-348 (Book JJ, ChapsXXV-XXVU) 
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criterion of personal identity is the task of explaining what relation unites a person over 
time. Consciousness is the name Locke gives to the union of thoughts that make up a 
person " [ f j o r since consciousness always accompanies thinking... in this alone consists 
personal Identity".119 Locke never calls consciousness a relation. The reason for this can be 
found in Locke's definition of relation; "there can be no Relation, but betwixt two Things, 
considered as two Things, either in themselves really separate, or considered as distinct, and 
then a ground or occasion for their comparison."120 Relation can only occur i f two things are 
really distinct or we regard one thing in two ways such as to afford a comparison. Nothing 
truly identical, for example a person, could be united by relation, for this would mean that 
its temporally separated parts are really distinct, which is contrary to its identity. Of course, 
Locke allows that we can compare the same thing at two different times and suggest a 
relation between these observations. However, that is a different matter.121 This is how 
Locke explains our knowledge of the identity of animals and vegetables through causal 
changes (cause and effect being a relation). We observe a relation between their parts and 
changes in size over time, and this reveals the 'operation' that constitutes animals' and 
vegetables' identical lives.1 2 2 
Locke does call modes things on occasion. Consciousness could then be seen as genuinely 
a relation amongst distinct things. This is the very road Hume is to go down.1 2 3 However, 
Locke upholds an account of identity that makes it very unlikely that he would hold such an 
account of personal identity. Consciousness is introduced because Locke needs a way to 
unite modes into persons that neither makes persons quasi-substantial entities nor is a 
relation. Locke emphasises the similarities between an animal life and a person's 
consciousness. This comparison needs to be taken at face value. Locke conceived 
consciousness to be directly comparable to an animal life, and describes neither in causal 
terms. An animal life arises as a consequence of a certain aggregation of matter. Similarly 
a person is an aggregation of certain states in a thinking being. Locke is more interested in 
the fact of this aggregation than its cause. Further, as just discussed, Locke uses the notion 
of animal and vegetable identity to ground observations of cause and effect. 
It would appear therefore that Locke is not, as regards personal identity at least, a Lockean 
at all. He does not regard persons as either modes or relations. This is clear enough from 
1,8 Essay 541:4 (Book IV, Chap ED, §6) 
119 Essay 335 (Book H, Chap XXVII, §9) 
120 Essay 321 (Book II, Chap XXV, §6) 
121 Essay 328:4-6 (Book II, Chap XXVI, §1) 
122 Essay 324-5 (Book II, Chap XXVI, §1-2) 
1 2 3 See next chapter §§II, & IV-VI 
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the above discussion. Locke also doesn't think persons are substances. A l l he means to 
exclude by this is a pure Cartesian notion of substance, that is a mind or portion of matter 
identical in its own terms. To claim this Locke would have to know what sort of substance 
persons are. The very point of Locke's discussion is that the true nature of substances 
cannot be known well enough to equate any substance with a person. This, combined with 
Locke's desire to provide an account of personal identity where persons can be perfectly 
known, untainted by metaphysical vagary, obviously precludes claiming that persons are 
substances. 
What then does Locke think persons are? He thinks they are quasi-substantial compounds, 
that is they contain substance, but cannot be known certainly to be pure substances. He 
makes this clear in his conclusions 
[W]hatever Substance begins to exist, it must, during its Existence, necessarily 
be the same: Whatever Compositions of Substances begin to exist, during the 
union of those Substances, the concrete must be the same: Whatsoever Mode 
begins to exist, during its Existence, it is the same: And so i f the Composition 
be of distinct Substances, and different Modes, the same Rule holds.124 
Locke's account of personal identity is one of how these compound existences are held 
together. Having established the sort of relation Locke thinks persons have to substances 
his general theory of substance can be more closely evaluated. There is one more point that 
needs emphasising before continuing. A l l writers are clear that Locke distinguishes 
between an animal and the mass of matter that makes it up at any one time. Yet there is less 
consensus as to what constitutes the similar reciprocal term for Person. Person could be 
contrasted with substance, matter or spirit. None of these is obviously satisfactory. 
However, there is a further candidate that has been overlooked. Traditionally Locke is also 
taken to use Self and Person as synonyms. In fact Locke used these two terms to express 
the relation between a person and what constitutes that person at any one time. The 
argument for this claim wi l l be made later, but for the moment the reader should be warned 
to be vigilant for this possibility. 
124 Essay 347:33-35, 348:1-4 (Book II, Chap XXVH, §28) 
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I I 
L O C K E ON SUBSTANCE & IDENTITY 
Locke's account of substance is a complex one. This complexity arises because Locke 
combines apparently Cartesian and Aristotelian themes with his own empiricism despite the 
lack of easy compatibility and his opposition to both philosophies.123 Locke adopts the 
notion that things have a 'shared organisation of parts' and that this can provide a criterion 
of identity. Yet this identity is not substantial identity as it would be for an Aristotelian. 
Identity of substance concerns only aggregates of Cartesian substances, i.e. thinking 
substance and physical matter. Into this inherent conflict is born Locke's account of 
personal identity. The problem, therefore, is to determine what led Locke to adopt such a 
mixed account of identity criteria and what mistakes it leads him into. 
Locke outlines a strikingly Cartesian list of possible substances "We have the ideas of but 
three sorts of substances: 1. God. 2. Finite Intelligences. 3. Bodies."126 Locke, like 
Descartes, regards the identity of God as being indubitable, and gives only two sentences to 
the issue.12' Locke does not seem aware of the difficulties the rest of his account creates for 
him. To hold a corpuscular view in combination with there being three sorts of substance 
commits Locke to one of the following. First, there might be two types of corpuscular 
matter, spiritual and material. Or second, a substratum below all other substances forms 
both spiritual and material bodies, a sort of neutral monism. Locke is arguably sympathetic 
to both. He does seem to talk of substance as a substratum128 and appears to talk of the 
possibility of particles of matter themselves gaining and losing parts.12' He also talks as if 
1 2 3 For an insightful history of Locke's rejection of Aristotelian and Scholastic doctrines see McCann (1987). 
126 Essay 329:1-2 (Book II, Chap XXVTI, §2) 
12' Essay 329:2-4 (Book II, Chap XXVII, §2) 
1 1 8 Alexander (1980) and (1981) 
129 Essay 329:8-9 (Book II, Chap XXVTI, §2) If we take Locke to equate particle and atom here this result is 
strange. Locke could mean by particle a mass of matter, in which case his choice of words is strange, given the 
technical uses he puts particle and mass to elsewhere. If he does distinguish, so that particle should mean atom 
then he is committed to a substratum view, so that atoms can have different compositions. This would run 
against the obvious understanding and use Locke puts atoms to. Locke may mean that a particle of matter 
remains the same as long as it is not subsumed into a larger mass. However, it is not clear how an atom could 
lose its identity in this way, if it is a true simple. Again this can only be made sense of if there is a substratum 
and atoms can contain different amounts of matter. Mostly likely Locke uses 'particle of matter' to mean 'part 
of matter'. This Cartesian usage best captures Locke's intentions. However, it is not an atomistic use. So this 
clashes with Locke's later claim about the jumbling of atoms not changing the identity of a mass in §3 though 
this passage is ambiguous. Locke's phrase is "let the parts be never so differently jumbled". Locke is often 
taken to mean that arrangement is not important to a masses identity, but the 'never' could be read as meaning 
the opposite of this. This returns to the original difficulty. If Locke here doesn't mean atom when he writes 
part men maybe the jumbling is of the gross parts of a body, not its constituent atoms. Clearly there is either a 
delicacy in Locke's usage here that has not been widely commented on, or he is inconsistent in his use of 
language in these passages. McCann notes some of this difficulty (McCann 1987, p. 61) and comments that the 
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souls are constituted of parts in a manner analogous to material bodies, and therefore 
seemingly of spiritual as well as material atoms. Here, as throughout his account of 
substance, Locke is caught between the Cartesian attack on Scholasticism, to which he is 
sympathetic, and the more radical corpuscular mechanics of his scientific fellows. Locke's 
general position, though, is a pragmatic one. Matter is the substratum we presume to 
explain material objects, spirit the substratum we presume to explain thought.13'1 However, 
all this aside, the real issue is to provide criteria of identity for finite intelligences and 
bodies. 
The identity of both finite intelligences and material particles consists in the fact that each 
has a "determinate time and place of beginning to exist, the relation to that time and place 
will always determine to each of them Its identity, as long as it exists."131 This solution is 
typical of Locke. It allows him to leave questions about the nature of substance untouched 
and still provide a robust theoretical framework. Locke believes that anything that can be 
said to have a beginning (although not necessarily an end) can have its identity fixed by that 
beginning in time. This principle can be extended to concretes and compounds which 
remain identical as long as they remain so composed.131 
This has two implications for personal identity. First, persons can be accounted for without 
a full account of substance. Secondly, although having a beginning means an identical 
entity exists, it does not imply that informative non-circular criteria can be given for that 
object's constitution. 
difficulty is unimportant to Locke's wider claim that coherent spatio-temporal bodies are identical. This fits 
well with the Lockean tactic of side-stepping more complex issues by emphasising a level of importance 
untouched by underlying debates. The final resolution of Locke's meaning in this passage can be left to others. 
It is possible that Locke wants to dress his theory in the colours of contemporary science but doesn't entirely 
manage. This is a not uncommon fate for philosophers. 
130 Essay 297:24-36,298:1-10 (Book II, Chap XXIII, §5) 
131 Essay 329:5-7 (Book II, Chap XXVII, §2) If two things are formed by the splitting of one thing, they might 
both reasonably be said to have the same beginning. Amoebas do not provide such an example, because their 
splitting is clearly spatially if not temporally distinct. That is to say, it is clear which part of the previous whole 
has become each of the two new independent wholes. However, at a sub-atomic level two smaller atoms might 
be created from a larger atom in such a way that their was no question of spatial distinction prior to the split. 
The parts were mixed and until the point of the split could have belonged to either of the new atoms. This 
contrasts with the amoeba case where there is a clear pre-figuring of the division. Sub-atomic particles do not 
seem to exhibit this sort of ordered division. Until the division an electron could end up in either new atom 
Although this may not be an accurate representation of chemical physics, there is a philosophical problem that 
arises when one considers the possibility of separating mixtures. Of course, this depends on how strong one 
feels the identity conditions of mixtures are, and whether or not they represent co-incident objects. A mixture 
of two types of powder can be regarded as either one mass, or two coinciding masses. If they are one mass and 
the two powders could be separated instantaneously the same problem would emerge. However, there is little 
reason to regard mixtures or masses of powders as anything other as aggregates, which surely have very weak 
identity conditions. For an alternative view, taking mixtures and aggregates to have more metaphysical weight 
see Simons (1987) §6.2, pp. 218-21 and §6 in general. 
132 Essay 347:33-348:4 (Book n, Chap XXVII, §28) quoted at the end of §1, above. 
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Nonetheless Locke also states that physical matter consists of atoms. In his atomism Locke 
follows the corpuscular mechanism of his day and assumes that atoms are finite and 
indivisible. Material substantial identity for Locke is derived from the identity of simples. 
The identity of thinking substance Locke says nothing about, feeling it is even more obscure 
in its nature than matter. As for modes, as each mode must terminate in a substance it will 
be the same as long as it persists in one substance. The exception to this is modes that are 
necessarily momentary. These, perishing as they begin, are necessarily diverse. Locke 
brings our attention to "things whose Existence is in succession, such as are the Actions of 
finite Beings, v.g. Motion and Thought, both which consist in a continued train of 
Succession."1" As memories are presumably examples of thoughts, the clear implication is 
that each memory must belong to some substance. This will be significant later. Locke's 
statement that thoughts are necessarily diverse and exist as successions is under discussed in 
the literature. It has obvious ramifications for the kind of psychological account one can 
construct from Locke. It is also a fascinating pre-figuring of Hume's advances on Locke's 
theory."4 Further it impinges on Locke's views on whether the soul can be said to always 
think. This is discussed below in §m. 
As discussed in the previous chapter Descartes' account of individuation is somewhat 
jejune. Descartes believed that living bodies are machines. Yet material substance should 
minimally be described in terms of extension in space. The pure Cartesian project of 
material description in terms of extension is deeply inadequate for individuating objects. 
Broadly Descartes' difficulty arises because mechanic description supplants the Scholastic 
notion of substance but cannot offer a substitute principle of individuation. This paucity of 
explanation combined with a desire to avoid a lapse into scholasticism may have been 
among Molyneux's motivations in urging Locke that the Essay needed an account of the 
Principium Individuations to be complete in its account of "metaphysick and logick".133 
Locke's adoption of simples as paradigmatically identical leads him in an obvious direction. 
Aggregates and compound substances should be regarded as identical as long as they 
change none of their parts "the Mass, consisting of the same Atoms, must be the same 
133 Essay 329:28-30 (Book II, Chap XXVII, §2) 
1 3 4 Hume believes identity to be a relation between unity and diversity. If, like Locke, one assumes that 
thoughts are necessarily diverse, and, like Locke, one wishes to preserve the notion of the person being the 
same, one would seem to inevitably have to arrive at an account of mental identity akin to Hume's. This will 
be fully discussed in the next chapter, esp. §§II & V. 
1 3 3 See Molyneux's letter to Locke, 2nd March 1693 p. 650, Letter 1609, Vol. IV in Locke (1979) 
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Mass, or the same Body, let the parts be never so differently jumbled."136 However, Locke 
goes on for "Tis not... Unity of Substance that comprehends all sorts of Identity, or will 
determine it in every Case".1" 
Substantial identity, understood as unity of particles or the unity of mind, must be 
supplemented for "In the state of living Creatures, their Identity depends not on a Mass of 
the same Particles, but on something else.""8 This 'something else' in plants is "such an 
Organisation of Parts in one coherent Body, partaking of one Common Life". 1 3 ' Locke says 
further that "[t]he Case is not so different in Brutes".140 Indeed Locke sees no difference 
between the identity of plants and animals. In both cases identity consists in partaking in 
the same life. The section 'Identity of Animals'"" only adds a distinction between artefacts 
and living organisms. In a nod towards the mechanistic analysis of the Cartesians Locke 
likens the organisation of parts in an animal's body to those of a watch. The only difference 
is that "in an Animal the fitness of the Organisation, and the Motion wherein Life consists, 
begin together, the Motion coming from within; but in Machines the force, coming sensibly 
from without, is often away, when the Organ is in order, and well fitted to receive it." 1 4 2 
Here Locke echoes the principle that Descartes had appealed to in his account of substance, 
that of independence. An animal could be conceived of separately, its motion coming from 
within. This is not true of an artificial machine, which would need a maker to provide 
motion from without.143 
Locke is clear that neither animal nor vegetable identity is substantial identity. Yet this is 
not the entire picture. Locke suggests that there are only three sorts or kinds of substance; 
l3<i Essay 330:16-18 (Book II, Chap XXVII, §3). As discussed above in note 131 previously Locke's exact 
meaning is not clear here. Ayers has made much of Locke's failure to realise that a mass of matter can endure 
as long as its parts are changed in a regulated fashion (Ayers 1981). In defending Locke against this charge 
this passage is crucial. Clearly Locke allows that an animal or vegetable life is one type of regulated change. 
However, if he means by 'never so jumbled' a limited change, he appears to accept Ayers' point. If he means 
any arrangement of the same simples is the same mass, then Ayers' objection has weight. See note 131 above. 
Essay 332:23-24 (Book II, Chap XXVII, §7) 
138 Essay 330:20-22 (Book II, Chap XXVII, §3) 
139 Essay 331:4-5 (Book II, Chap XXVH, §4) Locke's insistence on plants being 'one coherent body' might be 
too strong a condition, as some plant species arguably remain as coherent bodies while in fact containing 
different individual plants. 
140 Essay 331:19 (Book II, Chap XXVII, §5) 
141 Essay 331:19-33 (Book II, Chap XXVII, §5) 
141 Essay 331:29-33 (Book II, Chap XXVII, §5) Locke's use of watches as an example of a substance is clearly 
based on an informed knowledge of the working of timepieces. See Essay 463:14-36, 464:1-22 (Book HI, Chap 
VI, §39). Locke's insistence on the watches parts being in fit order to receive motion from without tells against 
those who believe Locke believes in intermittent objects. If the watch was taken apart it would presumably not 
be in fit order, and would have gone out of existence. For a view that interprets Locke as holding that objects 
can have intermittent existence see Hoffman (1980) 
1 4 3 Locke's account meets problems when trying to separate individual animals in a species. Each individual is 
bom of a parent, and was at some point a part of that parent. The motion that the parent passes to a newly 
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finite intelligences, bodies and God. These are 'pure' substantial kinds. This does not 
preclude the possibility of either sub-sorts of substances or compound or mixed substances. 
I f this is the case, objects like animals and vegetables can also be substances. Locke does 
make reference to the union of substances, commenting "during the union of those 
Substances, the concrete must be the same".1*' This decidedly Cartesian distinction between 
substances and their compounds ('the concrete') puts Locke in a similar position to 
Descartes. Animals and Vegetables both are and are not substances. Naturally, Locke does 
not develop as careful a defence of this position as Descartes does, because Locke has an 
entirely different apparatus for explaining knowledge of substance and their possible 
unions. Nonetheless it would be useful to settle whether Locke treats animals and 
vegetables as substances, or mere concretes, or, i f the matter is obscure, whether it is safe to 
put it aside. 
McCann persuasively demonstrates that Locke wished to avoid introducing substantial form 
in an explanatory role."" Scholastic doctrine"16 suggests that substantial form is not just the 
organisation of matter, but a real part of the thing it constitutes. Locke, in line with Boyle, 
wishes to'claim that a plant is no more than theTnatter that is'organised thereinr Hence 
Locke's reluctance to call individual concretes substances. To do so would seem to 
concede that some further entity was present. Locke instead adheres to the Cartesian 
attribute version of substance. Noonan, therefore, is wrong to state that "something like 
Aristotle's substantial form holds a prominent place in [Locke's] thought, at least with 
respect to living creatures.""" Although Locke is looking for a suitable replacement what he 
is looking for is quite unlike the Aristotelian or Scholastic conception. Of course, Locke 
might be mistaken in assuming that a difference of position is possible. A Lockean life 
unites parcels of matter, and Locke does not rise to the complexities such a position throws 
up. However, Locke is clear that "animal Identity is preserved in Identity of Life, and not 
of Substance."148 The tension in Locke's position goes back to the very origins of the Essay. 
In Draft A he comments that it would be nonsensical "that a fortuitous concourse of attoms 
unguided by an understanding should frequently constitute the bodys of any species of 
conceived embryo is essential to its corning into being, but this point when this stops being 'from without' and 
can be said to be 'from within' cannot always be easily pinpointed in a non-arbitrary fashion. 
144 Essay 347:35,348:1 (Book II, Chap XXVH, §28) 
1 4 5 McCann (1987) pp. 55-57. 
1 4 6 Obvious different writers conceived the problem differently, but broadly speaking there is an emergent 
shared doctrine. 
1 4 7 Noonan (1978a) p. 344 
148 Essay 337:17-18 (Book II, Chap XVH, §12) Locke concedes that the term life can be prone to ambiguity at 
Essay 503:27-35 (Book m, Chap X, §22) 
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animals".149 Here, though, Locke finds himself appealing to something beyond material 
constitution to justify mere masses not being animals. Locke is engaged in a struggle to 
avoid appealing to Aristotelian Form, while avoiding the problems of outright materialism. 
This is a difficult mid-ground to hold, and Locke's notion of Being may not succeed. 
Indeed the frequent empiricist reliance on existence to ground individuation is reminiscent 
of Scholastic haecceity.130 Nonetheless, the broad aim and its impact on Locke's thinking 
can be appreciated without having to settle details. 
For the above reasons some commentators131 have suggested that Locke employs a thesis of 
relative identity.132 Locke allows that something could be the same animal but a different 
body. Noonan insists that "what is noteworthy is the total absence in Locke of inferences 
made by way of the principle that i f all Fs are Gs then the same F is always the same G".131 
Locke's continued treatment of both vegetables and animals as things promotes this view. 
Locke claims identity consists in sameness of life. This has to be made consistent with 
Locke's scepticism about substance. Although we can observe that the sameness of an oak 
does consist in its ability to take up new particles and organise them, this process cannot be 
completely known. Thus experience can only teach us that sameness of substance and 
sameness of vegetable or animal life are distinct. Locke does not believe that detailed 
knowledge about identity of life is available. Hence he cannot close the gap between 
material substance and lives. Locke's doubts about possible knowledge of substances leave 
him caught between two stools. On the one hand he cannot except an Aristotelian notion of 
substance as he holds we cannot know enough about natural kinds. On the other hand he 
cannot accept the Cartesian Rationalism that would appeal to the laws of mechanics to 
complete the explicatory power of material substance. Yet, experience clearly does teach us 
that material bodies are distinct in their identity from vegetable and animal lives. Locke, 
therefore, ends accepting both as simultaneously valid accounts of identity. The price of 
this is that (probably despite Locke's intentions) he does not class plants and animals as 
substantial things. They are, nonetheless, Beings, in the sense Locke gives Being to mean 
'an existence'. Each has a beginning, and this is all that a being needs to be an identical 
existence. 
Draft A, §42 p. 74 
1 3 0 SeeThiel (1998a) 
1 3 1 See Mackie (1976) and Noonan (1978a), Griffin (1977), Geach (1968). See Chappell (1989) for a survey of 
the debate. 
1 3 2 The modem source of this debate is to be found in Geach (1962) and (1968). Sympathetic arguments can be 
found in Quine (1948) and (1958b). For extensive (and convincing) argument against relative identity see 
Lowe (1989c). 
1 3 5 Noonan (1978a) pg. 346 
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However, Locke's insistence that masses of matter and Lockean lives are distinct does 
provide an answer to those who claim Locke is a relativist as regards identity. I f something 
is an F and a G and the F and the G constitute different things at all times, then there is no 
question of relative identity, only of coincidence. Locke does maintain the thesis of sortal 
dependency, indeed the term sortal is Locke's. However, sortal dependency is not relative 
identity.134. Locke's main thesis about identity is that existence itself accounts for identity, 
and each existence is individuated by its origin. Therefore a succession of things can be 
coincident with another kind of thing, but this is not identity. Masses of matter are unstable 
for. Lockej incapable of surviving the loss or addition of any amount of matter. Masses are 
defined in almost complete opposition to Lockean lives, which are defined as things that 
can survive the addition of amounts of matter. Even for the time a mass of matter remains 
unchanged while in coincidence with an animal life it is not identical with that animal, 
because the two things have different histories, one having come into existence after the 
other. The only time the mass and the animal might be thought to be identical is when the 
animal first comes into existence. This, however, is only illusory. 
"A i^mals are not generated fTom nothingr Aithough-me^rocess is unclear,-at some point a 
mass of matter becomes organised such as to constitute an animal. The animal and the mass 
appear to not only coincide but be identical i f a change to the mass brings the animal into 
existence. Then, briefly, the mass' and the animal's constituent parts have the same 
histories. However, only the .animal can survive the addition or subtraction of parts. Even 
at this initial moment of genesis this serves to immediately distinguish the animal from the 
mass. Should the animal come into existence with no addition or subtraction to the mass, 
then even this is not true, because the mass exists prior to the animal.135 
1 3 4 Sortal Dependency is the claim that ah identity statement is incomplete without a. sortal term. That is to 
assert 4a=b''is meaningless unless one can say a is the same F as b; Lowe (1989)'claims Sortal Dependency is 
essential while defendinga non-relative account of identity. Forargumentsiabouttrie worthofSortal 
Dependency see Ayers (1974) and Alston & Bennett (1984). 
1 3 5 This defence of Locke is a development of that given in Chappell (1989)r The possibilityof one moment of 
coincidence collapsing into identity might be regarded by some as fatal to a coincidence account of objects. As 
I do not wish to defend such an account, and believe it can be shown to be undesirable without developing such 
an argument, I leave its development to others. If one wishes to deny coincidence there are other difficulties 
about how animals come into existence which have to be faced. In Draft A Locke writes that "the two Ideas 
are not exactly one & the same but in the understanding as distinct as the Ideas of one & two white & black or 
as of body & man" §27, p. 46. Locke seems to be suggesting that the distinction between man and body isonly 
a'distinction of reason. However, if he is adopting the scholastic terrh his other examples are curious, neither 
being obviously a mere distinction of reason. 
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Suffice to say Locke's apparent adherence to the doctrine of coinciding objects is not to be 
applauded.'" Nonetheless, it is the position Locke adopted, and it is important to be clear 
that he held it in a manner incompatible with relative identity. Relative identity theorists 
who mistake Locke as one of their own do so for various reasons. Relative identity is 
associated with an attack on the coherence of the notion of objects as the most natural and 
primitive parts of any ontology. As such it is the last blow in a campaign started by Locke 
against the notion of substance. But Locke believed in substance, and he believed in 
objects. Hence Locke had no need for relative identity. Locke did adopt sortal dependency. 
However, Locke did this to explain the gap between our empirical knowledge and the 
nature of things. To claim we understand things only because we have an idea of them is a 
very different from claiming that things only exist as they do because of our ideas of them. 
Relative identity is a doctrine for the philosophically extreme, and Locke, curious as his 
philosophy might be at times, is not one of these extremists.1" 
It is normally assumed Locke hoped by settling the issues of vegetable and animal identity 
he could easily settle the question of Man's identity as merely a special case of animal 
identity. However, Locke's notion of Man is not nearly as straightforward as he intended. 
In the Second Edition of the Essay Locke discusses the definition of Man, introducing the 
famous example of the rational parrot. The place of this argument is discussed in §IV. 
However, Locke's philosophical journey to this mature position is a long, fascinating and 
revealing one. This is the subject of §ITJ. 
1 5 6 For contemporary arguments in favour of coincidence see Lowe (1983a) & (1995). For replies, responses 
and alternatives see Burke (1992), (1994a), (1997a) & (1997b) as well as Doepke (1982), Simons (1985) and 
(1986), Noonan (1985) and finally Zimmerman (1995) & (1997). 
Locke's use of compound substances may mean he does not hold a theory of coincident objects. 
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Il l 
L O C K E ' S NOTION O F MAN 1" 
Having discussed the notion of identity (§1-3), and then vegetables (§4) and brutes (§5), 
Locke proceeds to discuss "wherein the Identity of the same Man consists; viz. in nothing 
but a participation of the same continued Life, by constantly fleeting Particles of Matter, in 
succession vitally united to the same organised Body."15' Locke then makes a strong case 
for placing identity of the Man solely in the identity of the Animal for 
He that shall place the Identity of Man in any thing else, but like that of other 
Animals in one fitly organised Body taken in any one instant, and from thence 
continued under one Organisation of Life in several successively fleeting 
Particles of Matter, united to it, will find it hard, to make an Embryo, one of 
Years, mad, and sober, the same Man, by any Supposition, that will not make it 
possible for Seth, Ismael, Socrates, Pilate, St. Austin, and Coesar Borgia to be 
the same Man. For i f the Identity of Soul alone makes the same Man, and there 
be nothing in the Nature of Matter, why the same individual Spirit may not be 
united to different Bodies, it will be possible, that those Men, living in distant 
Ages, and of different Tempers, may have been the same Man[.]1 6 0 
Locke has two competing accounts of Man in his sights. One is the Aristotelian notion of 
Man that defines a man as 'a rational animal'.141 The second is the Cartesian account that 
defines Man as a unit of mind and body, a fusion of thinking and extended substance, that is 
the Compositional Account. 
Locke's queries with the notion of Man date back to the earliest draft of the Essay. Locke 
notes that a child might "call a Negro a devil rather then a man & at the same time call a 
dryl a man."1" He explains: 
1 5 8 Unfortunate as Locke's choice of the word 'Man' is I have followed his usage to avoid confusion in exegesis 
and also because it is not possible to substitute any phrase without settling the very issue under investigation 
(obviously substituting 'person' would be disastrous, and 'human being' is confused by Locke's technical use 
of being. 'Human animal' might be acceptable, but this would prejudge which aspects of humans Locke 
thought were animal). 
139 Essay 331:34-5, 332:1-2 (Book II, Chap XXVTI, §6) 
160 Essay 332:2-14 (Book n, Chap XXVTI, §6) There being 'nothing in the Nature of Matter' preventing union 
to a different soul runs against Descartes' appeal to the body being the best fit for a soul, if this means a best fit 
to the individual soul the body is in union with. 
1 4 1 Locke attributes the definition animal rationale to Aristotle and the lengthier animal implume bipes latis 
unguibus to Plato. 
1 6 1 Draft A, §2 p. 9. 'Dryl' or 'Drill' is a term current in the 17th Century for a Baboon or any larger African 
monkey, a use maintained in the less obsolete term Mandrill. This example is repeated at §27, p. 48. Other 
relevant passages in Draft A not discussed here are: Man used as an example at §3, p. 12; Rationality is only 
part of the idea of man "not the knowledg of things existing in rerum nature" §13, p. 27/8; "body, sense & 
motion" alternative definition of man §29, p. 55; some men more different to each other than some men to 
beasts §41, p. 69. 
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for even that species which we may supposd to know best and cal man is not 
soe readily distinguished from beast or to speake more properly it is but very 
uncertainely or significantly yet determind what those number of qualitys are 
which togeather are signified by the word man, whereof when any of them are 
wanting the thing wherein they are wanting is not to be cald man.163 
In this early version Locke does attempt to list the qualities that go together to make the 
idea of Man: 
when instructed by the observation of my senses I have framd the Idea of a man 
i.e. have put togeather these following Ideas v.g. 1° A face usual to that species 
which though consisting of many particular Ideas for brevitys sake & the thing 
being obvious I take for one. 2° Two hands with five fingers on each. 3° Two 
legs. 4° Upright posture. 5° Living. 6° A power of laughing. 7° A power of 
speakeing. 8° Of reasoning i.e. knowing the consequence of words or 
propositions one to another. 9° of judging i.e. guesse at the truth of words or 
being of things.'64 
Clearly this list has it problems. 1 is blatantly circular and 2 & 3 clearly not essential. 4 is 
still important in defining the species of Homo Sapiens but crawling men are still men. 6 is 
derived from the same school of Greek and scholastic definitions as 'rational animal' and 
'featherless bipeds' and just as bad. 7 is favoured by the Cartesians. As already noted by 
the time of the Essay proper Locke has rounded on such definitions. Only 5, 8 and 9 need 
to be taken seriously. I f Locke is not yet ready to condemn the former group he is aware of 
the difficulties that await. He continues: 
I say when I have put all these 9 Ideas together & thereof in my minde framd 
the Idea which I call a man I cannot thereby certainly know that where any 8 of 
those 9 realy exist togeather that there the 9 t h is necessarily also (at least i f we 
except the 5 t h Life which is not the specific Idea wherby I know man. or 
destinguish him from other things,) For when I say a man is rational or hath the 
power of reasoning, it hath one of these two meanings 1° either that the power 
of reasoning belongs to or is included in that Idea which I have framd & call 
man, & then the proposition is certainly true & is only verbal & reaches noe 
farther then my owne Ideas & words or names I apply to them 2° or that where 
the 7 foregoing Ideas meet togeather there this 8 t h [and 9th?] is certainly also, & 
then the proposition is real i.e. of things existing realy without my minde but is 
not certainly true...163 
'"Draft A, §2 p. 9/10 
1 6 4 Draft A, §13, p. 28 Locke seems confused over his numbering and despite various crossings out and 
corrections does not seem to arrive at a consistent scheme. 1 have done my best to iron out the numbering 
consistent with the intended meaning. 
1 6 3 Draft A, §13, p. 28/9 
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Although Locke cites the various qualities uncritically, the problem of the shape of man 
guaranteeing reason is already present. Locke notes later that the shape of man does not 
imply the existence of a soul1" and largely repeats the arguments above while becoming 
more critical. Locke urges that some "rational men" he knows "may demonstrate that 
infants, changelings & maniacs are noe men".167 Some might allow that a dumb creature is a 
man, others insist on the power of speech. Some may even neglect all aspects of shape and 
allow "quadrupes" or animals or any shape as long as they "found speech and reason 
joynd".168 He concludes that all this confusion should be put to one side in favour of what is 
sure about substance. Definition "is noe very material question to our present 
purpose... [for] of such a complex Idea it is certain that What is is.""" Locke prefers to 
assert that the existence of individual substances is certain, however impoverished our 
definitions might turn out to be. This is the emergence of the role Being is to take in the 
mature Essay. 
In Book HI, Chapter XI , §16 'Morality Capable of Demonstration'170 Locke considers the 
inadequacy of definitions of Man in discussions of morality. 
Upon this ground it is, that I am bold to think, that Morality is capable of 
Demonstration, as well as Mathematicks: Since the precise real Essence of the 
Things moral Words stand for, may be perfectly known; and so the Congruity, 
or Incongruity of the Things themselves, be certainly discovered, in which 
consists perfect Knowledge. Nor let any one object, that the names of 
Substances are often to be made use of in Morality as well as those of Modes, 
from which will arise Obscurity. For as to Substances, when concerned in 
moral Discourses, their divers Natures are not so much inquired into as 
supposed; v.g. when we say that Man is subject to Law: We mean nothing by 
Man but a corporeal rational Creature: What the real Essence or other Qualities 
of that Creature are in this Case no way considered. And, therefore, whether a 
Child or Changeling be a Man in a physical Sense, may amongst the Naturalists 
be as disputable as it will, it concerns not at all the moral Man, as I may call 
him, which is this immovable, unchangeable Idea, a corporeal rational Being. 
For were there a Monkey or any other Creature to be found that has the use of 
Reason to such a degree, as to be able to understand general Signs, and to 
deduce consequences about general Ideas, he would no doubt be subject to 
Law, and, in that Sense, be aMan, how much soever he differ'd in Shape from 
others of that Name. The Names of Substances, i f they be used in them as they 
should, can no more disturb Moral, than they do Mathematical Discourses: 
Where, i f the Mathematician speaks of a Cube or Globe of Gold, or of any 
1 6 6 Draft A, §27, p. 48 
6 7 Draft A, §27, p. 49 
1 6 8 Draft A, §27, p. 49 
1 6 9 Draft A, §27, p. 49 
170 Essay 516:21-517:11 
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other Body, he has his clear setled Idea, which varies not, though it may, by 
mistake, be applied to a particular Body to which it belongs not.171 
In this passage Locke tries to pull apart the same notions that he explores in the Second 
Edition discussion of the rational parrot. Locke insists that in some discourses not all 
aspects of a substance are relevant, we need not always know its 'real essence'. Hence the 
definition given to a Man varies with our concern. Locke notes that physical deformity or 
immaturity is claimed by some to exclude children and changelings from being men.1" 
This, however, 'concerns not the moral man', which is 'this immovable, unchangeable idea' 
of 'a corporeal rational being'. That the moral man is a forerunner of Locke's notion of 
person is made clear by what follows. The Moral Man is defined by way of qualities 
exhibited. Hence anything, even a monkey, which exhibited these qualities, would 'in that 
sense be a man'. The qualities are those of reason. The moral man, however, does not need 
to be able to "consider it self as it self, the same thinking thing in different times and 
places"1" 
At this stage Locke has made a number of connections and distinctions that typify the 
account of persons, but some have yet to appear. The notion of a Moral Man is still tied to 
the notion of a Man, and to the notion of a 'corporeal thinking being'. In the second edition 
this has become "thinking intelligent Being".174 Further Locke's claim that a monkey would 
be 'in that sense a man' is entirely dismissed when Locke writes in the Rational Parrot 
section "whoever should hear a Cat or a Parrot discourse, reason, and philosophize, would 
call or think it nothing but a Cat or Parrot".™ This breaks the link with the Aristotelian 
rational animal that the Moral Man had. Locke does not exclude being corporeal, but does 
not insist upon it. 
Locke has yet to make the connection between the Moral Man and the moral agent. The 
connection to agency and moral consciousness is crucial in Locke's introduction of 
'Consciousness' and 'Person' as terms of art. At this stage moral agency is still connected 
with being a Man and seen as a defining aspect of humanity. Locke has to move to seeing 
agency as key to moral action. Agency connects to knowing one's own actions. This 
1,1 Essay 516:21-36, 517:1-11 (Book m, Chap XI, §16) 
Locke sees the failure to make an embryo and a mature man one and the same as a definite weakness, given 
his account of man. See Essay 332:7 (Book II, Chap XXVTJ, §6) 
Essay 335:11-13 (Book II, Chap XXVII, §9) For example the qualities of a unicorn can be imagined (a 
mixed mode) but never repeatedly experienced like the qualities of a horse (a nominal essence based on a real 
essence). 
174 Essay 335:10-11 (Book II, ChapXXVH, §9) 
173 Essay 333:9-10 (Book II, Chap XXVTI, §8) 
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prompts Locke to add the self-knowledge found in Consciousness to his requirements for 
being a Moral Man. It is when this final connection is broken with Man that Locke starts to 
talk of personal identity instead. 
Locke's analogy with mathematics is intriguing. In the early Essays On The Law of Nature 
Locke had entertained that a scientific proof of morals was possible."6 This intention is 
fully clear in the opening part of §16 quoted above. Although he abandoned the attempt to 
fully expound such a moral system, Locke did not abandon the idea that somehow the 
reward and punishment for moral acts did have a sure and certain footing. Hence the 
analogy with geometry. A geometrical notion is a 'settled idea, which varies not'. 
Similarly, Locke believes, the Moral Man is a way of conceiving of a Man in a manner 
'which varies not'. I f we understand what the Moral Man is, then we will properly 
understand how to settle issues of personal identity and moral blameworthiness and 
'substances ... can no more disturb moral... discourses'. 
The entirety of Locke's concerns with personal identity are formatively captured in this 
passage. All that is to change in the Second Edition is that Locke runs through all the ways 
that substances might upset our understanding of the Moral Man, and that Locke 
supplements the moral aspect with a legal and forensic gloss. 
Locke's reasons for believing that an account of Man as a natural kind cannot be complete 
are also present in much greater length in the First Edition. Indeed the classification of Man 
as a species of animal could without little exaggeration be said to obsess Locke in these 
passages.1" An extensive discussion of which qualities can be ascribed to Man occurs in 
Book in, Chapter VI , 'Of The Names of Substances'.'78 There is a complementary 
discussion in Book IV, Chapter XL 'Reality of Knowledge'.1" As these passages are rarely 
discussed it is worth surveying the different issues Locke raises. 
1 7 6 Locke (1988) p. 54#and p. 199. Compare Essay 549:12-26 (Book IV, Chap m, §18) 
1 7' The references to the definition of Man can be found at Essay 440:4-15 (Book III, Chap VI, §3), Essay 
440:27-30 (Book m, Chap VI, §4), Essay 441:5-10 (Book IJJ, Chap VI, §4), Essay 450:19-22 (Book III, Chap 
VI, §21), Essay 450:23-35,451:1-16 (Book IE, Chap VI, §22), Essay 453:13-36,454:1-21 (Book IE, Chap VI, 
§26), Essay 456:25-34 (Book HI, Chap VI, §29), Essay 460:30-36 (Book HI, Chap VI, §33), Essay 462:24 
(Book III, Chap VI, §36, Essay 464:15-22 (Book HI, Chap VI, §39), Essay 465:30-34, 466:1-6 (Book IE, Chap 
VI, §43), Essay 474:24-6 (Book EI, Chap VTE, §1), Essay 500:5-18 (Book EI, Chap X, §17), Essay 500:27 
(Book EI, Chap X, §18), Essay 502:19-24 (Book EI, Chap X, §21), Essay 516:31-36, 517:1-6 (Book EI, Chap 
XI, §16), Essay 518:33-4, 519:1-18 (Book EI, Chap XI, §20), Essay 569:8-35, 570:1-36, 571:1-36, 572:1-37, 
573:1-8 (Book IV, Chap XI, §§13-16). This list does not claim to be comprehensive. These passages are 
rarely cited although Mattem (1980) cites Essay 516:21-517:11 (Book ffl, Chap X3, § 16). Two other examples 
prepossess Locke; Gold and the internal workings of a Watch. The uses of a watch as an example may follow 
Boyle's use in The Origin of Forms and Qualities (1666, Works EI, 48-9). 
178 Essay 438:28-471:13 
179 Essay 630:12-639:8 
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Locke's wider aim in 'Of The Names of Substances' is to define and demonstrate the 
difference between nominal and real essences. This is summarised by Locke's comment 
that "Indeed, as to the real Essences of Substances, we only suppose their Being, without 
precisely knowing what they are: But that which annexes them still to the Species, is the 
nominal Essence, of which they [the real essences] are the supposed foundation and 
cause."180 Nominal essences are the collections of qualities competent language users assign 
to substances that are recognised by their language. This is possible because real essences 
are premised to underwrite this practice. The nature of real essences is impossible to 
accurately discern. However, Locke insists that qualities consistently occurring together is 
good proof that there are real essences. This grounding distinguishes nominal essences of 
substances from the more arbitrary mixed modes.'" Locke concludes "[t]his then, in short, 
is the case: Mature makes many particular Things, which do agree one with another, in 
many sensible Qualities, and probably too, in their internal frames and Constitution... " 1 8 2 
Locke also outlines his concerns with the definition of Man quite clearly: 
And I imagine, none of the Descriptions of the word Man, which we yet have, 
nor Descriptions of that sort of Animal, are so perfectancTexact, as to satisfie a 
considerate inquisitive Person; much less to obtain a general Consent, and to be 
that which Men would every where stick by, in the Decision of Cases, and 
determining of Life and Death, Baptism or no Baptism, in Productions that 
might happen.183 
Locke furnishes us with examples of the defective definitions as well as the issues he cites 
as contentious. The issue of baptism is discussed using the case of the Abbot of St. Martin 
as an example.184 The Abbot was born deformed, and "'Twas for some time under 
Deliberation, whether he should be baptised or no."183 The exclusion was based on the 
Abbot's failure to conform to the "sacred Definition of Animal Rationale""6. Locke is 
scathing of the worth of two Scholastic definitions of man, Animal Rationale and Animal 
implume bipes latis unguibus.1*7 He argues there is no reason "why a Visage somewhat 
180 Essay 442:33-7 (Book III, Chap VI, §6) 
181 Essay 455:23jf (Book III, Chap VI, §28) 
182 Essay 462:14-16 (Book m, Chap 6, §36) 
m Essay 455:16-22 (Book IU, Chap VI, §27) 
1U Essay 454:1-21 (Book ffl, Chap VI, §26) 
183 Essay 454:7 (Book III, Chap VI, §26) 
188 Essay 454:2 (Book.III, Chap VI, §26) 
187 Essay 453 :15-16 (Book HI, Chap VI, §26) These definitions are also discussed at Essay 500:5-18 (Book IE, 
Chap X, §17) where Locke ascribes the former to Aristotle and the latter to Plato. At Essay 456:25-31 (Book 
HI, Chap VI, §29) Locke attacks the Animal Rationale asking if "Balaam 's Ass has, all his Life discoursed 
rationally" why it would not be considered a rational animal, thus prefiguring the rational parrot argument. 
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longer, or a Nose flatter, or a wider Mouth could not have consisted ... with a Soul".188 
This argument is not complete, and Locke also argues for the complementary position, that 
external appearance does not imply a faculty of reason: This is a point familiar from the 
•Rational Parrot argument in 'Of Identity and Diversity.'18' Here, however, Locke adds the 
further point that it is only our nominal essence of Man that is being challenged. Locke 
asks, "Shall the difference of Hair only on the Skin, be a mark of a different internal: 
specifick Constitution between a Changeling and a Drill, when they agree in Shape, ,and 
want of Reason, and speech?""0 ^ . - -
In 'Of the Name of Substances' Locke mainly uses Man as an example of a substance that 
is variously and contrarily defined. The moral and epistemological implications are 
discussed in 'Reality of Knowledge' . The passages here are key in demonstrating why 
Locke would turn his back on the Moral Man in favour of the non-substantially and 
supposedly unequivocal status of a-person. 
Locke begins by arguing that Changelings are between Man and Beast. By Beast Locke 
means non-human animal. A Changeling is a baby supposed' by folklore to be a child 
exchanged for another at birth by fairies. The replacement child has the form of a human 
baby, but lacks rational sense.191 Loosely this matches with our notion of mental handicap. 
Locke reserves the term 'Monster' for the physically handicapped. Hence he comments 
when comparing the two "What will your drivling, unintelligent, intractable Changeling be? 
Shall a defect in the Body make a monster; a defect in the Mind (the far more Noble, and, in 
the common phrase, the far more Essential Part) not?"1" Locke reminds us that Man and 
Beast represent only nominal essences, so a further nominal essence between them supposes 
no contradiction unless one supposes that the names reflect their real essences perfectly. I f 
this were the case no species would exist between the two, but we .cannot know this to be 
the case our knowledge being restricted to nominal essences.193 This allows Locke to 
continue: 
Changelings, which is as good a word to signify something different from the 
signification of MAN or BEAST, as the Names Man and Beast are to. have 
significations different one from the other. This, well considered, would 
resolve this matter, arid shew my meaning without any more ado. But I am not 
.•"fiiay 454:17-19 (Book ni, Chap VI, §26) . 
189 Essay 334:34-5, 335:1-8 (Book II, Chap XXVII, §8) 
190 Essay 451:8-l 1 (Book III, Chap VI, §22). ' , -:,L:. . 
1 9 1 Hence Locke's comment about "some Changelings, who have lived forty years together without any 
appearance of Reason" Essay 569:14-15 (Book IV ; ChapfV, §13) 
192 Essay 571:35-6,- 572:1 -2 (Book IV, ChapJV,-§ 16) V 
193 Essay 569:8-29 (Book IV, Chap IV, §13) : ' • 
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so unacquainted with the Zeal of some Men, which enables them to spin 
Consequences, and to see Religion threatened whenever any one ventures to 
quit their Forms of Speaking, as not to foresee what Names such a Proposition 
as this is like to be charged with: And without doubt it will be asked, I f 
Changelings are something between Man and Beast, what will become of them 
in the other World? To which I answer, 1. It concerns me not to know or 
inquire. To their own Master they stand or fall.* It will make their state neither 
better nor worse, whether we determine anything or no. They are in the hands 
of a faimful Creator and a bountiful Father, who disposes not of his Creatures 
according to our narrow Thoughts or Opinions, nor distinguishes them 
according to Names and Species of our Contrivance. And we that know so 
little of this present World we are in, may, I think, content ourselves without 
being peremptory in defining the different states, which Creatures shall come 
into when they go off this stage. It may suffice us, that he hath made known to 
all those who are capable of Instruction, Discoursing, and Reasoning, that they 
shall come to an account, and receive according to what they have done in this 
Body.""4 
The tactic is typical of Locke. He condemns pedants and puritans not because of any 
weakness in their argument (although it is clear Locke has little time for their arguments) 
but by undercutting their claims. The eternal fate of every creature will be decided by 
divine wisdom, and it is both impossible and unnecessary to attempt to discover what this 
decision might be, or second-guess the criteria it will be made upon. The attack, though, 
has to be regarded as limited. Locke himself will attempt to offer an account of correct 
moral blame in the personal identity chapter. His comments about a geometrical 
demonstration of morals and ethics show that he accepts the possibility. His account is not 
based, however, on 'Names and Species of our Contrivance.' The crucial difference is that 
although knowledge of compounded things like substances must necessarily be limited 
because of their complex nature, individual simple qualities can be known more certainly. 
Locke's later account is based on Consciousness, which he feels can be certainly known. 
Locke continues to distinguish between human justice and divine justice, and is clear their 
ways of knowledge are distinct."1 Locke continues 
"The force of these men's question (viz. will you deprive Changelings of a 
future state?) is founded on one of these two Suppositions, which are both false. 
The first is, That all Things that have the outward Shape and Appearance of a 
Man, must necessarily be designed to an immortal future Being after this Life. 
Or, secondly, that whatever is of humane Birth must be so.""5 
194 Essay 569:30-35, 570:1-20 (Book IV, Chap IV, §14)' Cf. Rom. 14:4, " Cf. 2 Cor. 5:10. It is the Bible, not 
Locke, that urges an account for things 'done in this Body'. I take this to be among the passages in scripture to 
support insistence on bodily resurrection, something Locke nods towards at Essay 340:4-7 (Book II, Chap 
XXVII, §15) 
195 Essay 343:38,344:1 (Book II, Chap XXVII, §22) 
196 Essay 570:22-27 (Book IV, Chap IV, §15) 
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Locke argues that i f outward shape were necessary to possible immortality, then anything of 
human form would have to be immortal. As this would apply to statues"7 Locke suggests 
the consequence is absurd."8 Further Locke finds it ridiculous to "place the Excellency of a 
Man more in the external Shape of his Body, than internal Perfections of his Soul"."' 
Finally, Locke rebuffs those who claim a certain shape is indicative of a soul being within. 
This would need proof, and Locke finds none. The only evidence of a soul being present is 
degree of reason, and reason is found sometimes in monsters, yet not in changelings, despite 
their shapes.200 
Locke then moves to the question of parentage.101 Locke does make considerable usage of 
the biological notion of a species. However, he is also willing to consider the possibilities 
represented by fantastical animal compounds, such as Mermaids, and winged fishes.202 
Locke's biological knowledge is often plainly wrong, for example he claims " I once saw a 
Creature, that was Issue of a Cat and a Rat, and had the plain Marks of both about i t" 2 0 3 and 
no such creature could exist. The same goes for Locke's claim that "Women have 
conceived by Drills". 2 0 4 Locke has already pointed out the stupidity of depending upon 
parentage to determine knowledge of a thing's species. I f we depended on such information 
we would have to "go to the Indies ... to know whether this be a Tiger or that Tea".205 
Clearly no such journey is necessary. Locke argues that even with parentage known one 
still arrives at borderline cases. 
For since there have been humane Foetus's produced, half Beast and half Man 
... it is possible they may be in all the variety of approaches to the one or the 
other Shape, and may have several degrees of mixtures of the likeness of a 
Man, or a brute, I would gladly know what are the precise Lineaments, which 
197 Essay 571:24-25 (Book IV, Chap IV, §15) 
198 Essay 570:27-36,571:1-7 (Book IV, Chap IV, § 15) 
199 Essay 571:8-10 (Book IV, Chap IV, §15) 
200 Essay 571:17-29 (Book IV, Chap IV, § 15) This rebuttal would put Locke at odds with Descartes' claim that 
the human body is a vessel fit to take a soul, and ideally fitted to do so by nature. This is an important 
difference between Locke and Descartes in their attitudes to the Compositional Account of human beings. 
Locke also comments at Essay 108:17-20 (Book II, Chap I, §10) "But whether the Soul be supposed to exist 
antecedent to, or coeval with, or some time after the first Rudiments of Organisation, or the beginnings of Life 
in the Body, I leave to be disputed by those, who have better thought of that matter." 
2 0 1 See also Essay 451:17-32,452:1-8 (Book HI, Chap VI, §23) for a comparable discussioa 
202 Essay 447:1 -29 (Book III, Chap VI, § 12) 
203 Essay 451:28-9 (Book HI, Chap VI, §23) Locke may have seen an African cat, some species of which have 
long rat-like snouts, and little or even no fur, giving them a very rodent like appearance. Confusions of this 
type are not uncommon in 17th Century travel literature. In 1696, De Vlamingh, for example, notes finding on 
an island off Western Australia "a kind of rat as big as a common cat, whose dung is found in abundance all 
over the island." The Quokkas of Western Australia are, in fact, marsupials. (The example is borrowed from 
Jeff William's Western Australia, Lonely Planet 1998, p. 148) 
204 Essay 451:23 (Book HI, VI, §23) 
205 Essay 452:6-8 (Book HI, Chap VI, §23) 
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according to this Hypothesis, are, or are not capable of a rational Soul to be 
joined to them.™ 
Locke feels this also means that his opponent must concede that Monsters and Changelings 
are a species between Man and Beast. Consequently guidance cannot be taken from the 
delineation of species.10' 
These examples demonstrate the centrality the notion of Man played in the composition and 
development of the Essay.1" Locke's doubts are present from the beginning. However, it is 
only as the Essay evolves that Locke realises that the attack he has placed on the notion of 
man has left him without an account of the Moral Man. The Moral Man passage is an 
interim measure, before the emergence of Locke's theory of personal identity. 
The chapter ' O f Identity & Diversity' attempts to provide a deflationary account of the 
notion of Man. The account of Man must answer to common sense, i.e. that we have an 
idea of Man we use successfully, but also not grant any inroads to the doubts Locke has 
identified. Locke is sympathetic to the notion that Man has a moral aspect and this aspect is 
what we morally judge. However, he is aware of the tensions of this account, given his own 
arguments about knowledge of substances. Further he is aware of the zeal with which some 
would use definitions of man to persecute others. Like his attack on innate ideas Locke 
finds himself obliged to attack the presupposition to avoid the ends the arguments would be 
put to. Locke presents himself with a dilemma. He might repair his account of the Moral 
Man so that uncertainties about substance both do not undermine his own account nor 
provide succour for the zealots. Alternatively he can develop an account of moral 
responsibility that does not rely on any notion of man. This is the prime motivation behind 
Locke's account of personal identity. He wishes to preserve the instincts that lead him to 
206 Essay 572:22-29 (Book IV, Chap IV, §16) The use of a slippery-slope paradox to demonstrate the notion of 
man not to depend on shape (by suggesting a small feature change, and then another, and so on) is echoed by 
Hume's suggestion that if one perception does not give us the idea of a person, then no number of perceptions 
ascribed to an animal can give one such an idea. See Hume's discussion of the oyster at Treatise 634:28-34 
(App. 7) 
207 Essay 573:1-8 (Book IV, Chap IV, §16) 
2 0 8 Curiously references to Man are almost entirely absent from Draft B with the exception of a comment at §78 
that "none of the definitions or rather descriptions of that sort of animall [Man] hath donne soe perfectly & 
exactly as to satisfie a considerate inquisitive person." (p. 185, this is extended to become Essay 455:16-22 
(Book HI, IV, §27) in the final Essay), and the repetition of the example of a child mistaking a negro for a devil 
and a drill for a man (§84, p. 192) and casual use as an example at §92, (p. 198) and §93b (p. 202). In Draft B 
Locke prefers to use swans, herons and cassowaries as examples. This disappearance might be indicative of 
both Locke's pre-occupation and confusion with the issue of Man as a substance. The difficulties with the 
issue in Draft A led him to remove the discussion from the later Draft B, but the importance of the issue led 
him to re-introduce the discussion to the complete Essay. The unpublished Draft C may reveal more of this 
development, as might an unpublished manuscript Identity of Persons dating from 1683 (Bodleian Library MS 
Locke f. 7, p. 107) alluded to by Thiel (Thiel 1998, p. 908, note 113, and bibliography). 
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believe in the Moral Man, while making his account immune to scepticism. This means 
Locke wishes to respect two strands. The Moral Man is a corporeal being regarded only in 
terms of moral culpability. Commentators have emphasised the moral strand to severe 
detriment of the corporeal strand Whatis needed is a reconstruction of Locke's theory of 
personal identity that places embodiment of the person firmly in the picture as Locke 
intended. It is simply wrong to present Locke as disregarding non-psychological aspects of 
personal identity. 
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I V 
L O C K E & T H E RATIONAL P A R R O T 0 9 
Locke's discussion of Man reappears in §8 of ' O f Identity and Diversity' 3 1 0 in the discussion 
of the rational parrot. Normally commentators treat the rational parrot argument as i f it is 
Locke's sole argument about the relation between Man and personal identity. This shows 
the dangers of concentrating on arguments in isolation from the wider text. In this case the 
effects would be miriimised i f the rational parrot argument only restated Locke's arguments 
elsewhere. It is therefore necessary to try to discern to what extent the rational parrot 
argument is a restatement of Locke's position prior to the Second Edition, and to what 
extent it is an advance on those views. If, as the previous section suggests, the personal 
identity discussion was added because of the difficulties Locke found in his discussion of 
Man one might expect the rational parrot argument to reflect this departure in Locke's 
thinking. 
Before telling the story of the talking parrot, Locke repeats his definition of an animal 
secured in §§5 & 6 and then makes the major claim of §8: 
And whatever is talked of other definitions, ingenuous observation puts it past 
doubt, that the Idea in our Minds, of which the Sound Man in our Mouths is the 
Sign, is nothing else but an Animal of such a certain Form: Since I think I may 
be confident, that whoever should see a Creature of his own Shape and Make, 
though it had no more reason all its Life, than a Cat or a Parrot, would call him 
still aMan[.]2" 
Clearly this statement repeats Locke's earlier contempt for scholastic attempts to define 
Man in terms of rationality (although we should not forget the role Locke himself gives to 
rationality in his definition of the Moral Man). This is picked up later when Locke asks 
, w Locke is often attacked for using thought-experiments. It would be reasonable to assert that there are no 
conversing parrots (although there are parrots that repeat the sounds of words parrot fashion!). Yet, Locke is 
not presenting a thought experiment. He takes himself to be presenting reliable evidence. Those who seek to 
remove thought experiments from the personal identity debate, such as Wilkes (1988), only replace the 
problem with one of interpretation, i.e. whether unusual cases really do challenge our concepts. There does not 
seem to be anything to choose between the alleged weaknesses of enquiry in thought alone, and the obscurities 
of empirical interpretation. Further, no one has ever suggested that Locke's argument fails because parrots do 
not in fact talk (although maybe someone should). In short, evidence that demands careful appraisal is no 
better a tool than a carefully conceived thought experiment For this reason I have not excluded thought 
experiments, or indulged in a lengthy discussion of their worth. What is more, if Locke had asked us to 
imagine a race of rational animus who were not human it is hard to see what would be wrong with this. 
1,0 Essay 332:35-335:8 
J" Essay 333:2-8 (Book II, Chap XXVT1, §8) 
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whether talking parrots "would not have passed for a race of rational Animals".1" However, 
Locke's claim seems to run in direct contradiction to his statements elsewhere that shape 
cannot provide any guide to the distinction between humans, changelings, monsters, drills 
and so forth. In fact Locke can be extricated from contradiction, but only at cost to the 
strength of his position. 
Although Locke has argued that Man, Changeling, and Monster represent nominal essences, 
it is also clear that he does regard Man and Beast as real essences. That is, he assumes that 
the distinction between Man and Beast is a real one, even i f our nominal essences do not 
reveal this.2 1 3 Borderline cases are not at a deep level borderline, but as nominal essences 
clearly cannot settle which real essence they fall under one should tolerate agnosticism on 
this issue. Locke's belief in a real essence of man means he thinks there is a minimal 
possible definition, and this is shape. This goes back to the Draft A list cited above, with its 
preponderance of physical characteristics. It is expressed here by the phrase 'own Shape 
and Make'. The use of the word 'Make' is revealing. Mere external shape would not be 
enough, however, 'make' suggests the inner constitution of the animal. Locke has urged 
that when the inner constitution of something is fully known, i.e. with a watch, we do go 
near to knowing something's real essence. Locke's own knowledge of medicine and 
Natural Sciences influence him to believe that biology might ultimately provide the real 
essence of Man qua animal. Ideally science wi l l be able to reveal the internal constitution 
of Man so it wi l l be as clear as the workings of a watch. 
However, Locke does not exclude rationality from his final definition of Man. He finishes 
§8 with a clear embracing of the Compositional Account. 
For I presume 'tis not the Idea of a thinking or rational Being alone, that makes 
the Idea of a. Man in most Peoples Sense; but of a Body so and so shaped joined 
to it; and i f that be the Idea of a. Man, the same successive Body not shifted all 
at once, must as well as the same immaterial Spirit go to the making of the 
same Man.2,4 
Locke's aim is not to define Man without reference to rationality. His objection is to those 
who "shall place the Identity of Man in any thing else, but like that of other Animals in one 
fitly organized Body". 2 1 3 Locke is not claiming that the definition of Man should not contain 
2,1 Essay 335:1-2 (Book II, Chap XXVII, §8) 
2 1 3 He opens Draft B by remarking "Since it is the Understanding that sets man above the rest of sensible 
beings" (Draft B, §l ,p. 101) 
2,4 Essay 335:3-8 (Book II, Chap XXVII, §8) 
213 Essay 332:2-4 (Book II, Chap XXVII, §6) emphasis added 
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reference to rationality. It would wrong just to define Man as 'a rational Being alone'."6 To 
give a Man's identity conditions one need only refer to the biological continuity of a human 
being. Giving identity in terms of immaterial substance would also have to fail. As Man is 
like other animals there would be inevitable contradiction "Unless they wi l l say, 'tis one 
immaterial Spirit, that makes the same Life in Brutes; as it is one immaterial Spirit that 
makes the same Person in Men, which the Cartesians at least wi l l not admit, for fear of 
making Brutes thinking things too:" 2" 
2 1 6 Consider also his comment that "Likewise, to say, that a rational Animal is capable of Conversation, is all 
one, as to say, a Man. But no one will say, That Rationality is capable of Conversation, because it makes not 
the whole Essence,,to which we give the Name Man:" Essay 450:19-22 (Book III, Chap VI, §21) 
211 Essay 337:24-7 (Book II, Chap XXVII, §12) 
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V 
T H E FAMOUS DEFINITION & A NEW INTERPRETATION 
Having dismissed the possibility of understanding personal identity by looking at what the 
idea of Man stands for Locke begins §9 with his famous definition: 
This being premised to find wherein personal Identity consists, we must 
consider what Person stands for; which, I think, is a thinking intelligent Being, 
that has reason and reflection, and can consider it self as it self, the same 
thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only by that 
consciousness, which is inseparable from thinking, and as it seems to me 
essential to it; It being impossible for any one to perceive, without perceiving, 
that he does perceive.218 
This is not the totality of Locke's definition, although it is often taken to be.2" The 
definition is qualified throughout Chapter XXVTI. Uncovering these qualifications and 
development and influences elsewhere in the Essay is the purpose of this section. 
Concentrating on this definition has also led commentators to treat Locke's use of self and 
person as being synonymous.250 As already advertised the two should be read and 
understood apart. Before establishing this claim in detail the following loose distinctions 
can serve as place holders. By Person Locke means the enduring thing that one is. By Self 
he means the present substantial union of personal presence, immaterial and/or material 
substance. This he sometimes calls the Personal Self.1" Locke also has two distinct uses of 
self. One is merely that of self-identity, the other the name of the Self. These are 
distinguished quite reliably in Locke's text by the former appearing in plain text and the 
latter in italics, or with a capital 'S'. 2 2 3 This distinction is not unique to Locke, but it is 
important not to conflate the uses (for example, in the above definition, Locke is not talking 
about the substantial self). 
Locke's definition of Self is given at §17. Locke writes: 
218 Essay 335 .9-16 (Book D, Chap XXVTJ, §9) 
2 " Wiggins is an influential example of one writer who assumes this. See Wiggins (1980, p. 149 and Chapter 6 
at large). 
2 1 0 For example Noonan (1998) p. 315. This seems to be a shift from the views of in Noonan (1978) and the 
more careful considerations of Noonan (1989). 
At Essay 336:24 & (Book U, Chap XXVII, §10) & Essay 337:6 (Book II, Chap XXVII, § 11). Locke also 
thrice uses 'Personality', twice in the same sentence when discussing moral reward, Essay 344:5 (Book II, 
Chap XXVII, §22) and in the same context at Essay 346:28 (Book II, Chap XXVII, §26). 
2 2 21 will mark the distinction by following Locke in this conventioa 
65 
Self is that conscious thinking thing, (whatever Substance, made up of whether 
Spiritual, or Material, Simple, or Compounded, it matters not) which is 
sensible, or conscious of Pleasure and Pain, capable of Happiness or Misery, 
and so concern'd for i t self, as far as that consciousness extends. Thus every 
one finds, that whilst comprehended under that consciousness, the little Finger 
is as much a part of it self, as what is most so.m 
For commentators committed to presenting Locke as giving a purely psychological and 
causal related account of personal identity there is great temptation to ignore this subtlety in 
Locke. Yet it would be an insult to a great thinker to continue as i f the second definition is 
entirely pleonastic. Although Locke is prone to repetition in his discussion he nearly 
always introduces nuances with each reworking of a theme. The onus falls to those who 
would read Self and person as synonyms to provide argument for this. 
There is a decided Cartesian cast to Locke's definition. Descartes had claimed with the 
cogito that we could be certain of our own existence through the certain connection we have 
with our own thoughts. I f thinking confirms our existence, then constant and uninterrupted 
thinking would confirm enduring existence. Locke subscribes to the cogito along with 
Descartes, but does not accept that the soul always thinks. Locke's approval for the cogito 
is longstanding. In Draft A Locke had written: 
The Understanding knows undoubtedly that while it thinks reasons or imagins 
it is or hath existence or that there is something that knows & understands 
which according to Cartes & I thinke in truth is the most certein & undoubted 
proposition that can be in the minde of a man.124 
Locke's opinion is similar in Draft B where the cogito is "a certainty as great as humane 
nature is capable of ' 2 " . By the time of the complete Essay Locke had separated the 
argument into the parts he found useful and those he found suspect. He asserts that 
In every Act of Sensation, Reasoning, or Thinking, we are conscious to our 
selves of our own Being; and, in this Matter, come not short of the highest 
degree of Certainty™ 
'tis altogether as intelligible to say, that a body is extended without parts, as 
that any tiling thinks without being conscious of it, or perceiving, that it does 
so.227 
Essay 341:14-20 (Book II, Chap XXVII, §17) 
Draft A, §27, p. 42 
Draft B, §35, p. 144 
Essay 619:1-3 (Book IV, Chap EX, §3) 
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Locke adopts the Transparency Thesis that follows from the cogito. However, he devotes a 
considerable amount of the first chapter of Book H 2 2 8 to attacking the notion that the Soul 
always thinks. By insisting that the mind always thought, Descartes was able to identify the 
soul and the mind. This Locke cannot do because he feels that sleep interrupts thought, 
indeed that "every drowsy Nod shakes their Doctrine, who teach, That the Soul is always 
thinking"™. Hence Locke is obliged to distinguish the soul and the mind. To this end he 
introduces a definition of consciousness "Consciousness is the perception of what passes in 
a Man's own mind." 2 3 0 
Locke's phrasing 'a Man's own mind' is no accident. It is the mind of a man, that is an 
animal body united with a soul, Locke refers to. Chapter I of Book I I appears in the First 
Edition of the Essay and as such pre-dates the personal identity Chapter. I t is also here that 
Locke makes his first references to personal identity. The example he introduces, that two 
persons could share one body, is used as a reduction ad absurdum of his opponent's 
position. However, Locke comes to realise his own position is equally vulnerable to this 
conclusion. This stands as a further motivation to the Second Edition arguments.231 
Therefore it is more than worthwhile to pick out the distinctions between Soul, Man, Mind 
and Consciousness that Locke is making in this chapter to see how they impinge on his later 
fuller statements about personal identity. 
Locke says he must "confess my self, to have one of those dull Souls, that doth not perceive 
it self always to contemplate Ideas".232 From this Locke concludes against the Cartesians 
that "the perception of Ideas being ... not [the Souls] Essence, but one of its Operations".233 
This is consistent with the Lockean view that immaterial substance is the substratum we 
presume to make thought possible. Locke feels that we can assert from the fact that we 
sometimes think that there is a thinking thing within us.214 It is this limited version of the 
Cartesian argument that Locke is looking to defend. 
217 Essay 115:15-8 (Book II, Chap I, §19) At Essay 108:22-3 (Book II, Chap I, §10) this argument is put as "[I] 
can conceive it any more necessary for the Soul always to think, than for the Body always to move". 
™ Essay 108:17-118:31 (Book U, Chap I, §§10-25) 
229 Essay 111: 22-23 (Book II, Chap I, § 13) In this Locke prefigures Hintikka's discussion of the cogito as 
performance. See Hintikka (1962). 
230 Essay 115:23-4 (Book II, Chap I, §19) 
2 3 1 Thiel (1998b), p. 888 is unusual in placing any weight on these passages. Otherwise they are infrequently 
alluded to and more rarely discussed. 
232 Essay 108:20-22 (Book II, Chap I, § 10) Hume will later confess to having a soul so dull it cannot perceive 
itself at all. 
a' Essay 108: 23-25 (Book II, Chap I, §10) 
234 Essay 108:31, 109:1-2 (Book II, Chap I, §10) 
67 
Just as dreaming had caused Descartes so much perplexity, Locke finds sleeping and 
dreaming the nub of the difficulty. This is inevitable after he grants "that the Soul in a 
waking Man is never without thought, because it is the condition of being awake".115 The 
following discussion is entirely, and explicitly, couched in terms of the Compositional 
Account of Man. I f a Man is a unit of a soul and a body, then the soul could think while the 
corporeal body slept. Hence the Man, as a unit, might be unaware of the thoughts of the 
soul. The consequences of this would, Locke thinks, be absurd. Hence he argues: 
It is certain, that Socrates asleep, and Socrates awake, is not the same Person; 
but his Soul when he sleeps, and Socrates the Man consisting of Body and Soul 
when he is waking are two Persons: Since waking Socrates, has no Knowledge 
of, or Concernment for that Happiness, or Misery of his Soul, which it enjoys 
alone by it self whilst he sleeps, without perceiving any thing of it; no more 
than he has for the Happiness, or Misery of a Man in the Indies, whom he 
knows not. For i f we take wholly away all Consciousness of our Actions and 
Sensations, especially of Pleasure and Pain, and the concernment that 
accompanies it, it wi l l be hard to know wherein to place personal Identity.2 3 6 
The concerns of the Second Edition account of personal identity are in place here in the 
shape of the importance attached to Consciousness of Actions. What is sharply different is 
that Locke derives the absurdity of the claim of an always thinking soul by appealing to the 
coherence of the Compositional Account, i.e. that identity of person should be expected to 
run with the identity of a Man. Locke clearly has no difficulty in understanding the Man 
and the Person to be co-conscious. Indeed, Locke derives the absurdity from an appeal to 
co-consciousness. The periods of the soul's supposed thinking during sleep are not co-
conscious with the Man, unlike waking states. I f they exist at all they are only co-conscious 
with themselves. However, Locke uses the common-sense account that personal identity 
goes with the waking man to form the conclusion that the soul does not think during sleep. 
Clearly Locke finds coherent the consequence that i f the soul always thinks then two 
persons might inhabit one Man. However, it is also clear that he rejects that this possibility 
occurs and this is the central plank in his argument against the soul always thinking. This 
demonstrates incontrovertibly Locke's sympathy for the Compositional Account of Man, 
and its role in personal identity. 
255 Essay 109:31-2 (Book fl\ Chap I, §11) 
236 Essay 110:12-22 (Book II, Chap I, § 11) Locke shows his first concerns here over the possibility that 
consciousness might be transferred, although here he is quite damning of the possibility. Also note that 
consciousness of thought and consciousness of happiness and misery have not yet been separated out as they 
are in the 2 n d Edition so the former concerns the person and the latter the self. 
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This sympathy is continued in Locke's tone in the next section. Locke supposes it possible 
"the Soul o f Castor, whilst he is sleeping, retired from his Body""' but only because this "is 
no impossible Supposition for the Men I have here to do with, who so liberally allow Life, 
without a thinking Soul to all other Animals. These Men cannot then judge it impossible, or 
a contradiction, That the Body should live without the Soul; nor that the Soul should subsist 
and think, or have Perception, even Perception of Happiness of Misery, without the 
Body." 2 3 8 It is clear from Locke's tone that he disagrees with the truth of these Cartesian 
propositions. In this section Locke suggests a case where a soul migrates between two 
Men. The passage that concludes this section reads: 
Just by the same Reason, they make the Soul and the Man two Persons, who 
make the Soul think apart, what the Man is not conscious of. For, I suppose, no 
body w i l l make Identity of Persons, to consist in the Soul's being united to the 
very same numerical Particles of matter: For i f that be necessary to Identity, 
' twi l l be impossible, in that constant flux of the Particles of our Bodies, that 
any Man should be the same Person, two days, or two moments together.239 
This could be read as an attack on the Compositional Account. The addition of this 
comment at this point seems dissonant. Locke is of course right that no-one would (or 
indeed could) make identity of persons consist in the union of a soul with a numerically 
identical collection of particles of matter. However, Locke is only attempting a clarification 
of the Compositional Account. He identifies the person and the Man here. I f personal 
identity consists in sameness of Man, qua unit of soul and body, then this union must allow 
for the change of parts usual in a living body. This is consistent with Locke's aims in this 
sectioa Identity of person is assumed to be identity of Man, and Man is a unit of soul and 
living body. This has to be granted by those who would allow the sharing of a soul between 
two bodies, or their account would lapse into incoherence, for the Soul would constantly 
find itself in Union with different bodies. This would result, though trivially, in a 
succession o f different Men being present. Although modem writers like Lewis" 0 might 
accept this consequence, Locke finds it incoherent. This being granted, Locke forces the 
point to demonstrate the incoherence of the soul-sharing account and its premise that the 
Soul can be in union with a body forming a Man, and the Man yet remain unconscious of 
the Soul's perceptions. 
237 Essay 110:28 (Book II, Chap I, §12) 
138 Essay 110: 29-34 (Book JJ, Chap I, §12) Note Locke's emphasis that the soul might not be necessary for 
perception, but is surely necessary for the perception of happiness and misery. 
239 Essay 111: 14-21 (Book II, Chap I, §12) 
2 4 0 See Lewis (1976) and (1983b) 
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Locke concludes that " I f such a definition [that the soul always thinks] be of any Authority, 
I know not what it can serve for, but to make many Men suspect, That they have no Souls at 
alL since they find a good part of their Lives pass away without thinking". 1 4 1 He resolves 
"Not to mention again the absurdity of two distinct Persons, which follows from this 
Supposition".141 
The supposition that follows from Locke's position is that the body plays an essential 
facilitating role in thinking. In fact, Locke regards the proper unit of rational thought as the 
Man and not the Soul, Mind or indeed Consciousness. I f the Man is properly rational, then 
the Man is also, by Locke's own lights, a Rational Being, the very sort of thing that Persons 
are. The Moral Man discussion emphasised the corporeal. Here the role of the corporeal is 
explicitly linked with discussion of personal identity.1 4 3 Even more tellingly Locke's 
discussion of the body's role in thought is carried out in terms of memory. 
Locke considers a counter argument to his claim that the mind does not always think; 
' " T w i l l perhaps be said, That the Soul thinks, even in the soundest Sleep, but the Memory 
retains it not."1" Locke rounds on this counter-argument in various ways. First he argues 
that "Most Men, I think, pass a great part of their Sleep without dreaming."143 Whether we 
all dream, and for how much of our sleeping existence we dream, is a question of perpetual 
dispute, and no more settled today than it was in Locke's time. Whatever one is inclined to 
think of Locke's assertion that common experience tells us that we do not dream all the 
time we sleep146 this argument is not Locke's most interesting and can be put to one side. 
141 Essay 116:8-11 (Book II, Chap I, §19) 
141 Essay 112:22-23 (Book II, Chap I, §15) 
1 4 1 The discussion in this chapter attempts to follow the chronological development of Locke's views. Clearly 
this is difficult for those arguments that appear simultaneously for the first time in the First Editioa The 
earliest arguments are about Man as a substance, as clearly shown by the discussion in Drafts A & B. I would 
suggest that the Moral Man argument predates in composition the arguments about the always thinking soul 
which mark a mid-point between the former argument and the Second Edition personal identity passages. The 
unpublished Draft C may shed light on this (as might other manuscripts). Without this material (and of course 
this material may not shed any light) one can only rely on the circumstantial evidence of placing each argument 
in a likely progression of thought. Although it would be interesting to establish the order of composition in 
Locke's argument this is not essential here. His final position, in the sense of arguments of latest composition, 
is clearly that of the Second Edition additions. It suffices to demonstrate that Locke was attempting to deal 
with conflicting themes and that his final position emerges from them. It does not matter if he held them 
sequentially or simultaneously (and one must allow that the intellectual process is rarely purely linear, and that 
old notions leave their ghosts if not their corpses). 
144 Essay 111:29-30 (Book II, Chap I, §14) 
143 Essay 112:1-2 (Book JJ, Chap I, §14) 
146 Essay 112:2-8 (Book II, Chap I, § 14) 
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More interestingly Locke claims that "To think often, and never to retain it so much as one 
moment, is a very useless sort of thinking".241 Locke then makes his claim about the body's 
role in memory: 
[TJt will be said, that in a waking Man, the materials of the Body are employ'd, 
and made use of, in thinking; and that the memory of Thoughts, is retained by 
the impressions made on the Brain, and the traces there left after such thinking; 
but that in the thinking of the Soul, which is not perceived in a sleeping Man, 
there the Soul thinks apart, and making no use of the Organs of the Body, leaves 
no impression on it, and consequently no memory of such Thoughts.248 
The possibility of so-called 'Intellectual Memory', i.e. purely spiritual memory, intrigues 
Cartesians and Cartesian commentators. Descartes' acceptance that the body is responsible 
for most memory led him into an awkward compromise that the Soul must be allowed some 
faculty of memory itself. Locke clearly finds the notion of Intellectual Memory 
unpromising, and provides arguments against it.24' 
Locke argues that to suggest that the Soul can acquire Ideas without the body should imply 
that it can remember these Ideas as well, otherwise "to what purpose does it think?"250 This 
forces a dilemma. Either the Soul does not remember, which Locke has further arguments 
against, or it does remember, but in a manner which is not co-conscious with the Man. 
From this flows 'the absurdity of two persons'. What is more, to claim the Soul can think 
without remembering is tantamount to materialism. Locke's target is a certain kind of 
materialism that reduces memories to organisation of matter, presumably with no role for 
thinking matter: 
Characters drawn on Dust, that the first breath of wind effaces; or Impressions 
made on a heap of Atoms, or animal Spirits, are altogether as useful, and render 
the Subject as noble, as the Thoughts of a Soul that perish in thinking; that once 
out of sight, are gone for ever, and leave no memory behind them.231 
These separate attacks on Materialist and Intellectual theories of memory makes no sense 
other than against the background assumption of a Compositional Account of Human 
Beings and their rational capacities. It seems clear that Locke believes that tmnking matter 
thinks, but lays up its storehouse of memory in the corporeal body. In short, Locke can 
only make sense of memory as a function of the Composite Man. With this presumption 
Essay 112:9-10 (Book II, Chap I, §15) 
Essay 112:15-22 (Book II, Chap I, §15) 
For lengthy and fascinating discussion of Locke's theory of memory see Sutton (1998). 
Essay 112:31 (Book II, Chap I, §15) 
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Locke can conclude that thinking matter does not think apart from the body, or remember 
without it. This is justified because to continue to suppose we think in our dreamless sleep 
would imply 
[T]hat our infinitely wise Creator, should make so admirable a Faculty, as the 
power of Thinking, that Faculty which comes nearest the Excellency of his own 
incomprehensible Being, to be so idlely and uselesly employ'd, at least lA part 
of its time here, as to think constantly, without remembering any of those 
Thoughts^] 2 3 2 
Locke relies on the Compositional Man even more clearly when he asks us to consider the 
nature of the dreams we do remember; 
How extravagant and incoherent... they are... This I would willingly be 
satisfied in, Whether the Soul, when it thinks thus apart... from the Body, acts 
less rationally... I f its separate Thoughts be less rational, then these Men must 
say, That the Soul owes the perfection of rational tliinking to the Body: I f it 
does not, 'tis a wonder that our Dreams should be, for the most part, so 
frivolous and irrational; and that the Soul should retain none of its more rational 
Soliloquies and Meditations."3 
Locke also insists that the Body is the source of all Ideas, otherwise 
'Tis strange, the Soul should never once in a Man's life, recal over any of its 
pure, native Thoughts, and those Ideas it had before it borrowed any thing from 
the Body 1" 
Locke also feels the ignorance and lack of reason in Children to be further proof that the 
Soul does not always think. 
[F]ew Signs o f a Soul accustomed to much thinking [are found] in a new born 
Child, and much fewer of any Reasoning at all. And yet it is hard to imagine, 
that the rational Soul should think so much, and not reason at all. . . [Instead] 
Infants,[... ] , spend the greatest part of their time in Sleep, and are seldom 
awake, but when... some... violent Impression of the Body, forces the mind to 
perceivef.]2 3 3 
151 Essay 112:34-6,113:1-3 (Bookfl, Chap I, §15) 
152 Essay 113:5-9 (Book II, Chap I, §15) 
155 Essay 113:16-26 (Book II, Chap I, §16) Unless, it might be argued against Locke, it is deemed useful by 
God for us to have thoughts we do not remember. Indeed passages of fanciful and irrational thought might be 
useful if they are a gateway to enlightenment as some suggest. 
234 Essay 114:8-10 (Book II, Chap I, §17) This argument is used in an adapted form against the transmigration 
of the soul. See Essay 339:5-34 (Book II, Chap XXVTI, §14) 
235 Essay 116:25-32 (Book II, Chap I, §21) 
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A foetus also thinks very little, and this is because it is denied any external stimulus.256 
The weight of evidence from Book I I , Chap I is overwhelming in its support for reading 
Locke as subscribing to the Compositional Account of Man. It is also clear that Locke uses 
this very assumption to attack alternative theories of personal identity. I t also clear that 
Locke placed memory and rational activity, that is rational being in a Man, not solely with 
that thinking part of us that we are so in the dark about. Locke's appeal to the Benevolence 
of Creation as guarantor of the parsimony of mental activity is akin to Descartes' appeal to 
Nature's design of Soul and Body so as to be a perfect f i t for each other. This is compatible 
with an evolutionary account of human beings, as long as evolution can be made a suitable 
surrogate for Divine Benevolence. A naturalistic evolutionary account favours Animalism, 
for it bases understanding of human endeavours on humans being biological entities. 
Identifying persons and animals is a natural part of this. The question, then, is to establish 
to what extent Locke does deviate from this version of the Cartesian Compositional Model 
in the Second Edition personal identity discussion. As has already been suggested there is a 
decidedly Cartesian cast to Locke's Famous Definition. In light of Locke's explicit use of 
Cartesian themes elsewhere this can now be spelt out in detail. ^_. 
136 Essay 117:2-9 (Book II, Chap I, §21) 
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V I 
T H E COMPOSITIONAL RECONSTRUCTION OF T H E FAMOUS DEFINITION 
There is nothing in the first part of §9 that is incompatible with the Book IL Chapter I 
Compositional Account. A person is "a thinking, intelligent Being"," 7 "the same thinking 
thing"," 8 "the sameness of rational Being"." 9 As Locke regards the Compositional Man as a 
rational being (i.e. a rational existence) there is no dissonance. Locke also repeats the 
Transparency Thesis240 while emphasising "When we see, hear, smell, taste, meditate or wi l l 
anything, we know that we do so."261 A l l of these perceptions are according to Locke 
dependent on the body.2 6 2 Locke gives a role to substance in the sameness of self (not 
person), but emphasises that "I t [is] not being considered in this case, whether the same self 
be continued in the same, or divers Substances."263 
The uniting principle is consciousness. Locke states "consciousness always accompanies 
thinking, and 'tis that, that makes every one to be, what he calls self \ 2 6 4 Locke is creating a 
tight knot of concepts here. It is important to note that Locke talks of being the same self 
with oneself, and not the same person. This is because Locke is reserving self Tor (what wi l l 
be called for the moment) the instantiated person. Sensation and Perception (both 
inherently bodily) create the sense of Self whatever substances presently constitute the Self 
The Transparency Thesis provides an awareness of whatever belongs to the Self and 
"thereby distinguishes [it] from all other thinking things".263 In all of "this alone consists 
personal Identity".™ There is nothing in this that is necessarily antagonistic to Locke's 
previous commitment to the Compositional Man being the basis of personal identity. 
What differs from before is the additional statement: 
"7 Essay 335:10-11 (Book JJ, Chap XXVII, §9) 
"8 Essay 335:12 (Book II, Chap XXVII, §9) 
"' Essay 335:24 (Book II, Chap XXVH, §9) 
260 Essay 335:14-16 (Book II, Chap XXVII, §9) 
261 Essay 335:16-17 (Book D, Chap XXVII, §9) 
2 4 2 Meditation, it might be objected, is not. However, even Descartes gave some role to the body in 
imagination, e.g. when discussing our ability to understand in reason what a thousand sided shape is like, while 
being unable to picture the shape in our mind's eye in Meditation VI (ATVII: 72-74; CSMII: 50-51). If 
Descartes allows a role for the body in such acts of contemplation, then surely Locke, with his suspicion for 
Intellectual Memory, would to. There seems no necessity to read meditate here to be a purely intellectual 
exercise, and every reason to imagine Locke was suspicious of such purely intellectual acts. 
263 Essay 335:19-21 (Book II, Chap XXVII, §9) 
264 Essay 335:21-2 (Book H, Chap XXVII, §9) 
263 Essay 335:22-23 (Book II, Chap XXVII, §9) Hence Locke provides an account of a person's boundaries, 
something which is claimed to allude Hume's bundle theory. See §IV of the next chapter for arguments that 
this claim is a spurious objection anyway 
266 Essay 335:23-24 (Book II, Chap XXVII, §9) 
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And as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past Action 
or Thought, so far reaches the Identity of that Person; it is the same self now it 
was then; and 'tis by the same self with this present one that now reflects on it, 
that that Action was done."7 
In the understanding of this one sentence the greater part of all the woes of Lockean 
scholarship concerning personal identity are to be found. Consciousness here should be 
understood as the unifying principle of substances that creates the self. The self now can 
come to stand in some relation™ to a self that performed a previous 'Action or Thought'. 
This constitutes the identity of a person. Locke provides no better clue than that 
consciousness can be 'extended backwards'. Nonetheless, the following sections contain 
material enough to construct a reading compatible with Locke's Compositional sympathies, 
and his scepticism about knowledge of substance, especially Man. In short Locke 
substitutes his reliance on Man in Book n, Chapter I for a reliance on Rational Being. A 
Man is a Rational Being, but here the emphasis is on the Cartesian cogito and the sureness 
of knowledge provided by The Transparency Thesis. A Rational Being always knows the 
extent of its substantial self. The Rational Being of Chapter 27 is the heir to Locke's Moral 
Man, a corporeal rational being. 
It has seemed beyond even the obvious to many that Locke is referring to the faculty of 
memory when he talks about consciousness being extended backwards."' The historical 
precedent for this is, of course, Reid's famous criticism of Locke. Reid insists: 
Mr. Locke attributes to consciousness the conviction we have of our past 
actions, as i f a man may now be conscious of what he did twenty years ago. It 
is impossible to understand the meaning of this, unless by consciousness be 
meant memory, the only faculty by which we have immediate knowledge of 
our past actions."0 
It is of course true that memory is the faculty by which we know about the past. There is 
also a subset of memories that not only provide us with knowledge about the past, but also 
appear to inform us about our own pasts. This is personal or autobiographical memory. It 
267 Essay 335:24-28 (Book JJ, Chap XXVII, §9) 
2 6 8 Though for reasons discussed in §1 above this is not a relation in Locke's techinical sense. 
2 6 9 See, for example Carruthers' blithe assertion that Locke held a memory theory in Carruthers (1986) p. 78. 
Quinton presents a version of the memory theory which he takes to be completely in the spirit of Locke. See 
Quinton (1962). Shoemaker (1959) takes himself to be similarly motivated. Perry attacks the memory theory, 
but also takes Locke to be the source of this theory. See Perry (1975b). 
2 7 0 Reid (1785b), p. 115 in Perry (1975a). Reid's criticism is dependent not only on a typically wilfully abrupt 
reading of Locke but his own insistence that memory provides direct or immediate access to our pasts. Such a 
theory of memory is arguably incoherent, and any objection based on it must therefore suffer. 
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is this latter form of memory that is usually supposed to be the basis of personal identity."1 
Loosely the claim is that a person is constituted by the collection of memories to which 
each individual has a unique and peculiar psychological relatioa 
Consciousness is a relation persons have presently with themselves, and a relation they have 
to their past selves. However, this does not imply that Consciousness is memory.2" It 
would be trivial to insist that all our relations to the past are necessarily memories. Locke 
does indeed distinguish between memory and extended consciousness. Bringing this out 
will sideline memory interpretations of Locke. 
First it should be noted that Locke has a developed theory of memory given in Book II , 
Chap X, 'Of Retention'."3 Locke is perfectly aware of what memory is, and as his 
discussion of the soul's alleged perpetual thinking above demonstrates, is willing to make 
philosophical use of memory to prove arguments. I f this were the case it would seem odd at 
the very least that i f Locke intended a memory theory he didn't just use the term memory to 
explicate it. Instead he introduces the apparatus of extended consciousness. It seems 
unlikely that he went to this difficulty unnecessarily. There are two motivating factors. 
Locke felt it highly probable (although not proved) that memory relied on the body, and the 
Compositional Man. Therefore, while attempting to give an account of personal identity 
that is indifferent to substantial composition, Locke needs to use a neutral term. The second 
reason is simpler. Locke simply does not intend to provide a memory theory. 
Nonetheless various passages give easily to a memory reading. Locke writes early on in his 
discussion: 
For as far as any intelligent Being can repeat the Idea of any past Action with 
the same consciousness it had of it at first, and with the same consciousness it 
has of any present Action; so far it is the same personal self.™ 
Hughes in his defence of Locke's theory emphasises, correctly I feel, the importance of non-personal 
memory in reinforcing our belief in the reliability of personal memory. See Hughes (1975). 
" : Many commentators simply assume that Locke identifies memory with extended consciousness. Laird, 
pithy as ever, manages an interesting interpretative near-miss when he writes "Locke's general conclusion, 
sometimes expressed with some diffidence but, in the main, very firmly, was that personal identity lasted only 
so long as the same continued consciousness lasted. [... ] Such reflex appropriation, it would seem to many of 
us, need not be identified with explicit memory. Locke, however, interpreted it in no other sense, even 
forensically." Laird (1932) p. 169. If only Laird had pursued the doubts he attributes 'to many of us' (indeed, 
if this many had not themselves been so silent) Locke's subtle and intriguing opinion on this matter might have 
been correctly established sooner. Laird, despite asking the right question, leaves prevailing orthodoxy 
unscathed. 
"'Essay 149:19-155:21 
"< Essay 336:21-24 (Book II, Chap XXVII, §10) 
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Locke's theory of memory is that past Ideas are recreated in the image of the original. The 
problems of such an account aside, the phrase 'repeat the Idea of an past Action' is 
consistent with Locke's theory of memory. However, the account is qualified in important 
ways. The relationship between a repeated Idea and the 'Idea of a past Action' is not clear. 
Ideas caused by sensation can be repeated as representations. But this is mere repetition of 
an Idea. Yet Locke emphasises it is the Idea of a past Action. This suggests something 
more akin to personal memory. To repeat a past Action in the mind is to re-experience it, 
not just to represent it. 
The evidence for this distinction is in the latter part of the quotation. The consciousness of 
a past act is the same as the consciousness of a present Action. It seems clear that the 
relation a person stands in to a present Action is not one of (mere) memory. This implies 
the relation consciousness has to a past Action cannot be (mere) memory either. The 
repetition of consciousness has something distinct. 
The waters are muddied further when Locke introduces what some have taken to be a 
prototype of Q-memories. In the light of our ignorance about "what kind of Substances 
they are, that do think"1" we cannot settle "whether the consciousness of past Actions can 
be transferr'd from one thinking Substance to another.""6 The issue wouldbe settled 
according to Locke were it not for this difficulty: 
I grant, were the same Consciousness [of a past Action] the same individual 
Action, it could not [be transferred]: But it being but a present representation of 
a past Action, why it may not be possible, that that may be represented to the 
Mind to have been, which really never was, will remain to be shewn. And 
therefore how far the consciousness of past Actions is annexed to any 
individual Agent, so that another cannot possibly have it, will be hard for us to 
determine, till we know what kind of Action it is that cannot be done without a 
reflex Act of Perception accompanying it, and how perform'd by thinking 
Substances, who cannot think without being conscious of it. 2 7 7 
Here Locke clearly embraces a representation account for the presentation of past Actions. 
This is placed in contrast with the ideal situation in which this is not possible. This would 
seem to destroy the privileged reading of consciousness suggested above. However, 
Locke's reasons for believing in the possible transfer of memory are premised on the 
privileged reading. Consciousness is the experience of being intimately related to an action, 
the experience that / did it. Locke can find no evidence of actual memory transfer occurring 
273 Essay 337:31-32 (Book II, Chap XXVH, §13) 
276 Essay 337:31-33 (Book II, Chap XXVII, §13) 
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so he appeals to what he regards as an analogous situation for possible evidence. 
Sometimes we have "representations in Dreams, [... ] which yet, whilst dreaming, we take 
for true."278 
It has already been noted Locke remained impressed by the cogito even in the mature 
Essay. Here Locke makes clear use of a related Cartesian tactic, the dreamer hypothesis. In 
a dream we appear to have a relation to an Action which is whilst dreaming 
indistinguishable "with that consciousness, which remarks our waking Thoughts.""' Locke 
feels this establishes that while the test of an Action being our own is that it is performed 
with the same consciousness that we would perform a present action, that this awareness 
can be confused. We can have the phenomenological experience of a veridical experience 
but be deluded. Dreaming acquaints us with this possibility because we experience false 
veracity in dreams, but upon awakening realise our error. Likewise Locke regards memory 
as a certain acquaintance with past events, accompanied by a peculiar phenomenological 
quality. It is therefore equally susceptible to delusion. For this reason Locke recognises 
and explicitly makes a case against a memory theory. Memory cannot provide the sort of 
extended consciousness that Locke is looking for:_Our experience_teaches_us that memoryr -
is unreliable. Locke's prime motivation is to exclude unreliable factors from an account of 
personal identity. Hence he refers to memory as "that which we call the same 
consciousness"™ rather than same consciousness proper. 
Locke is dearly aware that he must explain 
[W]hy one intellectual Substance may not have represented to it, as done by it 
self, what it never did, and was perhaps done by some other Agent... [and] may 
not possibly be without reality of Matter of Fact 
Locke feels that in the absence of a refuge against this possibility our notions will 
[TJill we have clearer views of the Nature of thinking Substances, be best 
resolv'd into the Goodness of God, who as far as the Happiness or Misery of 
any of his sensible Creatures is concerned in it, will not by a fatal error of theirs 
transfer from one to another, that consciousness, which draws Reward or 
Punishment with i t 2 8 1 
2" Essay 337:33-338:6 (Book II, Chap XXVII, §13) 
278 Essay 338:11-12 (Book II, Chap XXVII, §13) 
2" Essay 336:6-7 (Book II, Chap XXVII, §10) 
280 Essay 338:6-7 (Book II, Chap XXVII, §13) emphasis wadded 
281 Essay 338:14-18 (Book II, Chap XXVII, §13) 
With God guaranteeing that our memory will only reflect consciousness as far as 
consciousness is actually extended Locke can safely conclude that what we represent to 
ourselves actually happened.2" This is important, because Locke is quite clear that 
forgetfulness does occur. Equally Locke is quite sure that forgetfulness has no effect on 
personal identity. Even i f God does not guarantee the faculty of memory we can trust that 
God's review of our consciousness will be perfect and fair, even i f ours is flawed.283 
The extension of consciousness is like a temporally extended version of the cogito. At any 
point in time this consciousness allows someone to be aware of what presently constitutes 
themselves. This is true of spatial extension, so our self is extended into that part of matter 
consciousness goes with. Locke gives the example that "Upon separation... should this 
consciousness go along with the little Finger,[... ] , 'tis evident the little Finger would be the 
Person, the same Person".™ Then Locke asserts this is true temporally; "[Consciousness 
. . constitutes this inseparable self, so it is in reference to Substances remote in time."™ 
Locke's term 'inseparable self is intriguing. I f Locke is holding a memory theory he is 
obliged to claim that persons have gaps in their existences, and that parts of their pasts can 
be lost forever through (ordinary) forgetfulness. This would seem to conflict with the self 
being inseparable. How is this to be understood when considering the passage where Locke 
discusses forgetfulness? Locke begins the discussion while considering i f the Person is one 
identical substance. 
This few would think they had reason to doubt of, i f these Perceptions, with 
their consciousness, always remain'd present in the Mind, whereby the same 
thinking thing would be always consciously present, and, as would be thought, 
evidently the same to it self.284 
This clearly draws on the certainty of the Transparency Thesis. Locke agrees that i f we 
were Cartesian Souls that thought all the time, then we should be sure of our identity. 
Locke also seems to assume that this would make us sure we were the same substance. 
This is a departure from modern writers who presume that changes of whatever substance 
supports thinking could take place without interruption of first-person experience. Locke 
2 8 2 The obvious correlate of this is that we should reliably be able to identify imaginings as imaginings. 
2 8 3 Locke discusses Pascal's prodigious memory, but remarks that only Angels regularly can have all of their 
pasts laid out in their minds at one time while "humane Minds are confin'd to... having ... Ideas only in 
succession, not all at once." Essay 154:20-21 (Book II, Chap X, §9). Locke's appeal to Man's finite powers to 
explain our fallibility recalls Descartes' arguments in Meditation IV. 
284 Essay 341:20-24 (Book II, Chap XXVTI, §17) 
283 Essay 341:25-28 (Book TJ, Chap XXVII, §17) 
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provides no reason why constant first-person experience would provide a guarantee against 
change of substance. Presumably as he is examining a full-blooded Cartesian version he 
does not think the problem could arise because thought is the essence of thinking matter. It 
would be odd i f a substance's essence could be interrupted without awareness. This, 
though, is all by-the-by as Locke is about to dismiss the relevance of the full Cartesian 
account to personal identity. Locke continues: 
But that which seems to make the difficulty is this, that this consciousness, 
being interrupted always by forgetfulness, there being no moment of our Lives 
wherein we have the whole train of all our past Actions before our Eyes in one 
view: But even the best Memories losing the sight of one part whilst they are 
viewing another; and we sometimes, and that the greatest part of our Lives, not 
reflecting on our past selves, being intent on our present Thoughts, and in 
sound sleep, having no Thoughts at all, or at least none with that consciousness, 
which remarks our waking Thoughts. I say, in all these cases, our 
consciousness being interrupted, and we losing the sight of our past selves, 
doubts are raised whether we are the same thinking thing; i.e. the same 
substance or no. Which however reasonable, or unreasonable, concerns not 
personal identity at all."" 
That Locke concludes that forgetfulness and interrupted-consciousness-concerns not^ 
personal Identity at all' would, one would have thought, been enough to end speculation 
about Locke's allegiances in this matter. Locke's point is merely a re-iteration of the earlier 
Book n, Chapter I attack on the Cartesian Soul. Locke rejects the view that the unifying 
feature of a thinking being can be uninterrupted continuity of thought. I f the soul, as 
Cartesians maintain, did always think then this could be the case. However, as Locke 
demonstrated we often do not think. Locke therefore needs to find some other unifying 
principle. He finds this by analogy with Animal identity: 
Different Substances, by the same consciousness (where they do partake in it) 
being united into one Person; as well as different Bodies, by the same Life are 
united into one thinking Animal, whose Identity is preserved, in that change of 
Substances, by the unity of one continued Life. 2 8 8 
289 Essay 335:30-34 (Book II, Chap XXVII, § 10) Compare this with both Descartes' and Locke's remarks 
about how an embodied angel would apprehend their corporeal abutment. 
181 Essay 335:34-336:11 (Book II, Chap XXVII, §10) Locke's misgivings about memory are long-standing. 
On Saturday 22n d January 1678 Locke wrote in his Journal "For the minde endeavouring to retaine only the 
traces of the patteme loosening by degrees a great part of them and not haveing the liberty to supply any new 
colours or touches of its owne, the picture in the memory every day fades and growes dimmer and is often 
times quite lost." (Aaron & Gibb 1936, p. 104). See also Draft B, §23, p. 134 for the precursor to 'Of 
Retention' (Book II, Chap X) in the published Essay. Locke also comments that "the memory is very weake" 
at Draft B, §27, p. 137. Memory is not discussed in Draft A. 
288 Essay 336:14-18 (Book II, Chap XXVII, §10). 
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In his discussion of Lockean Lives earlier Locke had avoided suggesting that the relation of 
one body to the next was a causal one. It is reasonable to assume that he does not see the 
union of substances in a person as a causal relation either. What is more, i f the Lockean 
Life of a Person is consciousness this seems to preclude a memory theory. There is no 
analogy between memory and a life. There is, however, an analogy between union of 
substance into an animal life, and self-aware union of substances into a thinking being. 
There is one further passage that needs dealing with to establish the non-memory reading of 
consciousness.28' Locke's discussion of the Drunk Man and The Sober Man has produced a 
small industry in Lockean scholarship, not to mention the extensive correspondence with 
Molyneux on the topic.2'0 
Locke maintains that there is something peculiar in drunkenness that removes 
consciousness. Putting aside whether this state is self-induced, and therefore still 
blameworthy, one needs to make further sense of this claim. Drunkenness can cause 
forgetfulness, that much is common-knowledge. What, though, is of more interest to Locke 
is the possibility that Drunkenness can cause present action to occur without consciousness. 
It is in this sense that Locke finds a parallel with the sleep-walker. While drunk (one would 
presume extremely drunk) Locke feels it is possible to act without knowing one is doing 
so.2" Drunkenness therefore is a possible example of that "kind of Action... done without a 
reflex Act of Perception"2'2 that Locke had mentioned earlier in his discussion of the transfer 
of consciousness. Drunkenness, in other words, seems capable of causing a failure of the 
Transparency Thesis. Locke feels i f this failure is genuine, then someone could be excused. 
2 8 5 The example of the Day-Man and Night-Man given in §23 also appears to mention forgetfulness and that 
"the Mind many times recovers the memory of a past consciousness, which it had lost for twenty Years 
together." Essay 344:36-345:1 (Book II, Chap XXVII, §23). However, it is not forgetfulness that makes the 
example coherent but that we could "suppose two distinct incommunicable consciousnesses" Essay 344:18 
(Book II, Chap XXVII, §23). Forgetfulness is not the same as being incapable of recalling something, and so 
this example I take not to rely on memory (although Locke illustrates it in this manner to make the sceptical 
possibility appear closer to actual experience). 
2 9 0 In De Beer (1979): Letter 1609, from William Molyneux, 2 n d March 1693 (Vol. 4:650), Letter 1620 Locke to 
W.M., 28lh March 1693 (Vol. 4:665), Letter 1655, Locke to W.M., 23rd August 1693 (Vol. 4:722), Letter 1661 
from W.M., 16th September 1693 (Vol. 4:729), Letter 1685, from W.M., 23rd December 1693 (Vol. 4:767), 
Letter 1693, Locke to W.M., 19lh January 1697 (Vol. 4:785), Letter 1712, from W.M., 17th February 1694 (Vol. 
5:21), Letter 1744, Locke to W.M., 26th May 1694 (Vol. 5:58). For discussion see Helm (1981) and Allison 
and Jolley (1981). 
2" Locke had a dispute with Thomas Stringer about the ownership of portrait. Stringer claimed Locke had 
given him the painting. Locke claims to have no recall of this and remarks in a letter "I am sure I could never 
give it away in a letter to anyone, or say anything like it unless I were drunk when I writ it." This is maybe 
indicative that Locke's view of drunkenness was based on peculiar personal experience. For a discussion of 
the whole affair see Yolton (1985, pp. 10-14). 
292 Essay 338:3-4 (Book II, Chap XXVII, §13) 
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However, the extent of this possible excuse is not delimited by memory as those who have 
fulminated over this case assume. Locke is attempting to provide a theory of moral 
retribution as well as one of personal identity. Consciousness transforms here into 
Conscience."3 This is the moral counterpart of consciousness. For two states to be 
personally co-conscious they have to be performed with the same consciousness even i f 
done at different times. In this sense the co-consciousness relationship is the same for 
simultaneous as for temporally distinct actions. The Conscience is the totality of moral 
actions that fulfil this relationship. Memory does not necessarily uncover all these 
connections. Lockean bodily memory could not do so, and Locke denies the existence of 
Intellectual memory"*. Thus Locke writes: 
But in the great Day, wherein the Secrets of all Hearts shall be laid open, it 
may be reasonable to think, no one shall be made to answer for what he knows 
nothing of; but shall receive his Doom, his Conscience accusing or excusing 
him."5 
Divine judgement will discern the true relations of consciousness that our finite intellectual 
capacities cannot always reveal to us. Conscience, being a repository of every act a person 
performed with full consciousness, is the marker of how each person will be judged. 
The same approach explains §20"" where Locke considers what would happen on the 
supposition " I wholly lose the memory of some parts of my Life, beyond a possibility of 
retrieving them, so that perhaps I shall never be conscious of them again" and asks "yet am 
I not the same Person"?1" Locke solves this by asking the reader to "take notice what the 
Word / is applied to, which in this case is the Man only."198 I , meaning the consciousness, 
cannot come to be separated from its past. Recall that the self is 'inseparable'. The Man, 
however, could be united with different consciousnesses, although these would have to be 
"incommunicable".29' Once again memory is linked with the Man and not the person. 
This also strikes a blow against those who attempt to construe Locke as holding a prototype 
Constructivist account. These writers are impressed by Locke's comment that "whatever 
2 , 3 See Winkler (1991b) for an interpretation of Locke along these lines. Rovane uses the moral side of Locke's 
theory as inspiration for her Neo-Lockean account of personal identity, although she explicitly claims to 
deviate from Locke on many points. See Rovane (1999) esp. pp. 3-12. 
2 9 4 Although he does allow that Angels might have all their actions laid before them at all times, Essay 154:21-
24 (Book II, Chap X, §9) This would seem to tell decisively against the role of human memory in constructing 
conscience. 
295 Essay 344:8-12 (Book II, Chap XXVTI, §22) emphasis added. 
2M Essay 342:23-343:4 (Book II, Chap XXVH, §20) 
"' Essay 342:23-26 (Book II, Chap XXVTJ, §20) 
298 Essay 342:28-29 (Book U, Chap XXVII, §20) 
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past Actions [the self] cannot reconcile or appropriate to that present self by consciousness, 
it can be no more concerned in, than i f they had never been done".300 However, it should be 
clear, that consciousness (or Conscience) could not arbitrarily appropriate or ignore 
Actions. Those performed by the same consciousness belong to the person, those not so 
performed, do not and cannot. That Locke's theory is guaranteed by divine benevolence 
should not be counted against it, especially when one remembers that Locke is aiming 
towards an account compatible with prevalent Protestant Eschatology.301 
Locke's attempt to yield a moral theory from personal identity also tempts him to find a 
legal theory as well. One must agree with Locke that it is the practice of law to punish the 
person. However, Locke notes in the Drunken and Sober Man discussion that "Humane 
Laws punish both with a Justice suitable to [Justice's] way of Knowledge",302 that is by way 
of the facts established by third-person criteria rather than first-person criteria.303 
Sensitivity to this distinction comes out towards the end of the personal identity discussion. 
Locke remarks that "[Person] is a Forensick Term"3<M which is to say a legal term. Locke 
precedes this comment by remarking that "Person, as I take it, is the name for this self. 
Where-ever a Man finds, what he calls himself, there I think another may say is the same 
Person."3" This chimes in perfectly with Locke's comment that courts must punish the 
Man. It is where a Man finds himself that others might say they find him as well. Usually 
this will be where the Person is found, for as Locke remarks " I know that in the ordinary 
way of speaking, the same Person, and the same Man, stand for one and the same thing."306 
2W Essay 342:32 (Book II, Chap XXVII, §20) 
300 Essay 346:35-38 (Book II, Chap XXVII, §26) 
3 0 1 For discussion of the reaction to Locke's theory among theologians see Tennant (1982). 
302 Essay 343:38, 344:1 (Book II, Chap XXVTI, §22) the reading 'Justice's way of Knowledge' rather than 'the 
accused's way of Knowledge' is widely accepted to be the correct way to settle the ambiguity in Locke's text 
here. See Allison & Jolley (1981). 
1 0 3 Although consider this case collected in The Fortean Times (No. 124) originally reported in The Melbourne 
Herald of 25th February 1999: "Two elderly Alzheimer's patients had 'a bit of a scrap' at a care centre in New 
Zealand's North Island. When police arrived 15 minutes later, one of the men felt sore and the other couldn't 
remember the fight. In court last February, the police explained to judge Pat Treston that they were obliged to 
withdraw the case because neither man could recall the incident. Quipped Judge Treston. 'What incident?'." 
Some would detect a Lockean tone in the judge's sense of humour. 
304 Essay 346:26 (Book II, Chap XXVD, §26) 
303 Essay 346:24-26 (Book II, Chap XXVTI, §26) emphasis added. Locke's shift between first-person and third-
person identification is of interest here, especially given the role Hume later gives this distinction. See next 
chapter, Section X. Locke's comment here that 'Person, as I take it, is the name for this self is not in 
dissonance with my claim the two terms are distinct in Locke's usage. The self is the person at a moment. In 
his discussion of legal practice Locke is asserting that normally we take the presence of a self to entail the 
presence of a person. That is a conscious being will remain the same conscious being in a reliable fashion. 
Which, for purposes of the law means we can rightly punish the same man with confidence that we are 
punishing the same person. This explains why where a man finds himself another may say he finds the same 
person. To finds oneself is to be conscious. Being so conscious is enough for another to base their identity 
judgements upon. All this, of course, presumes the Compositional Account. 
306 Essay 340:18-20 (Book II, Chap XXVII, § 15) 
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V I I 
L O C K E & ANIMALISM & T H E MAN AGAIN 
Locke's legal interpretation of the person rests clearly on the supposition that the Man and 
the Person are reliably one. If, ultimately, this is not true it does not matter for the 
apportioning of blame on judgement day is God's business, and not ours. Man should be 
suitable for our day to day business. As has been shown, though, in the published Essay 
Locke has all but thrown up his hands in dismay when trying to define Man. Locke, 
therefore, is trying to bring together two instincts. He does not want to premise any 
philosophical or moral conclusion on an account of Man that may be shown to be incorrect. 
Equally he wants to give an account of how we feel ourselves to be identical and persisting 
beings. 
Locke does have instincts about what Man might turn out to be, and the implications this 
would have for his theory. Throughout the personal identity discussion he remarks on what 
he feels is most likely: 
I know that in the ordinary way of speaking, the same Person, and the same 
Man, stand for one and the same thing.307 
I agree the more probable Opinion is, that this consciousness is annexed to, and 
the Affection of one individual immaterial Substance.308 
I am apt enough to think I have in treating of this Subject made some 
Suppositions that will look strange to some Readers, and possibly they are so in 
themselves. But yet I think, they are such, as are pardonable in this ignorance 
we are in of the Nature of that thinking thing, that is in us, and which we look 
on as our selves. Did we know what it was, or how it was tied to a certain 
System of fleeting Animal Spirits; or whether it could, or could not perform its 
Operations of Thinking and Memory out of a Body organised as ours is; and 
whether it has pleased God, that no one such Spirit shall ever be united to any 
but one such Body, upon the right Constitution of whose Organs its Memory 
should depend, we might see the Absurdity of some of those Suppositions I 
have made.309 
In other words, i f we could be sure of the Composition of Man, then one could adopt a 
theory of personal identity that identified the Man and the Person. Locke without these 
Essay 340:18-20 (Book H\ Chap XXVII, § 15) 
Essay 345:25-27 (Book II, Chap XXVTJ, §25) 
Essay 347:13-24 (Book 0, Chap XXVO, §27) 
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doubts would adopt Descartes' Compositional Account and would be far more an animalist 
than a psychological theorist. 
With his theory of personal identity Locke believes he has achieved the aims he had with 
the Moral Man account: moral attribution safe from the vagaries of substance. His account 
is one where "the precise real Essence of the Things moral Words stand for, may be 
perfectly known".110 Locke ends the chapter 'Of Identity & Diversity' by returning once 
more to his initial point of departure, the definition of Man. He reviews three possible 
definitions. That i f "a rational Spirit be the Idea of a Man, 'tis easie to know, what is the 
same Man, viz. the same Spirit"11' or while "a rational Spirit vitally united to a Body of a 
certain conformation of Parts""2 remain in union it is the same Man. Finally the Idea of 
Man might be "but the vital union of Parts in a certain shape".3,3 How we choose between 
these accounts does not matter. 
For whatever be the composition whereof the complex Idea is made, whenever 
Existence makes it one particular thing under any denomination, the same 
Existence continued, preserves it the same individual under the same 
denomination.314 
I f any of these beings are thinking intelligent Beings then they would of course also be 
persons. 
310 Essay 516:23-24 (Book ffl, Chap XI, §16) 
311 Essay 348:11-13 (Book II, Chap XXVII, §29) 
312 Essay 348:13-14 (Book II, Chap XXVII, §29) 
315 Essay 348:17-18 (Book II, Chap XXVII, §29) 
314 Essay 348:21-25 (Book II, Chap XXVII, §29) 
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C H A P T E R 3 
H U M E ON PERSONAL IDENTITY 
Hume's views on personal identity are notorious for two reasons. One is his supposed 
scepticism about personal identity. The second is his admission of confusion over the issue. 
Nonetheless Hume still has an important contribution to make to the personal identity 
debate. 
Hume's views on personal identity are profoundly influenced by Locke."5 Locke's 
quandaries arise from the doubts his empiricism throws up for the Compositional Account 
favoured by the Cartesians. Hume shares Locke's empiricist drive, but his principles are 
more extreme and his conclusions more dramatic.316 Locke was prepared to resolve personal 
identity by way of a quasi-substantial entity, 'a suitable concrete'. Hume, though, rejected 
outright the notion of substance and had serious misgivings about the very notion of 
identity. 
The extremity of Hume's account means that it is typically regarded as an interesting 
failure.3" Penelhum describes Hume's theory as "radically defective"318 while Waxman goes 
as far as to remark that "it is little wonder that [Hume's] account of personal identity tends 
to be regarded as a splendid example of how not to handle this problem."3" However, as 
Hume's conclusions are frequently misappropriated and self-confessedly confused, it is 
difficult to judge whether his account does fail. To judge this aright it is necessary to 
establish what Hume's aims were in giving an account of personal identity. Just as 
Descartes and Locke have suffered, Hume too has been bent into the shape of contemporary 
3 1 5 Roland Hall has persuasively suggested that Hume must have written with Locke's Essay in front of him, so 
many are the co-incidences. The broad structure, a treatment of identity and then a treatment of personal 
identity, matches Locke. Also Hume uses examples of near exact similarity. For more see (Hall 1974). 
3 1 6 Broadly, therefore, the picture of Locke's influence on Hume assumed here is the traditional one. Laird's 
opinion on the matter is worth quoting, being both insightful and instructive: "The traditional doctrine 
according to which Hume's highly developed empiricism and thorough-going phenomenalism show what 
Locke should have held had he been persistently clearheaded is, up to a point, tolerably accurate. It fails, 
however, to perceive that Locke, in his own way, was as stubborn a rationalist as ever he was an empiricist, and 
that a distinct tincture of his rationalism remained in Hume's philosophy, essentially unmodified if ultimately 
disowned, although the range of it was much more rigorously restricted than with Locke." Laird (1932) p. 50. 
Interestingly, the normally brutally precise Laird is unable to source this 'traditional' view. It is a curious fact 
that although philosophy's traditional views are often alluded to their origins remain obscure. Consequently 
one cannot help but entertain the possibility that no-one ever held them sincerely. Instead they are, in fact, 
fraudulent traditions, nourished not by heritage or pedigree, but laziness and convenience. 
3 , 7 See for example, Noonan (1989) p. 102-3, Perry (1975a) p. 26ff. 
3 1 8 Penelhum (1967) p. 98 
3 , 9 Waxman (1994) p. 223 
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issues.m Hume is probably more in sympathy with modem concerns than either Locke or 
Descartes, but his concerns are nonetheless quite distinct from present-day ones. 
Key to understanding both Hume's aims and the subsequent labyrinth of the Appendix is 
Hume's extreme empiricist outlook in Book I of the Treatise."' This is best achieved by 
attributing to Hume a principle that, although he never explicitly states, I believe is well 
supported by the text. The principle, which I call the Humean Insight, is this: that whatever 
it is that constitutes personal identity this should be accessible to us in a suitable manner (I 
say suitable manner to avoid pre-judging what this involves). 
Hume's difficulties arise because personal identity is the fulcrum upon which the rest of his 
philosophy refuses to balance. On the one hand he claims that perceptions are bonded by a 
"secret connexion"3" that we cannot ever know. On the other hand he speaks of 
This object [... ] self, or that succession of related ideas and impressions, of 
which we have an intimate memory and consciousness.313 
The Humean Insight, I believe, captures this tension between the intimacy of the self and 
the distance of causation. It captures what is still valuable in Hume's account and explains 
his quandary in the Appendix. 
Hume presents not one, but two accounts of personal identity in the Treatise. The explicit 
theory is contained in Book I , but there is a complimentary account in Books 0 & EH. 
Hume draws attention to his differing concerns when he writes: 
[W]e must distinguish betwixt personal identity, as it regards our thought or 
imagination, and as it regards our passions or the concern we take in ourselves. 
3 1 0 For a discussion of the state of Hume scholarship see Capaldi (1992). Shoemaker (1986) p. 3 has a 
perceptive survey of the ways Hume has been misappropriated (not least by Shoemaker himself). 
3 , 1 Madell is alone in also emphasising this writing "Hume's account of personal identity is very obviously an 
empiricist one in its desire to see personal identity as unmysterious, and in the view that it is to be explained in 
terms of observable connections between experiences" Madell (1981) p.lff. However, Madell condemns both 
Hume and what he identifies as the Empiricist Tradition of personal identity. On the contrary I feel the 
Humean Insight provides a useful test that any theory of personal identity should be able to pass. If personal 
identity is mysterious serious argument is needed to justify accepting such a position. Madell believes he can 
offer this, following Butler, Reid and Swinburne. 
m Enquiry 66:12 (VII, I) All references are to the Nidditch edited edition of the Enquiry, Hume (1975). Each 
has a page and line numbers marking the beginning and end of the quote (e.g. Enquiry 144.3-12). These are 
followed by numerals indicating Hume's own textual divisions (e.g. VII, II). 
3U Treatise 277:17-19 (II, I, I) All references are to the Nidditch edited edition of the Treatise, Hume (1978). 
Each has a page and line numbers marking the beginning and end of the quote (e.g. Treatise 144:3-12). These 
are followed by numerals indicating Hume's own textual divisions (e.g. I, JJ, II). In the case of the chapter 'Of 
Personal Identity' there is a forth numeral indicating the paragraph number (e.g. I, IV, VI, V). 
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The first is our present subject; and to explain it perfectly we must take the 
matter pretty deep[.]314 
Hume's theory concerning personal identity 'as it regards our thought or imagination' has 
involved critics far more than Hume's scattered comments about personal identity 'as it 
regards our passions or the concern we take for ourselves.' The always pertinent Kemp 
Smith is right to insist that we must ask: 
Why it is that in Book I of the Treatise the existence of an impression of the 
self is explicitly denied, while yet his theory of the 'indirect' passions, 
propounded at length in Book n, is made to rest on the assumption that we do 
in fact experience an impression of the self, and that this impression is ever-
present to us?5" 
That there is a question is partly Hume's own fault. He offers a whole chapter on personal 
identity as a metaphysical quandary, but no explicit systematic account of personal identity 
as it concerns the passions.3" However, this omission on Hume's part is in itself revealing. 
The chapter 'Of Personal Identity' takes a specific metaphysics of personal identity to task. 
Hume wishes to rid philosophy of otiose concepts and explanations. Hume is not 
antagonistic towards the notion of a person as an everyday expedient, nor does he deny that 
we have concern for ourselves. Hume's negative project needs careful and explicit 
statement. On the contrary Hume's positive theory is (at least in Hume's own assessment) 
so straightforward as to be obvious. A theory that emphasises the experience of concern for 
ourselves, and places everything of weight with that experience, has no need to further 
explain itself. This lack of developed positive theory in part explains Hume's confusion in 
the Appendix. 
Few parts of the philosophical canon are as notorious and unexpected as the Appendix 
recapitulation. Any interpretation of Hume's theory of personal identity must account for 
Hume's self-doubts. The Humean Insight does provide one such amelioration. This will 
324 Treatise 253:19-23 (I, IV, VI, V). Waxman suggests that the "self of'thought or imagination' is the 
condition for the representation of all imperfect identities (bodies, other minds, substances)" Waxman (1994) p. 
224. This suggests Hume's interest is not the traditional problem of personal identity at all, at least not in Book 
I. As will be discussed later, Hume does not make use of a notion of imperfect identity. Therefore, he has no 
need for personal identity to underwrite this practice. The discussion here will proceed in the belief that 
Hume's concern was more traditional, i.e. what constitutes a person, and how arrive at the idea of that 
constitution. 
3" Kemp-Smith (1941) p. v. Kemp Smith, in this quote at least, appears to conflate the self being intimately 
known with having an impression of the self. 
1 7 6 Indeed in Book II he says of personal identity '"Tis evident, that the idea, or rather impression of ourselves 
is always intimately present with us, and that our consciousness gives us so lively a conception of our own 
person, that 'tis not possible to imagine, that any thing can in particular go beyond it." Treatise 317:26-30 (JJ, I, 
XT) 
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also be achieved by looking beyond the chapter 'Of Personal Identity' and the Appendix. 
Garrett is typical when he says; "Although [Hume] devotes several pages in the Appendix 
to stating his misgivings, Hume does not succeed in clearly stating any specific problem 
with his earlier account. And no trace of the topic recurs in the first Enquiry, nor in any of 
Hume's other writings."'" In fact Hume is quite clear where he feels his difficulty to he, 
and the Humean Insight captures this difficulty. 
By adopting this approach it is possible to show that Hume would tolerate a version of the 
Compositional Account. It may even be that Hume would more than tolerate such an 
account, but does in fact embrace one. What is more his account is even closer to a modern 
Animalism than either Descartes' or Locke's. Such a reading is contrary to a long line of 
critics who perceive of Hume as holding a purely psychological criterion of personal 
identity."8 
Clearly the Naturalist Hume presented by Kemp-Smith is more likely to be an Animalist 
than the arch-sceptical Hume of the Logical Positivists. In what follows I side with 'The 
New Hume' rather than with 'The Old Hume'.329 The conflicts between the Old and New 
Hume are the key Humean themes: causation, external objects, and persons. The Old Hume 
is a sceptic about all of these. The New Hume is a causal realist and a realist about objects 
according to his assorted champions.330 The New Hume's opinion of personal identity has 
not been widely discussed but it reasonable to assume the New Hume is also a realist about 
persons. The New Hume's realist commitments are clearly a package. The Old Hume's 
alleged rejection of the existence of persons is supposedly the final flourish of Book I's 
sceptical tirade. The New Hume, all things being equal, should end with an account of 
personal identity that although Sceptically Realist is nonetheless Naturalistic about persons. 
As will emerge in what follows just such a Naturalism and Realism about persons is 
contained in the first book of the Treatise. In part this can only be established by accepting 
that Hume is a realist about both causation and objects. However, quite independent 
investigation can present a strong case for Hume being firstly a realist about persons, 
secondly accepting that persons are natural and thirdly that they are natural because they are 
3" Garrett (1997) p. 164. For more on Hume's comments on personal identity outside the Treatise see Mclntyre 
(1993). Although Garrett is right that Hume makes no explicit comments about personal identity several of the 
themes return particularly the role of introspection and intimacy. See Enquiry 64ff. (VII, I). 
3 1 8 Flew regards Hume's theory as utterly erroneous for just this reason. See Flew (1986) pp. 9\ff. Significant 
exceptions are Baier (1979) and Capaldi (1975). For others who ascribe a purely psychological account to 
Hume see note 4 in the Introduction. 
3 M The terms are borrowed from Winkler (1991b) pp. 541-44 & 575-78. 
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human animals. This account will be stronger when taken with the other doctrines of 
Sceptical Realism. Hopefully the account below will be persuasive enough, though, to 
stand alone as it is not possible to fully defend the New Hume within the scope of this work. 
The Treatise is a notoriously difficult work, and the chapter 'Of Personal Identity' a 
famously difficult chapter. Given not only the amount, but the diversity, of secondary 
material about Hume the following treatment is inevitably lengthy. The first section 
establishes which position Hume is attacking. His target is dubbed here The 
Metaphysicians' Self. Consequently Hume is attacking the notion that the self is simple and 
perfect in its identity. §U sketches Hume's view of identity as systematic fiction. §IU 
examines the psychological mechanisms Hume develops to explain how the fiction of 
identity arises. §§iV-VI explore Hume's account of identity in depth, looking first at 
identity in material bodies, and then in more complex cases. Having established the 
arguments Hume made use of prior to his arguments about personal identity § V I I looks at 
personal identity itself. It is argued that Hume's central difficulty with the Metaphysicians' 
Self is with the role of introspection and §VIJJ deals with these issues. §§LX & X then 
"present a new interpretation of Hume-based on-the Compositional-Account. Jinally_the__"_ 
Appendix is looked at. §XI explains why prevailing interpretations are insufficient and 
§XJJ attempts to explain the Appendix in terms of the Compositional Account. The purpose 
of this is twofold. It both demonstrates that the Compositional Account was at the heart of 
Hume's original account and establishes that Hume's worries arise from this position and 
his beliefs about introspection. 
3 3 0 Primarily Strawson, G. (1989) and Wright (1983) who both follow in the spirit of Kemp-Smith (1941). See 
Winkler (1991b) for useful discussion as well as Capaidi (1991) & (1992) 
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I 
HUME'S COMPLAINTS & T H E S E L F O F T H E METAPHYSICIANS 
The chapter 'Of Personal Identity' has both a negative and a positive stage. The negative 
phase is far clearer then than the positive. Hume's positive position is normally taken to be 
typified by his claim that " I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are 
nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions"."1 This is, in fact, quite 
mistakea However, the context of Hume's apparent positive claims makes it difficult to 
tell when Hume is still on the attack and when he is not. Hume does hold a bundle theory 
of the mind but this does not imply or commit him to a bundle theory of personal identity. 
These questions of interpretation will be dealt with later. First Hume's negative account of 
personal identity will be outlined. 
Hume levels his complaints against 'certain metaphysicians', although no one is named."2 
This picture of the Self will be called The Metaphysicians' Self. Hume lists three distinct 
claims: 
1) "We are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our self.""3 
2) "We feel its [the self s] existence and its continuance in existence.""4 
3) "[We] are certain, beyond the existence of a demonstration, both of its perfect 
identity and simplicity."5" 
Hume then distinguishes two defences he feels are used to justify these three claims: 
ID) 'Sensations' increase our belief in the self."5 
531 Treatise 252:31-33 (I, IV, VI , IV) 
3 3 2 Except Shaftebury at Treatise 254«1. It is likely that Butler is a major influence. Butler's Dissertation on 
Personal Identitywas published in 1736, three years before the Treatise (as von Leyden notes, 1957, p. 347). 
Greig (1931) states that "[Hume] desired both the acquaintance and the approbation of the Rev. Dr Butler, 
whose Analogy of Religion had been published only the year before... [however] he failed to meet Butler, 
though he tried at least once." p. 95-6. Church draws an interesting link to Malebranche "One of the 
metaphysicians whom Hume sets apart from this conclusion concerning the generality of mankind may have 
been Malebranche. The 'intimate consciousness' of the self that Hume fails to find would then be his 
translation of 'sentiment interieur' Malebranche thought us to have of the existence, but not the essence, of the 
self." Church (1935) p. 104$! However, as Church points out, Malebranche did not believe we could introspect 
the soul. See also Laird (1932) pp. 165-6 for the Malebranche connection. Laird also adds Anthony Collins, 
Henry Dodwell and Clarke into the mix (1932) p . \66ff . For more historical colour see Thiel (1998b). 
333 Treatise 251:4-5 (I, IV, VI , I) 
334 Treatise 251:6 (I, IV, VI , I) 
"'Treatise 251:7-8 (I, IV, VI , I) 
336 Treatise 251:8-12 (I, IV, VI , 0 
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2D) "To attempt a farther proof of this were to weaken its evidence; since no proof can 
be derived from any fact, of which we are so intimately conscious; nor is there any 
thing, of which we can be certain, if we doubt of this.""7 
(1) Hume agrees with, repeatedly commenting on the intimacy we have with ourselves."8 
However, these comments come in Book II of the Treatise by which time Hume has 
established that the self is only equivalent with a "succession of related ideas and 
impressions, of which we have an intimate memory and consciousness.""' Hume's aim in 
this chapter is to explore how the vulgar and other philosophers respond to the basic fact of 
this intimacy. Hume is not suspicious of the claim that we are intimate at every moment 
with ourselves as long as this is properly understood. (1) is compatible with Hume's own 
wider account (that we are never aware of anything other than individual perceptions"0). 
What he seeks to expose are the wrong moves made on the basis of (1). The first of these is 
the shift to holding (2). 
Hume cannot embrace (2), because he does not hold that the self continues perfectly 
identical through its existence. He does feel, though, that if there is a thing called the self, 
then it should be the sort of thing of which we are intimately conscious, and that we should 
be aware of how it exists over time. Of course, properly understood, we do feel the 
continuance and existence of the self over time, because we are intimately aware of 
perceptions. Hume, though, is highlighting the road to the erroneous belief in a simple 
identical self. (2) is acceptable to Hume in as much as being intimately aware of a 
perception is as much as we ever do know the self. However, (2) is unacceptable to Hume 
as commonly understood because it remains ambiguous whether the perception or the self 
itself is felt Hume holds quite clearly that we cannot find our self as a distinguishable part 
of our perceptions.541 
In the Appendix capitulation he states that "no connexions among distinct experiences are 
ever discoverable by human understanding. We only feel a connexion or a determination of 
the thought".MJ Hume does not seem to distinguish between self-knowledge in the sense of 
knowing the self, and self-knowledge in the sense of knowing the contents of our own 
mind. Of course, for Hume both of these are merely constituted by the perceptions, but one 
could know individual perceptions without being aware of how they are part of the same 
"' Treatise 251:12-15 (I, IV, VI , I) 
3 1 8 E.g. Treatise lll.Yl (II, I, I), 286:9 (II, I, V ) , 317:27 (II, I, XI ) , 320:16 (II, I, X I ) , 339:14 (TJ, H, II), 354:13 
(II, 0, IV), 427:25 (II, II, VII). 
™ Treatise 277:17-19 (H, 1,1) 
M0 Treatise 252:15-17 (I, IV, VI , III) 
341 Treatise 189:17-190:3 (I, IV, II) 
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succession. Not fully understanding the consequence of this distinction is a weakness in 
Hume's initial account. Once again intimacy plays a role in Hume's worries. Feeling a 
connexion is itself a type of intimacy. Yet we cannot be intimate with a causal connexion, 
because these connexions are ultimately mysterious. 
(3) Hume rejects. The Metaphysicians' Self is alleged to be perfect and simple. Refuting 
this is the central drive of Hume's attack. Further, this is also part of the Humean Insight. 
Any firm metaphysical claim about our personal identity cannot be mysterious and 
indemonstrable. Hence, by the same token, Hume rejects (2)D, that any attempt of a proof 
will undermine knowledge of our own personal identity. And Hume rejects the claim that 
sensations deliver up any idea of personal identity, for it will be his very claim that no 
impression of the self is to be found in our perceptions. 
(3) is the crux of the Humean dilemma. Although no proof can be offered for the existence 
of the self, its existence is something intimately known to us in our perceptions. The 
naturalness with which we know the self is the only proof Hume feels might be 
forthcoming. Indeed in Book I I he will come to suggest that: 
'Tis evident, that the idea, or rather impression of ourselves is always 
intimately present with us, and that our consciousness gives us so lively a 
conception of our own person, that 'tis not possible to imagine, that any thing 
can in particular go beyond it.M 3 
At this stage, though, Hume is still committed to analysing why we feel we can go beyond 
the intimacy of self-perceptions to some other truth. 
(1)D, like (1), Hume is in part in agreement with. Such a claim is compatible with a bundle 
theory of the mind. Hume would associate this claim with Cartesians who believed that 
sensations of the body confirmed the union of mind and body, and therefore confirmed 
knowledge of the soul."4 Hume makes no further use of this objectioa His comments only 
two paragraphs later that upon introspection all one can find is perceptions would seem to 
agree with this claim. I f the self is just a bundle of perceptions then sensations cannot help 
but increase our belief in the self. Sensations are a source of self-awareness. However, 
they are impugned here because they are inclined to increase our belief in the fiction of a 
perfectly identical self. 
Treatise 635:23-26 (App, X ) 
Treatise 317:26-30 (H, I, X I ) 
See previous note 332 for the importance of Malebranche in this connection. 
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Hume, of course, is quite aware of the difference between 'self used in the Metaphysician's 
sense and used in self-reference. The first two-paragraphs discuss the role of intimacy in 
apprehending the self, but are not spelt out in first-person terms. Intimacy, as already noted, 
plays a crucial role for Hume. Therefore, introspection also plays a role. Hume reserves 
the terms "myself™ and "himself™ to describe introspection. The first-person 
introspective passage34' remains entirely non-committal about what relation the perceptions 
discovered in introspection might bear to selves, persons, minds or any other entity. In this 
passage Hume is merely asserting the impotence of introspection in discovering anything 
about our own composition. Significantly this is the only part of Hume's discussion that is 
carried out in exclusively first-person terms. This is not surprising given the role of 
introspection in Hume's positive theory. 
Hume begins the discussion by describing the theory of self he attributes to other 
philosophers, the Metaphysicians' Self. In the first two paragraphs he uses the word 'self" 8 
exclusively except on one occasion when he writes "But self or person is not any one 
impression, but that to which our several impressions and ideas are suppos'd to have 
reference."54' Obviously it is of great weight whether Hume here establishes an equivalence 
between self and person. Arguably he does not. Instead 'self is used to describe the theory 
of other philosophers. 'Person' is only used when Hume begins his analysis. 'Person' is 
introduced as Hume's own term, to be contrasted with 'self. Hume regards 'self when 
used to refer to a putative metaphysical entity as a bankrupt term. 'Person', however, he 
seeks to adopt and rehabilitate. Paraphrased, then, Hume asserts that we have no single 
impression either of the Metaphysician's Self nor of our Person. Two things need to be 
noted. One that Hume asserts no equivalence, and that his usage of 'person' is introduced 
without definition. This rather implies that its meaning is a natural and common-sense one. 
Hume's attack, therefore, is precise and deliberate. He attacks a certain view of the self, 
The Simple view."0 The question remains, though, as to whether Hume is carrying out an 
attack on all notions of the self. Clearly, he cannot be doing this, because there are theories 
of the self other than the Simple View. However, Hume might have taken himself to be 
attacking all notions of the self i f he believed that the Simple View exhausted the 
145 Treatise 252:12, 252:15, 252:19 (I, IV, VI , HI) 
146 Treatise 252:25, 252:29 (I, IV, VI , m) 
147 Treatise 252:6-30 (I, IV, VI , HI) 
148 Treatise 251:5,251:11 0, IV, VI , I), 251:18, 251:22, 251:27, 251:29,252:4 (I, IV, VI , II) 
149 Treatise 251:24-6 (I. IV, VI , II) 
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alternatives to his own theory. Hume is taken to be making just such a claim by Twentieth 
Century empiricists who adopt Hume as their own.551 They take Hume to be defending a 
'No-self account of personal identity. The 'No-self view claims mat talk of selves is 
premised on a logical error, or that the self is a logical construct and not a real metaphysical 
entity. Hume does feel that identity is a psychological error, and that ideas of perfectly 
identical selves are constructs of the imagination. It is less clear where Hume feels this 
leaves the metaphysical status of persons. However, none of this commits Hume to a 'No-
self view. Broadly this is because the 'No-Self view is anti-realist and Hume's theory of 
personal identity is a realist one. Strawson pithily captures the faults of this interpretation 
of Hume: 
[The] current misinterpretation - travesty - of Hume as some sort of 
prototypical logical positivist rests almost entirely on supposing him to restrict 
his view of what could exist to what his epistemology admits as knowable or 
directly experienceable. And so it is that the great sceptical expositor of the 
vast extent of human ignorance is held to believe that there is definitely nothing 
we cannot know about (or at least considered as a heroic foreshadower of this 
view). I can think of no greater irony in the history of philosophy . 3" 
Clearly it greatly affects our view of Hume i f we decide his attack is a general rather than a 
limited one. It is clear that Hume is attacking a certain picture of personal identity, the 
Metaphysicians' Self. It is also obvious how one could take the bundle theory to be a 
denial of the existence of persons."3 However, this would be too glib. Hume's denial can 
only be understood along with his own theory of identity. The idiosyncrasies of Hume's 
version of identity means that Hume could consistently deny the existence of perfectly 
identical and simple persons while asserting the existence of persons. Stated so boldly this 
might seem paradoxical. This appearance says more about Hume's account of identity than 
it does about the personal identity debate at large. However, i f this is correct, Hume is not 
involved in a general attack against persons. Hume should be seen as conducting a limited 
attack against the theories prevalent while he was writing. These views he combined (and 
slightly caricatured) as the Metaphysicians' Self. Hume cannot be claimed as a proto-
positivist hero. Concerning bodies Hume adopts a limited attack, stating "We may well ask, 
What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body? but 'tis vain to ask, Whether 
Parfit (1984) coins this term to describe theories which rely on a single immutable entity to ground personal 
identity. These he contrasts with the Complex View, in which persons are taken to have proper parts. For 
extensive discussion of the Simple View see the excellent Soutngate (1994). 
3 5 1 See further Capaldi (1992) for discussion of the offences of the Logical Positivist reading of Hume. 
Carruthers persists in describing Hume as holding a No-Self theory. See Carruthers (1986) p. 51. 
3 3 1 Strawson, G. (1989) p. 66-7. 
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there be body or not?"iS* One might suggest that the Humean question of personal identity 
should be why we believe in selves, not whether or not selves exist. 
Regarding Hume as making a limited attack also rules out one of the more persistent 
objections to Hume. Hume is taken to claim that when he introspects he cannot find the 
thing that would be his self, and that he has no idea of the self (although no part of the text 
exactly fits with this reading). It is objected that i f Hume has no idea of the self, then he 
cannot be sure what he is looking for, and cannot claim therefore to have not found it. 3" 
Yet, Hume does have an idea of the self, the same idea of an identical simple self that all of 
us are inclined to have. It is this that he cannot find when introspecting. Hume's limited 
attack is on this notion of the self, and it is this notion of the self that Hume claims he can 
find no evidence for when introspecting. Seen like this Hume's claim is consistent, and the 
objection seems quite trite."6 
Having established that it is the Metaphysicians' Self that Hume attacks, a lengthy diversion 
is necessary into Hume's account of identity. This done, Hume's explanation of the 
emergence of the fallacy of the Metaphysicians' Self can be put in perspective. This in turn 
will finally allow Hume's positive theory of personal identity to emerge. 
5 5 3 For example Perry (1975a) introduces extracts from Hume under the title "Abandonment of Personal 
Identity". 
3M Treatise 187:25-27 (I, IV , II) 
3 3 5 Shoemaker (1986) p. 3-4 & Noonan (1989) p. 83. Although every philosopher I know is familiar with this 
'traditional objection', and undergraduates seem able to produce it with tedious regularity under the guise of a 
standard response, it seems to rarely make it into print. Noonan, for example, cites the objection as one "noted 
by many commentators" but cites no specific authors. Typically both Noonan and Shoemaker note the opinion 
but do not hold it themselves. Philosophy's traditional arguments often seem to exist as an oral tradition, 
perpetuated by uninspired teachers and students alike, and given currency by frequent repetition in dull 
discussions at duller dinner parties. 
3 3 6 Al l the more so considering Hume's clear description of his procedure at Treatise 633:24-29 (App. II) 
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I I 
H U M E ON IDENTITY 
Hume regards the problem of personal identity as peculiarly difficult. He remarks more 
than once that it needs separate treatment apart from a general account of identity.3" 
However, by the chapter 'Of Personal Identity' Hume asserts the problem can be explained 
in the same manner as "the identity of plants, and animals, and ships, and houses, and all the 
compounded and changeable productions i f either art or nature."3" However, he still 
devotes a whole chapter to establishing this claim. 
Therefore, before discussing Hume's account of personal identity his general account of 
identity needs to be examined.339 Hume regards identity as a perfectly legitimate relation 
listing it as one of the seven philosophical relations: 
Identity may be esteem'd a second species of relation. This relation I here 
consider as apply'd in its strictest sense to constant and unchangeable objects: 
without examining the nature and foundation of personal identity, which shall 
find its place afterwards. Of all relations the most universal is that of identity, 
being common to every being, whose existence has any duration.360 
The difference between identity and personal identity is previewed here. Hume's general 
account of identity is concerned primarily with the identity of'constant and unchangeable 
objects'. This is the strict sense of identity, or as Hume typically calls it Perfect Identity. 
Persons, however, are changeable and their identity therefore particularly requires 
explanation. Hume's account of the identity of changeable objects grows out of his account 
of the identity of unchangeable objects. Hume's discussion of Perfect Identity as 'strict' has 
encouraged some commentators to suppose Hume thought of other identities as being 
3 " At Treatise 14:27-29 (I, I, V) and 189:30-190:3 (I, IV, II). Hume notes the question is "abstruse" (189:31) 
and therefore demands "recourse to the most profound metaphysics" (189:34-5) and further that the meaning of 
person "in common life 'tis... never very fix'd nor determinate." (189:35-6 & 200:1). It is the difficulty of die 
question, therefore, that forces its separate consideration, not any difference in the problem's nature. 
338 Treatise 259:6-9 (I, IV, VI , X V ) . 
3 5 9 Waxman also adopts this approach, but in a moment of self-aggrandisement suggests "It also puts one in a 
better position to reckon with a possibility that, to my knowledge, has been neglected by every previous 
interpreter: that personal identity, thought the subject of Treatise I/iv/§6, is nevertheless premised in the 
account of identity of bodies in iv/§2 and substances in iv/§§3-5." Waxman (1994) p. 201. In fact many 
commentators have been aware of Hume's earlier comments on identity. Waxman is right, though, that the 
connection between the two discussions has been under-appreciated. Waxman may rest easy that such a 
mistake will not occur here. 
>M Treatise 14: 25-31(1,1,V) 
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Imperfect or loose and popular identities (following Butler's distinction)."1 This, it will be 
argued, is not the case. 
This section will examine Hume's general account of identity by looking at his comments 
concerning the identity of bodies. Then Hume's re-examination of identity as part of his 
discussion of personal identity will be considered. A large number of issues need to be 
examined. First, Hume's use of Perfect Identity needs to be clarified. Once this is clear it 
will be possible to settle whether Hume believes we ever encounter anything that is 
Perfectly Identical. This done Hume's talk of improper, imperfect, supposed, fictional and 
attributed identities will be considered, as well as the occasions when he uses the word 
'identity' alone and without seeming qualification. The aim of this is to establish if Hume 
does propose a second legitimate sense of identity along with Perfect Identity. 
Everyone must concede that some identity statements are erroneous. Hume, however, 
might go further and claim that all identity statements are errors, fallacies or fictions. 
Strawson explains clearly why Hume could be thought to hold this: 
Clearly, anyone who accepts a basically Humean (or more generally strict 
classical empiricist) epistemology is going to be led or forced... to consider... 
an account according to which all that ultimately exists are perceptions. For 
however dubious such a Strict Idealist theory is, it is (given Humean 
epistemology) quite clearly the only way not to go beyond the kind of thing one 
can know to exist, and know the nature of, or have direct experience of, in 
giving an account (and an 'ontologically outright' account) of the nature of 
whatever one is trying to give an account of. It is, in fact, the only way not to 
get involved in 'fiction '.161 
Hence Strawson concludes "Indeed it is the only way to avoid committing oneself to the 
view that some 'fiction' or other is actually true."™ 
Hume is not a Strict Idealist (though, of course some might argue he should be). Identity 
could be one of the fictions that Hume chooses to tolerate or believe in. The generality (and 
ontological generosity) of the above quoted definition suggests that Hume does tolerate 
identity. However, this only commits him to tolerating fictions i f all identity statements are 
fictions. The question turns once more upon whether Hume does or does not give identity 
3 6 1 See Butler's comments in Perry (1975a) p. 100-101. This is not to dispute the general influence of Butler on 
Hume. 
J M Strawson, G. (1989) p. 66 
3 6 3 Strawson, G. (1989) p. 66 Strawson would seem to be committed to saying Hume does not disparage 
fictions. It is one of the tasks of proponents of the New Hume to explain the many occasions when Hume 
clearly talks of fictions also being errors or fallacies. 
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one of more senses. Of course Hume may not distinguish between legitimate and 
illegitimate cases of identity. He may merely claim that all identities arise as a result of the 
imagination and there is nothing our enquiries can discover beyond this fact. 
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I l l 
T H E CONTRASTING R O L E S OF REASON AND T H E IMAGINATION 
Hume's account of identity first arises during his discussion of the existence of external 
body. Identity, therefore, is not Hume's prime subject. In fact Hume's prime concern is 
with the two competing explanations for our belief in the existence of external objects: the 
vulgar and the philosophical. The vulgar do not distinguish between internal perceptions 
and external objects. The philosophical system suggests a double existence is which 
perceptions represent objects. Hume devotes the closing passages of 'Of Scepticism with 
Regard to the Senses' to discussing this conflict.364 I f Hume's version of identity is forged 
in the white heat of a conflict it is wise to be clear about what fuels the disagreement. 
Famously, Hume declares that whatever the defects of vulgar thinking it is nonetheless the 
practice of "the unthinking and unphilosophical part of mankind, (that is, all of us, at one 
time or other)".365 However, "the philosophical system is found by experience to take hold 
of many minds"366, but "Nature is obstinate, and will not quit the field, however strongly 
attack'd by reason".367 The conflict, though, is yet more complicated for the "philosophical 
hypothesis has no primary recommendation, either to reason or the imagination"™. It must 
therefore be the case "that the philosophical system acquires all its influence on the 
imagination from the vulgar one".369 
The vulgar way of thinking is therefore prior to any conclusions reason may draw. The 
faculty of vulgar thinking is the imagination. Hume, recalling his discussion of 
mathematics,370 notes that "the imagination, when set into any train of thinking, is apt to 
continue, even when its object fails it, and like a galley put in motion by the oars, carries on 
its course without any new impulse."371 This impulse means "the mind... once in the train 
of observing an uniformity among objects, [... ] naturally continues, till it renders the 
uniformity as compleat as possible."371 
3 6 4 One third of the chapter's thirty pages. It is also the longest chapter in the Treatise by some margin. Such 
prolixity in as precise a writer as Hume is in itself indicative of crisis. 
365 Treatise 205:2-4 (I, IV, II) 
366 Treatise 213:23-24 (I, IV, II) 
367 Treatise 215:24-5 (I, IV , H) 
iS> Treatise 212:3-5 (I, IV, IT) 
369 Treatise 213:18-20 (I, IV , II) 
370 Treatise 198:14-15 (I, IV, II) citing (I, II, IV) 
371 Treatise 198:15-18 0, IV , H) 
372 Treatise 198:27-30 (I, IV, II) 
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The vulgar way of thinking is therefore greatly different to philosophical tJiinking. As 
Hume believes identity arises as a psychological fiction, this cleave is worthy of 
investigation. He writes: 
There is a great difference betwixt such opinions as we form after a calm and 
profound reflection, and such as we embrace by a kind of instinct or natural 
impulse, on account of their suitableness and conformity to the mind. I f these 
opinions become contrary, 'tis not difficult to foresee which of them will have 
the advantage. As long as our attention is bent upon the subject, the 
philosophical and study'd principle may prevail; but the moment we relax our 
thoughts, nature will display herself, and draw us back to our former opinion. 
Nay she has sometimes such an influence, that she can stop our progress, even 
in the midst of our most profound reflections, and keep us from running on with 
all the consequences of any philosophical opinion. Thus tho' we clearly 
perceive the dependence and interruption of our perceptions, we stop short in 
our career, and never upon that account reject the notion of an independent and 
continu'd existence. That opinion has taken such deep root in the imagination, 
that 'tis impossible ever to eradicate it, nor will any strain'd metaphysical 
conviction of the dependence of our perceptions be sufficient for that purpose."3 
Reason is at a double disadvantage. Firstly its conclusions are unable to dislodge those 
which have taken 'deep root in the imagination'. Secondly, the act of reasoning itself is 
prone to being corrupted and usurped by the imagination even while it takes place.3'4 
Nonetheless reason does have a role and some power with which to interrogate the progress 
of the imagination. The imagination moves from impressions to belief with such ease and 
rapidity that it does not spontaneously reveal its own workings. Reason, however, can 
discern the imagination's machinations and therefore expose which of our beliefs are 
fictions. 
Reason can interrogate imagination via reflection. Reflection is itself an act of reason and 
Hume appeals to the power of reflection to expose the imagination's fictions.375 Reflection 
can achieve this interrogation because the imagination ascribes qualities that are not present 
575 Treatise 214:16-35 (I, IV , II) Compare also these remarks 'Toothing is more dangerous to reason than the 
flights of the imagination, and nothing has been the occasion of more mistakes among philosophers. Men of 
bright fancies may in this respect be compar'd to those angels, whom the scripture represents as covering their 
eyes with their wings" Treatise 267:18-23 (I, IV, VII) 
5 ' 4 Hume also distinguishes two types of imagination. The first's principles "are permanent, irresistable, and 
universal" Treatise 225:11-12 (I, IV, TV) the other "changeable, weak and irregular" 225:14-15 (I, IV, IV). 
The first are "the foundation of all of our thoughts and actions, so that upon their removal human nature must 
immediately perish and go to ruin" 225:16-18 (I, IV, IV) and therefore "received by philosophy" while "the 
latter are rejected" 225:24-25 (I, IV, TV). The weaker sort of the imagination is prone to extravagant 
explanation, e.g. explaining a disembodied voice in the dark as a ghost instead of merely an unseen human 
being 225:25-225:5 (I, IV , TV). It is the former sense of imagination that is Hume's object in this discussion. 
3 ' 5 E.g. at Treatise 209:14-17 (I, IV, II), and the remark at 210:13-15 (I, IV, II) that "a very little reflection and 
philosophy is sufficient to make us perceive the fallacy of that opinion [of the imagination]." 
in our perceptions. Reflection does not make this error because it only surveys the true 
contents of our consciousness. Hume takes consciousness to be transparent "For since all 
actions and sensations of the mind are known to us by consciousness, they must necessarily 
appear in every particular what they are, and be what they appear.""6 The imagination 
being "permanent, irresistable, and universal""7 the generation of fictions is constant. Yet 
reason can make the effort of reflection and bring about a hiatus long enough to realise that 
our perceptions do not justify our imaginative fictions. 
This dual account is crucial to Hume. With it he can explain how our ideas are mostly 
fictions, yet also explain how we acquire various terms of rational enquiry. Broadly, 
Hume's explanation is that we inevitably acquire some ideas through the natural action of 
the imagination and can then examine these using reason. Further, reason is itself aware of 
the transparency of consciousness. Knowing that perceptions 'must necessarily appear in 
every particular what they are, and be what they appear' reason can derive notions of what 
perceptions would cause the experiences actually caused by imaginative fictions. These 
notions, therefore, need never be encountered in experience for Hume to legitimately claim 
we can reason with them. Indeed, it might be the case that we could never experience them 
and yet they can play a role in our reasoning. 
Unfortunately Hume nowhere explicitly claims this as his procedure. However, it does 
explain why Hume often appears to introduce terms out of order and offer definitions that 
purely empirical methods would not justify. When Hume is explaining how the 
imagination works he can presume all the conclusions of the imagination are already 
known. The imagination will already be working within any enquirer. I f imagination 
attempted to examine itself, then circularity would inevitably follow. However, reason 
underwrites our examination of our beliefs, and reason, necessarily trailing in the 
imagination's wake, has access to all our common beliefs. Adopting this procedure as 
Hume's own allays the fears of those commentators who believe Hume frequently finds 
himself tugging his bootstraps or liberally helping himself to the tools of rationalism he 
supposedly rejects."8 
Before preceding, though, a brief word of caution. By the time of the Enquiry Hume 
dramatically neuters his early account. There he merely asserts: 
"'Treatise 190:13-15 (I, IV , H) 
J" Treatise 225:11-12 (I, IV, IV) 
5 7 8 E.g. Stroud (1977) p. \00ff. 
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It seems evident, that... without any reasoning, or even almost before the use of 
reason, we always suppose an external universe, which depends not on our 
perception, but would exist, though we and every sensible creature were absent 
and annihilated. Even the animal creation are governed by a like opinion, and 
preserve this belief of external objects, in all their thoughts, designs and 
actions.3" 
The accompanying discussion of the conflict between reason and the imagination is entirely 
absent. It is natural to ask why Hume abandons the complexity of his earlier account. 
Hume begins this phase of his discussion with identical external objects and leads through 
to personal identity. This encompasses his discussion of the conflict between reason and 
the imagination and his discussion of identity. Famously Hume expresses reservations 
about his conclusions about personal identity in the Appendix. Arguably the account of 
personal identity is the accumulation of Hume's arbitration between reason and the 
imagination. I f he became dissatisfied with the outcome, it is likely that he also became 
dissatisfied with the preceding argument. The final section will argue that Hume's 
dissatisfaction in the Appendix is with reason's inability to discover anything positive about 
personal identity. That is to say, with the failure of introspection. For present concerns, 
though, one must consider that Hume's self doubts cast a long shadow across these 
chapters. Although the procedure suggested above appears to be Hume's (and serves him 
well) his failure to explicitly proclaim it, combined with his later doubts, suggests it is not 
without problems. Nonetheless, I will proceed with it because it not only explains Hume's 
initial discussion, but also makes best sense of his later doubts. For i f one's later 
dissatisfaction is with the conflict between reason and imagination what procedure is more 
likely to prompt this malaise than one that draws the conflict so starkly? 
Enquiry 151:21-29 (XII , T). Stroud also cites this passage, Stroud (1977) p. 110-1. 
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I V 
HUME'S ANALYSIS OF T H E IDENTITY OF BODY 
Hume first notes "We may well ask, What causes induce us to believe in the existence of 
body? but 'tis vain to ask, Whether there be body or not?"'80 The proper question, then, is 
"Why we attribute a CONITNU'D existence to objects, even when they are not present to the 
senses; and why we suppose them to have an existence DISTINCT from the mind and 
perception."381 
Only one solution appeases both demands 
This hypothesis is the philosophical one of the double existence of perceptions 
and objects; which pleases our reason, in allowing, that our dependent 
perceptions are interrupted and different; and at the same time is agreeable to 
the imagination, in attributing a continu'd existence to something else, which 
we call objects. This philosophical system, therefore is the monstrous offspring 
of two principles, which are contrary to each other, which are both at once 
embrac'd by the mind, and which are unable mutually to destroy each other.381 
Hume's description of the Doctrine of Double Existence as a 'monstrous offspring' strongly 
suggests his opinion of it is poor. The key issue presently is to discover to what extent 
Hume regards identity as being a partner in crime with this monstrous offspring. 
Our senses "convey to us nothing but a single perception"383 and "A single perception can 
never produce the idea of a double existence".384 Instead, "fallacy or illusion" must construe 
any double existence.385 I f "the senses presented our impressions as external to, and 
independent of ourselves, both objects and ourselves must be obvious to our senses".384 
Consequently Hume is prompted to ask "how far we are ourselves the object of our 
senses."387 
Hume is quick to assert that as the notion of person is "in common life... never very fix'd 
nor determinate. 'Tis absurd, therefore, to imagine the senses can ever distinguish betwixt 
380 Treatise 187: 25-7 (I, IV , H) 
381 Treatise 188:6-9 (I, IV, II) 
381 Treatise 215:6-15 (I, IV, II) 
383 Treatise 189:7 (I, IV, II) 
384 Treatise 189:9-10 (I, IV, II) 
385 Treatise 189:19 (I, IV, II) Here Hume does not employ the word 'fiction'. However, he appears to use 
'fallacy' and 'illusion' as simple cognates. 
386 Treatise 189:24-8 (I, IV, JO) 
387 Treatise 189:28-9 (I, IV, II) 
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ourselves and external objects."388 Hume's reasoning seems less than forceful. An unclear 
notion of something does not seem to preclude distmguishing it. Something's being a mere 
something would suffice. Admittedly such opacity would be unsatisfactory in an account of 
personal identity, but this is not the objection that Hume makes. His objection only carries 
weight when backed by his own version of the Transparency Thesis. Hume insists that 
[S]ince all actions and sensations of the mind are known to us by 
consciousness, they must necessarily appear in every particular what they are, 
and be what they appear. Every thing that enters the mind, being in reality as 
the perception, 'tis impossible any thing shou'd to feeling appear different. 
This were to suppose, that even where we are most mtimately conscious, we 
might be mistaken.389 
One consequence of this is to dispense with one of the classic objections to Hume's theory 
of personal identity. I f Hume is taken to hold a bundle theory of personal identity, then he 
has to explain how we know where one bundle ends and another begins. However, Hume 
doesn't have to answer this question. He boldly asserts that we cannot distinguish between 
perceptions of ourselves and perceptions of the external world within our own perceptual 
arrays. This would imply that i f one's perceptions were of another person one could not by 
principle of reason alone tell where the other person began and one's own self ended. 
Clearly, it can be objected that this is nonsense. We do know where we end and others 
begin. Hume, however, is not saying that we do not regularly make this judgement (that 
would be absurd). He is instead claiming that such judgements about persons are governed 
by custom and habit as much as are judgements about objects. Appreciating this will be 
essential to understanding the later account of personal identity. 
Hume does seem to make an almost instant slip and disregard his own doctrine here, when 
he notes that "[We] think an object has a sufficient reality, when its Being is uninterrupted, 
and independent of the incessant revolutions, which we are conscious of in ourselves."390 I f 
this were Hume's sincere opinion this would count severely against the interpretation 
above. The 'incessant revolution' can only be of perceptions. I f we are aware of this being 
'in ourselves', i.e. internal, then surely we can distinguish ourselves from external 
existences. 
588 Treatise 189:35-200:3 (I, IV, H) 
389 Treatise 190:13-19 (I, IV, H) Hume recaps in the Appendix "As long as we confine our speculations to the 
appearances of objects to our senses, without entering into disquisitions concerning their real nature and 
operations, we are safe from all difficulties" Treatise 638:18-21 (App.) 
™ Treatise 191:26-9 (I, IV , H) 
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There is, however, no slip. The use of 'ourselves' here is merely reflexive. As we do not 
experience the divide between internal perceptions and external objects we can only be said 
to experience perceptions as being internal. It could be objected that Hume is not entitled to 
a notion of internal without the collateral notion of the external. However, the 
Transparency Thesis deals with this difficulty. Perceptions necessarily present themselves 
as parts of our minds i f we experience them at all. All Hume is committed to saying is that 
we are transparently aware of the coming and going of our own perceptions. The use of 
'ourselves' carries no ontological weight. Again this seems to preclude Hume's supposed 
bundling difficulty. Experience of a perception must be complete and transparent. Further 
as perceptions are "perishing existences"3" there can be no problem of possible co-
ownership. A perception comes into existence when it becomes part of a pre-existing 
bundle (a mind) and subsequently perishes.392 The numerically same perception cannot, 
therefore, migrate to another bundle.393 Nor could it belong to two minds simultaneously for 
its brief perishing existence. I f this happened the two minds would have to be transparent to 
each other, because each mind always has complete knowledge of every perception 
currently in its bundle. There could only be two minds i f they were qualitatively identical 
and superimposed (for want of a better phrase) upon each other. Parsimony tells against 
such an elaborate objection. Such minds are numerically identical.394 
Returning to present concerns, though, Hume has to reconstruct the distinction we do 
experience between internal and external. Hume has denied this is readily present in our 
perceptions as awareness of our own nature. Instead, Hume continues that "as far as the 
senses are judges, all perceptions are the same in the manner of their existence."5'3 Because 
all perceptions are equal we are unable to make an effective division between internal 
perceptions and external objects. This leaves reason (and philosophy) in radical 
disagreement with vulgar practice, 
For philosophy informs us, that every thing, which appears to the mind, is 
nothing but a perception, and is interrupted, and dependent on the mind; 
whereas the vulgar confound perceptions and objects, and attribute a distinct 
continu'd existence to the very things they feel or see. This sentiment, then, as 
391 Treatise 194:1 (I, IV, II) 
3 9 2 It will not be discussed here how long a perishing thing exists when compared with an instantaneous thing, 
or momentary thing. 
3 9 3 Presuming its perishing career is very short. 
3 9 4 Anscombe famously objects to the cogito that it offers no guarantee that each of us is not many minds in 
union. 
3 , 3 Treatise 193:3-4(1, IV, II) 
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it is entirely unreasonable, must proceed from some other faculty than the 
understanding."6 
It is, o f course, the Imagination that Hume identifies as the source of these beliefs. 
Although "all impressions are internal and perishing""7 we are still prone to regard some as 
having external existence. Hume asserts this is because impressions of objects like 
"mountains, and houses, and trees""8 exhibit "COHERENCE and CONSTANCY"3". In contrast 
"Our passions are found by experience to have a mutual connexion with and dependence on 
each other; but on no occasion is it necessary to suppose, that they have existed and 
operated, when they were not perceiv'd".4°° This, of course, would follow from the 
Transparency Thesis. An individual pain does not exhibit the sort of coherence and 
constancy that might prompt one to think the pain needs to exist beyond one's experience of 
it. Our complete knowledge of it leads us to believe this. Conversely, impressions of 
constant and coherent external objects by virtue of their transparency feel incomplete. This 
produces the propensity to believe that coherence and constancy are indicative of a 
continued existence. 
Hume is, not unexpectedly, circumspect about this propensity. 
But 'tis evident, that whenever we infer the continu'd existence of the objects 
of sense from their coherence, and the frequency of their union, 'tis in order to 
bestow on the objects a greater regularity than what is observ'd in our mere 
perceptions.401 
This obviously follows from what Hume has said before. A l l perceptions are on an equal 
footing. Therefore the mind cannot distinguish which are of external objects from the 
contents of any individual perception. Any distinction must therefore arise from the 
perceptions in combination. Sensations do not exhibit the same coherence and constancy as 
impressions of external objects. This coherence belongs to external objects only. 
Stroud suggests Hume is careless in his discussion of how coherence and constancy ground 
the shift in belief to identical external objects.4" Hume talks about "mountains, and houses, 
3M Treatise 193:17-24 (I, IV, II) 
'"Treatise 194:1 (I, IV, II) 
398 Treatise 194:32 (I, IV, H) 
m Treatise 195:22 (I. IV, II) 
400 Treatise 195:29-33 (I, IV, II) 
401 Treatise 197:31-35 (I, IV, H) 
4 0 2 Stroud (1977) p. 100 ff. Stroud dismisses H.H. Price's attempt to explain Hume's project in terms of a 
naturalism about our material object terms (p. 109). This is surely correct. Hume is constructing a pathology 
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and trees"403 before he has established how we believe in external objects. As argued above, 
Hume is perfectly entitled to make use of these concepts because they are universally 
introduced by the imaginatioa Hume is in effect claiming that our imagination acts on 
some of our perceptions and not on others. The difference he finds between perceptions of 
external objects and sensations is that in the former the imagination can seize upon 
coherence and then constancy.404 
It is the imagination that provides what cannot be found in our perceptions. Before going 
into the discussion of identity Hume gives a preliminary account. As already noted, Hume 
says "the imagination, when set into any train of thinking, is apt to continue, even when its 
object fails it, and like a galley put in motion by the oars, carries on its course without any 
new impulse."405 This impulse means "the mind... once in the train of observing an 
uniformity among objects, [... ] naturally continues, t i l l it renders the uniformity as 
compleat as possible."40* 
I f this were the end of Hume's discussion he would save himself a great deal of 
controversy. However, the coherence of our perceptions even when completed by the 
imagination is "too weak to support alone so vast an edifice, as is that of the continu'd 
existence of all external bodies"40'. We must have regard for the constancy of our 
impressions and this is where Hume's difficulties begin: 
When we have been accustom'd to observe a constancy in certain 
impressions... we are not apt to regard these interrupted perceptions as 
different, (which they really are) but on the contrary consider them to be 
individually the same, upon account of their resemblance. But as this 
interruption of their existence is contrary to their perfect identity, and makes us 
regard the first impression as annihilated, and the second as newly created, we 
find ourselves somewhat at a loss, and are involv'd in a kind of contradiction.408 
of thought not language. He is not asserting that we talk about objects as if they are as real as our perceptions, 
but think about them in this way. 
403 Treatise 194:32 (I, IV, II) 
4 0 4 It could be objected that some sensations, e.g. a long-term pain, are as coherent and constant as any external 
object, indeed more so. One might ask if Hume's distinction on the grounds of coherence and constancy is one 
of kind or degree. Evidence favours degree, as the imagination can smooth over many different interruptions 
and irregularities. It might also allow that certain coherent and constant perceptions must themselves be 
internal, such as long-term pains. 
405 Treatise 198:15-18 (I, IV, II) 
406 Treatise 198:27-30 (I, IV, II) 
40' Treatise 198:35-199:1 (I, IV, II) 
408 Treatise 199:13-24 (I, IV, II) 
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The solution to this problem comes by "supposing that these interrupted perceptions are 
connected by a real existence, of which we are insensible."*" 
Stroud remarks that "Hume admits that 'coherence' plays only a supplementary role"" 0 to 
constancy in generating this fiction. However, Hume does not, as Stroud suggests, move so 
casually here. One must ask why Hume starts his discussion of identity with a discussion of 
constancy and coherence. Hume clearly thinks that constancy and coherence are the 
foundation of our belief in permanent external objects. However, he does not think this is 
the entire story, for coherence and constancy have a 'vast edifice' built upon them. Central 
to this edifice is identity. So the question arises why Hume thinks identity differs from the 
belief in external objects merely based on the coherence and constancy of our impressions. 
Hume's project in these passages is to sketch a progression from our impressions to the 
belief in external objects.4" In this coherence is not supplementary, buy primary. It is the 
coherence of our impressions with which the imagination first engages. The imagination's 
first step is only a small one. Our impressions appear to exhibit a predictability and 
reliability, and this coherence prompts the belief that something lies behind this coherence. 
Alone coherence would only prompt the notion of an ordered world. This Hume can 
exercise a liberal tolerance towards, for surely the world is ordered. The imagination's only 
role here is to make us prone to ignore inconsistency and dwell more on consistency. 
Constancy gains its role prompted by coherence. Constancy is a stronger condition than 
coherence. To say the world is coherent does not limit the amount of change in the world. 
Coherence is only a probable judgement that perceptions are more likely to be the same in 
the future. Constancy is the claim that they wi l l be the same. This is a step further towards 
the belief in external objects as the cause of our perceptions. This is why Stroud is wrong to 
suggest Hume gives coherence only a supplementary role. Coherence is the most easily and 
naturally formed opinion about our perceptions. Our perceptions are surely less constant 
than they are coherent. Constancy, therefore, can only provide a foothold for the 
imagination once coherence has provided a step-up. 
This does not, however, explain why Hume thinks the imagination carries us even further 
into the vast edifice of identical external objects. Part of the explanation is Hume's above 
4M Treatise 199:26-28 (I, IV, IT) 
4 1 0 Stroud (1977) p. 100 
4 , 1 In the Enquiry the entire detail of this project is (sadly) absent. There Hume merely remarks "It is evident 
that there is a principle of connexion between different thoughts or ideas of the mind, and that, in their 
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cited contention that the imagination moves inevitably towards its conclusion once set 
under way. To this Hume adds the claim that constancy gives us the notion of objects' 
Perfect Identity. Although not spelt out, Hume commits himself to another progression. I f 
our view of an object is interrupted we imagine the broken periods of observation to be not 
only qualitatively identical, but numerically identical. Hume suggests we do not do this by 
any inference, but naturally. Hence philosophy and vulgar experience find themselves in 
inevitable conflict. Reason can only tell us that interrupted perceptions are distinct 
existences. Yet naturally we confound qualitative identity with numerical identity. 
Hume's account would be simpler i f he merely asserted that we regularly confused 
qualitative identity with numerical identity. However, this would leave it unexplained why 
we make this mistake so regularly, and also not explain how we acquire the notion of 
perfect identity. Hume's account would also be simpler i f he merely remarked that this 
mistake was caused by errors generated by the coherence and constancy we observe in our 
perceptions. However, this would not explain the edifice we build upon them, or the errors 
of ancient and modern philosophy Hume attacks. 
Hume summarises the problem as follows 
When we have been accustom'd to observe a constancy in certain impressions, 
[ . . . ] , we are not apt to regard these interrupted perceptions as different, (which 
they really are) but on the contrary consider them as individually the same, 
upon account of their resemblance. But as this interruption of their existence is 
contrary to their perfect identity, and makes us regard the first impression as 
annihilated, and the second as newly created, we find ourselves somewhat at a 
loss, and are involv'd in a kind of contradiction. In order to free ourselves from 
this difficulty, we disguise, as much as possible, the interruption, or rather 
remove it entirely, by supposing that these interrupted perceptions are 
connected by real existence, of which we are insensible.'"3 
It is this supposition of a 'real existence, of which we are insensible' that prompts Hume's 
further enquiry. Hume offers this plan of analysis: 
In order to justify this system, there are four things requisite. First, To explain 
the principium individuationis, or principle of identity. Secondly, Give a 
reason, why the resemblance of our broken and interrupted perceptions induces 
us to attribute an identity to them. Thirdly, Account for that propensity, which 
this illusion gives, to unite these broken appearances by a continu'd existence. 
appearance to the memory or imagination, they introduce each other with a certain degree of method and 
regularity." Enquiry 23:1-5 (III) 
413 Treatise 199:13-14... 17-28 (I, IV, II) 
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Fourthly and lastly, Explain that force and vivacity of conception, which arises 
from the propensity 
As this is Hume's procedure it wi l l be followed through here. 
Treatise 199:35-200:7 (I, IV, II) 
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V 
H U M E ' S ACCOUNT OF T H E PRINCIPIUM INDIVIDUATIONIS 
Hume's establishing of the notion of identity has interminably puzzled critics. Stroud is 
typical when he remarks: 
It is difficult, to say the least, to see how [Hume] explains how we originally 
get the idea of the identity of an object through time. We get it, Hume says, by 
'conceiving' of a moment of time and an object existent at that time, and then 
'imagining' a change in the time without any variation or interruption in the 
object. But how are we able to 'imagine' such a thing unless we already have 
the idea of the invariableness and uninterruptedness of an object through 
time?414 
This confusion can be dissolved in the manner previously sketched.415 The imagination's 
universally provided experience of the fiction of identity is investigated by reason. The 
relation between imagination and reason is complex here, and consequently of considerable 
interest. It is worth, therefore, investigating these passages very closely. 
Hume begins by dismissing two possible ways by which we might acquire the idea of 
identity . 4 1 4 Consideration of a single object delivers only the idea of unity,"1 while a 
multiplicity of objects can only deliver the idea of diversity.*" The second of these is 
uncontroversial. However, Hume's imposition of unity over self-identity is obviously 
controversial. Curious as self-identity might seem, it is not a principle of logic Hume can 
simply dismiss. He can, of course, dismiss conclusions assumed to follow from the 
proposition that every thing is identical with itself. I f this is what he does then one should 
be able to extract what Hume's worries are. Otherwise Hume has to suffer the undignified 
suggestion that he miscomprehends a simple principle of logic. 
Hume's criticism has two parts. Firstly, 
4 1 4 Stroud (1977) p. 103 
4 1 31 therefore find myself in deep disagreement with Hirsch's attempts to establish that Hume argues that the 
idea of identity is found by the senses. See Hirsch (1983). 
4 1 6 Hume writes "we may observe" 200:8 (I, IV, IT) which I understand to entail an act of clear perception 
guided only by reason. That is to say the complete and transparent consideration of the "view of any one 
object" 200:9 (I, IV, U) uninterfered with by imagination cannot give the idea of identity, only unity. Equally, 
when Hume writes when discussing a multiplicity of objects "The mind always pronounces the one not to be 
the other" 200:19 (I, IV, IT) I take 'mind' to be a synonym for reason. Hume cannot mean mind in a broader 
sense that would include the imagination. If he did the imagination would proceed to confuse a resembling 
multiplicity with an identity. 
"'Treatise 200:8-16 (I, IV, H) 
418 Treatise 200:17-22 (I, IV, II) 
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For in that proposition, an object is the same with itself, i f the idea express'd by 
the word, object, were no ways distinguish from that meant by itself, we really 
shou'd mean nothingf.] 4" 
And 
[N]or wou'd the proposition contain a predicate and a subject, which however 
are imply'd in this affirmation. 4 2 0 
The latter grammatical objection is of little interest. The former objection is where Hume's 
opinion really lies. 
Hume regards identity as a relation. Therefore it must relate two things to have any 
significance. Hume objects that one object cannot stand in a relation with itself. Either 
there is a way to distinguish the two parts of a relation, or there is not. I f there is no way of 
making a distinction, then only one thing can be present, and the idea given by this is 
merely unity. 
Hume would be guilty of a bad error i f he claims there are no reflexive relations. Hume, 
however, is concerned here not with metaphysics, but with the psychology of reasoning 
about identity. This is entirely proper and consistent with his project to use reason to 
interrogate the imagination. Self-identity is not under trial as an abstract metaphysical 
principle per se. Hume is claiming reason cannot extrapolate from a single perception the 
idea of something related. The construction of relation requires the imagination. 
It is no accident that Hume considers "the view of any one object"411. It is our ability to 
picture in our mind's eye that is of interest to Hume. Recall, for purposes of comparison, 
Hume's comments on the difficulty of imagining something to be infinitely divisible. 
Hume draws our attention to the way we are obliged to picture the divisions of a grain of 
sand: 
When you tell me of the thousandth and ten thousandth part of a grain of sand, I 
have a distinct idea of these numbers and of their different proportions; but the 
images, which I form in my mind to represent the things themselves, are 
419 Treatise 200:10-13 (I, IV, H) Hence Hume's later comment that "We cannot, in any propriety of speech, 
say, that an object is the same with itself, unless we mean, that the object existent at one time is the same with 
itself existent at another." Treatise 201:22-25 
420 Treatise 200:13-15 (I, IV, U) 
421 Treatise 200:9 (I, IV, II) 
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nothing different from each other, nor inferior to that image, by which I 
represent the grain of sand itself, which is suppos'd to so vastly exceed them. 4 a 
Hume's objection to self-identity has the same basis. When we think of a thing being the 
same as something we have to picture two things to ask ourselves i f they are related in some 
way. There is no way of picturing in our mind one thing in a relation with itself. 
There is something temptingly correct about what Hume says when considered this way. 
We have no way of comprehending self-identity even (or especially) as an abstract 
metaphysical principle. It is not natural to state, and can only be imagined in the most 
slippery of ways.4" 
Instead Hume claims that "One single object conveys the idea of unity, not that of 
identity."4 2 4 Unity, as Hume uses it, is meant to exclude identity. Unity is to be 'one' while 
identity is to be 'one and the same'. This exclusion, though, is only justified on Hume's 
own rejection of self-identity. Hume insists that identity demands diversity yet purports to 
be about what is in fact unity. Understood this way Hume's attack makes clear sense. He is 
claiming that the perceptions we have of objects do not reveal objects' metaphysical 
constitutions. This means we do not know how objects remain identical (even 
synchronically). 
Even i f Hume succeeds in offering psychological reasons to separate Unity from 
Synchronic Identity it can still be the case that Humean Unity is no different from 
Synchronic Identity otherwise understood. Obviously each perception is identical with 
itself. Whatever interpretation one chooses one must accept that. However, Hume's 
dispute is not with this claim stated as a bald rule of metaphysics. His argument is that we 
have no way of reasoning about any perception such that we can know about that 
perception that it is identical with itself. To know this, the fact of a perception's self-
identity would have to be contained within each perception. Hume can find no principle 
present in each, just as he cannot find the distinction between the internal and external, or 
the perception and ourselves. 
411 Treatise 27:14-20 (I, II, I) when Hume here says 'nothing different' he of course means to suggest that the 
two images are qualitative exact similar not that they are numerical identical. 
4 2 3 Of course, the fact that we must imagine it is exactly Hume's point, i.e. exercise the imagination. Hume's 
distinction between reason driven picturing of states of affairs, and imaginings is an interesting one. Hume 
might suggest that reason can, temporally at least, enslave the imagination to do reason's bidding. 
Alternatively he could be suggesting that reason has its own ability to picture things in the mind's eye, in 
parallel to the imagination. Finally, he could rely on imaging being separate from both reason and the 
imagination and employed by both. Settling such details is beyond the scope of the present work. 
424 Treatise 200:15-16 (I, IV, H) 
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Further, knowing a perception to be self-identical would imply knowing something of 
perceptions' true nature. I f this were possible we could know something of objects' true 
nature. And it is just this kind of knowledge that Hume denies we have. Hume's sceptical 
realism means he must be neutral about what perceptions are. They might be individual 
existences (as self-identity would imply) or they might be dependent parts of a causally 
ordered system. As it is Hume's claim that we cannot settle this issue he must suppress the 
possibility of self-identity while continuing to explain how perceptions are individuated. 
Unity does just this without having recourse to the metaphysical certainties to which self-
identity pretends.4" 
This is certainly Hume's conclusion by the time of the Enquiry. There the discussion of 
unity and diversity is absent, and Hume only discusses the senses as a possible source of 
knowledge of objects. Nonetheless, he is scathing: 
In vain do you pretend to have learned the nature of bodies from your past 
experience. Their secret nature, and consequently all their effects and 
influence, may change, without any change in their sensible qualities. This 
happens sometimes, and with regard to some objects: Why may it not happen 
always, and with regard to all objects?416 
Likewise it would seem reasonable to conclude that unity cannot be construed as 
discovering the secret nature of objects, even when buttressed with the metaphysical 
principle of self-identity. 
What is required to explain identity is how "we make a difference, betwixt the idea meant 
by the word, object, and that meant by itself, without going the length of number, and at the 
same time without restraining ourselves to strict and absolute unity." 4" The answer wi l l be 
found in "recourse to the idea of time or duration."4" Of course, Hume's theory of time is 
4 " Hume appears to believe that simples can be defined psychologically rather than metaphysically. As his 
simples are perceptions the minimal unit of perception delimits what counts as a simple. This is supposedly a 
unity, but this projection seems unjust. The minimal unit of perception is variable and the amount of the world 
it individuates variable too. Hence whatever part of the world a moment's perception might delimit is not a 
unity in any independent sense. Hume's assumption that perception can provide these units not only leaves his 
metaphysics curiously grounded, but seems to lead to a collapse into idealism. This problem is made worse by 
Hume's habit of appearing to speak of perceptions as having duration, or treating as one perception what he 
elsewhere treats as a succession. 
4M Enquiry 38:9-15 (TV, H) 
4,7 Treatise 201:25-28 (I, IV, U). Hume initially remarks that "at first sight this seems utterly impossible" 
200:25-6 (I, IV, IT). This is one of many occasions when reason is implied by the metaphor of vision. It would 
be an interesting discussion for another time to tally Hume's comparisons between reason and having a clear 
view of a subject. Hume's choice of language is in part influenced by his pictorial theory of the imagination. 
4U Treatise 200:32-33 (I, IV, II) 
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not without its own complications. It would be an intolerable diversion to fully examine 
Hume's account of time here.419 However, a brief sketch is nonetheless necessary. 
A central Humean claim is "That all our simple ideas in their first appearance are dertv'd 
from simple impressions" .na The honourable exception to this is the 'missing shade of 
blue'.4 3 1 Yet it is clear that Hume maintains that some ideas are obtained without first being 
impressions. Of our idea of time, Hume says: 
Five notes play'd on a flute give us the impression and idea of time; tho' time 
be not a sixth impression, which presents itself to the hearing or any other of 
the senses. Nor is it a sixth impression, which the mind by reflection finds in 
itself.4" 
Time, Hume concludes "since it appears not as any primary distinct impression, can plainly 
be nothing but different ideas, or impressions, or objects dispos'd in a certain manner, that 
is, succeeding each other."433 
Similarly the idea of extension is a compound idea, abstracted from the senses of touch and 
sight.454 Extension is derived from "several lesser impressions"435 and as such no simple idea 
of this exists. Hume has to regard space and time as not being capable of simple perception. 
This is because he wants to claim that space and time do not exist apart from the objects 
that exist in space and time. Hence 
We have therefore no idea of space or extension, but when we regard it as an 
object either of our sight or feeling. 
The same reasoning w i l l prove, that the indivisible moments of time must be 
fill'd with some real object or existence, whose succession forms the duration, 
and makes it be conceivable by the mind. 4 3 4 
This latter statement about "a real object... whose succession forms the duration"437 needs 
close analysis. In a passage just before this Hume states his opinion concerning duration. It 
is held by both the vulgar and philosophers that "the idea of duration is applicable in a 
Those who wish to be so diverted will be ably engaged by Baxter (1987) 
Treatise 4:19-21 (I, I, I) 
Treatise 5:32-6:28 (I, I, IT) 
Treatise 36:31-35 (I, II, III) 
Treatise 37:13-16 (I, II, III) 
Treatise 38:6-39:15 (I, II, ffl) 
Treatise 38:28 (I, II, IH) 
Treatise 39:9-11,12-15 (I, II, EH) 
Treatise 39:13-14 (I, II, EH) 
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proper sense to objects, which are perfectly unchangeable".458 However the idea of duration 
"can never be convey'd to the mind by any thing stedfast and unchangeable."439 Hume 
refers the reader to elsewhere in the Treatise to discover the source of this fiction.440 There 
Hume suggests that there is a "continual succession of perceptions in our mind; so that the 
idea of time [is] ever present with us".441 When we compare this succession with an object 
that has remained unchanged we are apt to assume that it has, despite appearances, 
undergone a succession of changes as well. 4 4 2 
Hume appears to link object identity to survival of change. Seen in Humean terms, this is 
the linking of a diversity of units into a succession. This also gives us the notion of time. 
Of course, to modern eyes this is arguably a perfectly good notion of identity. Yet Hume 
finds this account to be antagonistic to the notion of identity. This is because Hume takes 
identity to imply simplicity and immutability. Hume's target is substance and the soul, the 
twin conceits of both the ancient philosophy and modern rationalism. In both these systems 
identity is underwritten by something that supports change but itself remains immutable.445 
Hume sums up his own argument, writing " I have already observ'd ( I , I I , V) , that time, in a 
strict sense, implies succession, and that when we apply its idea to any unchangeable object, 
'tis only by a fiction of the imagination, by which the unchangeable object is suppos'd to 
participate of the changes of co-existent objects, and in particular of that of our 
perceptions."444 Hume continues: "This fiction of the imagination almost universally takes 
place; and 'tis by means of it, that a single object, plac'd before us, and survey'd for any 
""Treatise 37:17-19 (I, H, ITI) 
459 Treatise 37:23-25 (I, II, HI) 
440 Treatise 37wl (I, II, IH) refers the reader to Treatise 65:11-31 (I, II, V) 
441 Treatise 65:15-17 Q, D, V) 
4 4 1 This separates Hume from contemporary four-dimensional ontologists. The march of time is uniform in 
these ontologies, and an unchanging object is in fact still made up of a succession of exact similar temporal 
stages. Hume, however, insists on time progressing differently for different objects. If there is any part of 
Hume's philosophy that does lead him into a labyrinth and should have led him into despair then it is this. One 
can have sympathy with the idea that change is essential to a genuine notion of objecthood, and Hume goes 
some way to recognising this. Hume's position could be saved if he made a Cartesian manoeuvre and insisted 
that ail objects are in fact always undergoing change, just as Descartes finds himself obliged to insist that minds 
are always thinking However, Hume is not prepared to make any such move. 
4 4 1 Hume is arguably right to reject the notion of any sort of object (mental or physical) that does not have parts. 
A simple substance that nonetheless changes by having different qualities, such as a Cartesian soul, Hume finds 
nonsensical. To have different qualities is to have different parts which can become differently arranged. To 
have parts is not to be simple. 
444 Treatise 200:33-201:3 (I. IV, H) Those who argue Hume distinguishes between strict and loose (or perfect 
and imperfect) identity, might draw support from an apparently similar use of 'strict' here. However, I am 
aware of no-one doing so. The distinction is most often argued for on grounds of philosophical neatness, and 
not textual evidence. Famously, the textual evidence is slim, Hume only using the phrase 'imperfect identity' 
once (at Treatise 256:24) and even this use is queried as an error by Selby-Bigge. Of this, more later. 
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time without our discovering in it any interruption or variation is able to give us a notion of 
identity." 4 4 3 
This fiction of a single unchanging object allows the further fiction of identity to flourish. 
The imagination suggests two scenarios. In the first we consider the object simultaneously 
at two times.444 In the second we imagine the object remaining steadfast while time 
changes.44' Waxman urges that "despite what one may be tempted to suppose, both 
viewpoints are necessary to acquiring the idea of identity."4 4 8 Indeed we do need both so we 
might obtain an idea between unity and number. The first gives us the notion of number, 
essential to relation, the second preserves unity. 
What has not been commented on is the importance in Hume's discussion of being able to 
picture these events. The first is suggestive of imagining two qualitatively identical objects, 
one of which is mentally tagged as earlier than the other. The second scenario suggests 
picturing an object and supposing it unchanging while time passes (and therefore change 
occurs). This ties with Hume's earlier suspicions of self-identity based on our inability to 
picture something as self-identical in our mind's eye. Hence Hume concludes "Here then is 
an idea, which is a medium betwixt unity and number; or more properly speaking, is either 
of them, according to the view, in which we take i t" . 4 4 ' 
Hume concludes: 
Thus the principle of individuation is nothing but the invariableness and 
uninterruptedness of any object, thro' a suppos'd variation of time, by which 
the mind can trace it in different periods of its existence, without any break of 
the view, and without being oblig'd to form the idea of multiplicity or 
number.430 
Hume's repeated reference to 'a suppos'd variation of time' reminds us that Perfect Identity 
rests on an act of the imagination. Perfect Identity, therefore, is a fiction. 
445 Treatise 201:3-7 (I, IV, H) The strategy, adopted on Hume's behalf in this analysis, of presuming 
imagination's actions always to be complete for reason's examination finds support here in Hume's comment 
that "This fiction of the imagination almost universally takes place'. The qualifying 'almost' detracts nothing. 
Hume is merely allowing for the possibility that reason can intervene to avoid the error. This, however, 
involves mental effort. Hence Hume writes 'without our discovering in it any interruption or variation'. The 
fiction occurs unless we sufficiently exercise reason to prevent the imagination suffocating us with persuasive 
and effortless fictions. 
444 Treatise 201:8-13 <J, IV, II) 
447 Treatise 201:13-18 (I> rV, II) 
4 4 8 Waxman (1994) p. 208 
449 Treatise 201:18-21 (I. IV, H) Emphasis added. 
430 Treatise 201:29-34 (I, IV, H) 
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This seems clear enough, but the fact seems lost on many commentators. This is 
particularly the case with those commentators who assume Hume makes a distinction 
between Perfect and Imperfect Identity (this wi l l be further discussed in the next section). 
These writers assume the title of fiction attaches only to Imperfect Identity, and that Perfect 
Identity is somehow more legitimate or respectable. The passages that have most prompted 
these interpretations are found later in Hume's discussion of personal identity. In these 
passages Hume is discussing how we come to attribute identity to items that are radically 
variable and interrupted (rebuilt buildings, rivers). These cases clearly differ from those 
where identity is attributed to simple, stable objects like hats and stones. However, it wi l l 
not do to assume that Hume thinks there is a difference not just of degree, but of kind, here. 
This wi l l be returned to shortly, once Hume's conclusions regarding the emergence of our 
belief in body have been dealt with. For the moment, though, it should be noted that Hume 
merely describes how we most easily obtain the notion o f a Perfect Identity. Nowhere does 
he suggest we experience Perfect Identities, nor that the experience of Perfect Identity is in 
anyway privileged, or any less a fiction than other productions of the imagination. 
The second part of Hume's system attempts to "shew why the constancy of our perceptions 
makes us ascribe to them a perfect numerical identity, tho' there be very long intervals 
betwixt their appearance, and they have only one of the essential qualities of identity, viz. 
Invariabteness."*" Hume has already hinted at the reason when recapping the definition of 
identity, which occurs on the occasions when the mind can act 'without being oblig'd to 
form the idea of multiplicity or number'. The imagination is a lazy faculty, choosing 
always the easiest view of the world. 4" Hence, the less likely a succession of perceptions is 
to oblige one to observe a difference the less likely the mind is to comprehend one. Hume 
subsequently makes this claim in yet stronger terms, saying "The mind readily passes from 
one [resembling perception] to the other, and perceives not the change without a strict 
attention, of which, generally speaking, 'tis wholly incapable."4" 
It is, of course, "a succession of related objects [that] places the mind in this disposition, 
and is consider'd with the same smooth and uninterrupted progress of the imagination, as 
attends the view of the same invariable object."454 Consequently "The thought slides along 
the succession with equal facility, as i f it consider'd only one object; and therefore 
451 Treatise 201:36-202:4 (I, IV, IT) 
4 " "The faculties of the mind repose themselves... and take no more exercise, than what is necessary to continue 
that idea" Treatise 203:20-22 (I, IV, U), See Treatise 203:12-206:25 in general. 
453 Treatise 203:8-11 (I, IV, II) 
454 Treatise 204:2-5 (I, IV, II) 
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confounds the succession with the identity." 4" In a footnote436 Hume points out that the 
resemblance is two-fold. Individual perceptions resemble each other, and so the act of 
surveying them feels the same. Also, the act of surveying a succession itself resembles that 
of surveying an unchanging object. The mind, therefore, is doubly confounded finding both 
the act and its contents resembling. Finally, Hume says 
The smooth passage of the imagination along the ideas of the resembling 
perceptions makes us ascribe to them a perfect identity. The interrupted 
manner of their appearance makes us consider them as so many resembling, but 
still distinct beings, which appear after certain intervals. The perplexity arising 
from this contradiction produces a propension to unite these broken 
appearances by the fiction of a continu'd existence, which is the third part of 
that hypothesis I propos'd to explain.4" 
Although Hume is trying to explain the emergence of a fiction his aim is not entirely 
sceptical. He feels moved to remind his reader that: 
We may begin with observing, that the difficulty in the present case is not 
concerning the matter of fact, or whether the mind forms such a conclusion 
concerning the continu'd existence of its perceptions, but only concerning the 
manner in which the conclusion is form'd, and principles from which it is 
deriv'd. 4 5 8 
The proper question, then, is "First, How we can satisfy ourselves in supposing a perception 
to be absent from the mind without being annihilated"45' and also "Secondly, After what 
manner we conceive an object to become present to the mind, without some new creation of 
a perception or image".460 
Hume's answer is simple. The mind "is nothing but a heap or collection of different 
perceptions, united together by certain relations".461 Each perception is distinguishable and 
therefore separable from this collection.4 6' Equally, each perception can come to be related 
435 Treatise 204:14-16 (I, IV, H) Hume comments directly after that "We shall afterwards see many instances 
of this tendency of relation to make us subscribe an identity to different objects; but shall here confine 
ourselves to the present subject" Treatise 204:17-19 (I, IV, IT). I take this to refer to the renewed discussion of 
more exotic cases of identity in 'Of Personal Identity' (see Treatise 253:15-258:36 (I, IV, VI)) Hume explicit 
directs his reader to these passages at 206:25«1. There we will "learn [the principles that explain] how the 
interruption in the appearance of a perception implies not necessarily an interruption in its existence" Treatise 
206:21-23 (I. IV, H) 
456 Treatise 204:wl (I, IV, U) 
4" Treatise 205:13-21 (I, IV, H) 
458 Treatise 206:26-31 (I. IV, fl") 
455 Treatise 207:7-8 (I, IV, IT) 
460 Treatise 207:9-11 (I, IV, II) 
•"" Treatise 207:14-15 (I, IV, IT) 
461 Treatise 207:17-22 (I, IV, II) 
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to any other perception or collection of perceptions, i.e. be introduced to a mind. 4 4 3 
Consequently "The supposition of the continu'd existence of sensible objects or perceptions 
involves no contradictioa" 4 4 4 As there is no logical contradiction in these suppositions there 
is no barrier to creating a fiction based upon them. This is precisely what we do, for "When 
the exact resemblance of our perceptions makes us ascribe to them an identity, we may 
remove the seeming interruption by feigning a continu'd being, which may fill those 
intervals, and preserve a perfect and entire identity to our perceptions."443 
Finally, Hume turns to the fourth part of his system which explains why we "not only feign 
but believe this continu'd existence,"444 and that, therefore, "the question is, from whence 
arises such a belief'.'" Belief is engendered by the "vivacity o f an idea"448 and Hume argues 
that a succession of related ideas is almost as vivid in the mind as a single idea 4 6 ' Further, 
Hume explains how memory and resemblance combine, so that "sometimes we ascribe a 
continu'd existence to objects, which are perfectly new to us, and of whose constancy and 
coherence we have no experience,".470 The reason for this "'tis because the manner, in 
which they present themselves to our senses, resembles that of constant and coherent 
objects".471 Hume is therefore able to explain how the imagination is able to derive an ever 
increasing hierarchy of fictions. Perceptions resemble not only each other, but also other 
fictions. The imagination can progress with less and less reference to the actual contents of 
our perceptions. Without this efficiency the imagination could scarce be claimed to achieve 
all Hume would want of it. The workload of producing a unique fiction for every object 
would surely be mentally exhausting. What is more it would be antithetical to Hume's 
conception of the imagination as a faculty that always prefers to take the line of least 
resistance. 
443 Treatise 207:23-32 (I, IV, IT) 
""Treatise 208:1-2 (I, IV, II) 
443 Treatise 208:4-8 (I, IV, IT) Note here that the identity preserved fictitiously here is perfect and entire. As far 
as I am aware this is the only occasion on which Hume qualifies perfect identity in this way. However, the 
implication is clear: the perfect identity is a fiction derived from a succession. As such it cannot be contrasted 
with the so-called imperfect identity some writers postulate. 
444 Treatise 208:10 (I, IV, IT) Hume's use of the word 'feign' is a little curious here as it suggest artifice, and 
therefore, intent in perceiving the fiction. However, this quirk seems minor enough to be regarded as a slip or 
merely curious usage. Hume's commitment to the inevitability of the fictions of imagination is well enough 
established elsewhere in the text 
447 Treatise 208:10 (I, IV, H) Hume's use of the word 'feign' is a little curious here as it suggest artifice, and 
therefore, intent in perceiving the fiction. However, this quirk seems minor enough to be regarded as a slip or 
merely curious usage. Hume's commitment to the inevitability of the fictions of imagination is well-enough 
established elsewhere in the text 
"•Treatise 209:13 (I, IV, U) 
449 Treatise 208:12-25 (I, IV, H) 
470 Treatise 209:6-9 (I, IV, H) 
471 Treatise 209:10-11 (I, IV, H) 
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The discussion of identity ends at this point, and is not returned to until the chapter 'Of 
Personal Identity'. Hume finishes lOf Scepticism with Regard to the Senses' with his 
discussion of the conflict between the philosophical hypothesis of Double Existence and the 
Vulgar way of thinking. 4" In the three chapters before personal identity takes centre stage 
he discusses 'The Antient Philosophy'473, 'The Modern Philosophy'4'4 and "The Immortality 
of the Soul'. 4" These chapters prefigure the discussion of personal identity only in as much 
as they contain refinements of Hume's attack on the philosophical respectability of the 
notions of substance and the soul. These Hume dismisses as fictions created to explain the 
identity of objects. A ful l discussion of these secondary arguments would be too much of a 
distraction. On the occasions where Hume's later argument draws support from these 
chapters they wi l l be referred back to. 
Treatise 209:14-218:34 (I, IV, II) 
Treatise 219:1-225:4 (I, IV, UY) 
Treatise 225:5-231:31 (I, IV, IV) 
Treatise 232:1-251:3 (I, IV, V) 
V I 
IDENTITY IN HUME'S 'OF PERSONAL IDENTITY' 
When Hume returns to the discussion of identity his subject is clearly meant to be the 
identity of the mind. He does not start his discussion of personal identity until later in the 
chapter.'"6 Hume has started the chapter with his attack upon the Metaphysician's Self (see 
§1 above) and concluded that we can only introspect our own perceptions. This leads Hume 
naturally into a discussion of how we ascribe identity to our grouped perceptions. The 
discussion is not yet of persons. Clearly it might be objected that Hume does write " I may 
venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of 
different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a 
perpetual flux and movement."4" Here, Hume seems to use 'mankind' as a synonym for 
'persons'. However, nothing forces us to assume this. The previous passage closed with 
Hume asserting that he could only find individual perceptions when he introspected.'"8 
Therefore, he reasons, this will be the case for the rest of mankind. The rest of mankind 
are, in this sense, only bundles or collections of perceptions. Indeed the term mankind 
seems chosen quite deliberately to be neutral between 'person' and 'self. This is a debate 
Hume wishes to save for later.4" For the moment he wants to highlight that all we have 
introspective knowledge of is a bundle or heap of perceptions. 
The mind, Hume is quick to remind us, is in "perpetual flux",480 a flux contributed to by both 
the senses481 and the powers of the soul.481 Therefore "There is properly no simplicity in it at 
one time, nor identity in different; whatever natural propension we may have to imagine that 
simplicity and identity."485 Hume reminds us that this notion of the mind is quite abstract: 
"They are the successive perceptions only, that constitute the mind; nor have we the most 
distant notion of the place, where these scenes are represented, or of the materials, of which 
476 Treatise 259:1 (I, IV, VI, XV) "We now proceed to explain the nature of personal identity" One could not 
ask Hume to be clearer about where his discussion begins. Yet this simple sentence is rarely, if ever, 
acknowledged at face value. Certainly, I am aware of no commentator who does so. 
477 Treatise 252:31-35 (I, IV, VI, IV) 
478 Treatise 252:24-30 (I, IV, VI, ffl) 
4 7 9 Likewise Hume's mention of personal identity at 253:19 refers to the present chapter at large, and not to the 
specific preceding point of issue (which is just the mind and its lack of identity or simplicity). 
480 Treatise 252:35 (I, IV, VI, IV) 
481 Treatise 252:35-253:2 (I, IV, VI, IV) 
482 Treatise 253:2-4 (I, IV, VI, IV) 
483 Treatise 253:7-9 (I, IV, VI, IV) 
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it is compos'd."484 This scepticism had already been voiced earlier in Hume's conclusions 
about the Soul. There he wrote; 
[T]he question concerning the substance of the soul is absolutely unintelligible: 
All our perceptions are not susceptible of a local union, either with what is 
extended or unextended; there being some of them of the one kind, and some of 
the other: And as the constant conjunction of objects constitutes the very 
essence of cause and effect, matter and motion may often be regarded as the 
causes of thought, as far as we have any notion of that relation.4*5 
Hume shares this determined agnosticism about what might ultimately constitute the mind 
with Locke. The notion of mind Hume is working with is, therefore, somewhat desiccated. 
This is, however, quite deliberate. It is a notion of mind stripped to its perceivable 
components. When Hume claims that the mind is only constituted by perceptions this is not 
a metaphysical claim. This much should be clear from his confession that we do not know 
what materials compose the mind. Our only clear notion of the mind is one of a place 
where individual perceptions collect and mingle. Hume's question is how we come to 
ascribe an identity to this mind.486 
This is clearly a special problem for Hume. His initial account of identity of objects has 
imagination building on the foundations of coherence and constancy. Yet, the mind 
singularly fails to exhibit either coherence or constancy. Two possible strategies present 
themselves. Hume could attempt to bridge the gap between his earlier account of identity in 
terms of coherence and constancy and the identity of incoherent and fleeting objects. 
Alternatively he can introduce a new account of identity to deal specifically with these 
difficult cases. 
The interpretation to be offered here takes the first route. It has already been observed that 
Hume regarded all identities as fictions, even Perfect Identity. Identity is no more than the 
relation that governs the duration of any being.4*7 It is perfectly possible for Hume to extend 
his account of identity to include anything with duration. All that is required is an account 
of how we ignore even radical incoherence and inconstancy when ascribing identity. 
444 Treatise 253:10-14 (I, IV, VI, IV) 
4M Treatise 250:4-11 (I, IV, V) 
4 8 6 Compare Hume's clear comment that processes of the mind do depend on the physiology of the brain at 
Treatise 60:21-61:15 (I, II, V). See §XII for discussion. 
4 " See definition at Treatise 12:25-31 (I, I, V) 
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Therefore, those accounts that suggest Hume is making use of a second kind of identity are 
to be rejected.488 This second type of identity is usually called Imperfect Identity. The 
phrase itself is difficult enough to adopt as Hume only uses it once.489 What is more this 
single occurrence is the subject of editorial conflict.4*0 It is of course possible that Hume 
might employ two senses of identity, yet only refer to one of the senses on one occasion, 
and then without separate definition and scant elucidation. It is, however, unlikely. 
Nonetheless, there might be philosophically persuasive reasons for believing Hume 
employs two senses of identity, despite the paucity of explicit textual evidence. These 
considerations are of some import in understanding Hume, so they are worth examining. 
Hume's previous discussion of identity had already established that Perfect Identity consists 
in being uninterrupted and invariable. As already mentioned, Hume's interest when he 
returns to discuss identity is with things that are very clearly both interrupted and variable 
(living things, rivers, persons).4" Therefore he offers his definition this time in negative 
terms: 
Thus the controversy concerning identity is not merely a dispute of words. For 
when we attribute identity, in an improper sense, to variable or interrupted 
objects, our mistake is not confin'd to the expression, but is commonly attended 
with a fiction, either of something invariable and uninterrupted, or of something 
mysterious and inexplicable [soul, self or substance], or at least with a 
propensity to such fictions.4*1 
4 8 8 Prime among these is Ashley & Stack (1974). Patten (1976a, esp. p670jf) follows them cautiously. 
Waxman (in an uncharacteristically uncritical moment) also assumes Hume makes use of the term, see 
Waxman (1994) p. 209-10. 
489 Treatise 256:24 (I, IV, VI, EX) 
4 9 0 Selby-Bigge suggests that Hume meant 'perfect' instead of'imperfect'. Nidditch, however, finds no 
difficulty with the phrase and does not highlight it in his edition. For exhaustive debate see von Leyden (1957). 
Von Leyden suggests three solutions: to delete 'imperfect' altogether, to replace 'imperfect' with 'improper' 
(his own preferred solution) or to replace 'imperfect' with 'perfect' (Selby-Bigge's solution). My personal 
preference is for the first solution. Hume is only qualifying identity here to make the text more lucid. He is not 
marking a difference in theory or analysis. As the qualification makes the text less lucid it is best dispensed 
with altogether. Neither alternative qualification makes the text clearer, and von Leyden's suggestion has little 
precedence in the Treatise (primarily a single use at 255:8). 
4 9 1 There is a school of criticism that attacks Hume's account of personal identity because it relies on 
regularities in our experiences. These comments from Stroud are typical "But our experience in fact exhibits 
no such regularities. It is not true that we get an experience of a certain sort only when we have just had an 
experience of a certain other sort, or that experiences of the first sort are always followed by experiences of 
another sort. Our experience does not exhibit such uniformities. And for those who like a little novelty in life, 
that is a very good thing." Stroud (1977), p. 126. Clearly I find this type of attack to be quite mistaken. As will 
be argued shortly, Hume embraces the diversity of our perceptions (indeed repeatedly comments on the mind's 
flux) and deliberately extends his account of identity attribution to allow for this. 
492 Treatise 255:6-12 (I, IV, VI, VTJ). Hume's final concession that we merely suffer 'a propensity to such 
fictions' is worthy to note. On what occasions, one wonders, are we not prone to these fictions? However, 
Hume must allow for this possibility if judicious and concentrated reflection and reason are to have the reach 
he wished them to. 
125 
This passage prompts the belief that Hume is beginning to offer a different account of 
identity. The phrase 'when we attribute identity, in an improper sense' suggests that there 
are other occasions when it is proper to attribute identity. On this suggestion such 
occasions would, of course, be observations of Perfect Identity, i.e. uninterrupted and 
invariant objects. Importantly, Hume insists this is not {contra Locke) a matter of words or 
denominations, but a question of psychology. Whether we think of a billiard ball being the 
same, or a river being the same, the mental effort is all but equivalent. There is no 
difference despite the obvious truth (a truth we would all confess to observe) that the career 
of a river is more turbulent than that of a billiard ball. However, this similarity of effort 
also denotes a similarity of procedure. All identities are equally fictitious and therefore no 
distinction can be drawn between those that are proper and those that are improper. 
However, Hume does not indulge here in pleonasm (Hume is too good a writer for this to be 
credible). There is no philosophical distinction between 'Imperfect', 'Improper' or 'Loose' 
Identity and 'Perfect', 'Proper' or 'Strict' Identity. Nonetheless, Hume is highlighting a 
distinction he has drawn in the previous passage, which does introduce a distinction 
between proper and improper ascriptions of identity. They, however, all remain equally 
suspect. Hume sketches a hierarchy of fictions we "feign"'1" with an identity. The worst are 
the complete fictions of "soul, and self, and substance".494 Hume then distinguishes 
occasions when no such fictions arise but "our propension to confound identity with relation 
is so great"493 we instead "imagine something unknown and mysterious".4'4 Hume offers 
"plants and vegetables"497 as examples. Importantly Hume uses the phrase "do[es] not give 
rise to such a fiction"498 where the 'such' alludes to soul, self and substance. Then Hume 
distinguishes occasions when we ascribe identity without either an extreme fiction or the 
attribution of a 'mysterious principle' but nonetheless "are not able fully to satisfy 
ourselves"499 by finding something to "justify our notion of identity."300 All these occasions 
are fictions of the imagination, and all produced in similar fashion. The phrase 'improper' 
merely highlights that "variable and interrupted objects"301 are more likely to be attended 
with an extreme fiction than more steadfast objects. In this passage Hume again urges that 
Treatise 254:25 (I, IV, VI, VI) 
Treatise 254:27 (I, IV, VI, VI) 
Treatise 254:29-30 (I, IV, VI, VI) 
Treatise 254:31 (I, IV, VI, VI) 
Treatise 255:1 (I, IV, VI, VI) 
Treatise 254:29 (I, IV, VI, VI) 
Treatise 255:3-4 (I, IV, VI, VI) 
Treatise 255:5 (I, IV, VI, VI) 
Treatise 255:8 (I, IV, VI, VH) 
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there is a hierarchy.301 What is more, the previous passage is quite clear why these special 
cases of fiction emerge. Hume highlights that "tho' we incessantly correct ourselves by 
reflexion, and return to a more accurate method of thinking, yet we cannot long sustain our 
philosophy, or take this biass from the imaginaton."303 Finally "Our last resource is to yield 
to it, and boldly assert that these different related objects are in effect the same".30* It is this 
act of 'boldly asserting' Hume is interested in. In less complicated identity claims 
(steadfast objects) the imagination makes easy progress. In more complex cases there is 
also an attendant 'assertion'. There is no difference in mental effort for the imagination is 
equally irresistible in its progression. However, certain identity claims are so clearly 
difficult that we have to feign some principle to accompany the action of the imagination. 
This is all Hume wishes to mark out by the phrase 'in an improper sense'.505 
Putting this distinction aside, Hume proceeds with his general argument by again repeating 
points made in the earlier discussion.306 Succession answers to the notion of diversity, but 
we attribute identity to it because "the relation of parts.. .produces an association of idea, 
and an easy transition of the imagination"50' and the resemblance "this act of the mind bears 
to that, by which we contemplate one continu'd object".308 Hume's task, then, must be to 
show that things we think we observe to be identical are in fact composed of successions.50' 
At this point Hume offers what amounts to a second definition of Perfect Identity. 
[S]oppose any mass of matter, of which the parts are contiguous and connected, 
to be plac'd before us; 'tis plain we must attribute a perfect identity to this 
mass, provided all the parts continue uninterruptedly and invariably the same, 
whatever motion or change of parts we may observe either in the whole or in 
any of the parts.510 
301 Treatise 255:9-12 (I, IV, VI, VU) 
303 Treatise 254:16-19 (I, IV, VI, VI) 
304 Treatise 254:19-21 (I, IV, VI, VI) 
3 0 3 One should also consider the consequences of inverting the sentence's meaning. Hence "When we attribute 
identity in a proper sense to invariable and uninterrupted objects,...". If this is correct (i.e. all the change logic 
requires) there is little impact on my reading. For this proper sense is equally attended by fictions, etc. 
Improper identity is only of interest if its corollary, proper identity, can be shown not to rely on a fiction. And 
this cannot be done. In a similar vein, therefore, I suggest that all of the various words Hume combines with 
identity are merely qualifications. Each denotes the degree of imagination involved. This no more commits 
one to having more than one identity relation than would The Sortal Dependency Thesis commit one to 
Relative Identity (See earlier discussion in Chapter 2, §11) 
3 0 6 See Treatise 204nl (I, IV, H) 
507 Treatise 255:20-23 (I, IV, VI, VU) 
508 Treatise 255:24-25 (I, IV, VI, VII) 
309 Treatise 255:26-29 (I, TV, VI, VU) 
5,0 Treatise 255:30-35 (I, TV, VI, VTIf) The example is lifted wholesale from Locke Essay 330:14-20 (Bk IT., 
XXVU, §3). For discussion of the importance of this to Locke see Chapter 2, §11 in this thesis. 
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Crucially, Hume chooses to explain Perfect Identity here not in terms of invariance and 
unintemiptedness in our perceptions, but in the object itself. On all prior occasions Hume 
had explained identity as a fiction of the imagination that arose from coherence and 
constancy in our perceptions. 
One could concede that on this occasion Hume allows himself to indulge in outright 
metaphysics and make a sure claim about the nature of body. Further, he claims that we 
could perceive the identity of such an object in a direct fashion unmediated by the 
imagination. Yet this seems extremely unlikely. Identity is essentially a fiction, being 
something the imagination creates betwixt unity and diversity. It simply cannot be 
observed. Further, it would seem incredible that Hume should labour so much effort on 
denying that the senses comprehend identity, only to latterly claim that certain objects could 
be observed to be identical.5" 
Hume would also be courting further disaster. He continues "But supposing some very 
small or inconsiderable part to be added to the mass, or subtracted from it; [... ] this 
absolutely destroys the identity of the whole, strictly speaking".512 Defining Perfect Identity 
in the manner above has the effect of making change and identity incompatible. It seems 
entirely antagonistic to Hume's carefully constructed Sceptical Realism to suggest that he 
embraces the extreme sceptical view that nothing at all can survive change. Not only would 
this run counter to common-sense, it would involve a positive metaphysical claim about the 
relations between the parts of objects over time. It is surely Hume's opinion that we are in 
no position to decide such matters. 
Fortunately, I believe, there is a better explanation at hand for what Hume is doing here. 
Recall the importance Hume had placed on being able to visually conceive identity in his 
initial discussion. In this passage Hume is offering a visual thought-experiment. Hence his 
stipulation to 'suppose'. Hume has not forgotten that we could not observe such a mass 
directly, nor has he abandoned his position that it is regularities in our perceptions that give 
rise to attributions of identity. 
By Hume's own lights having the experience of perceiving an unchanging object would 
only prove that one was experiencing an invariant and uninterrupted sequence of 
perceptions. Equally i f we did observe a small change in something, we would have formed 
5 1 1 Notwithstanding Hirch's claims that Hume does derive the notion of identity from the senses. See Hirsch 
(1983). 
511 Treatise 255:35-256:2 (I, IV, VI, VIII) 
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a new perception, and be able to perceive this diversity (though we might not make the 
mental effort to do so). Hume observes "yet as we seldom think so accurately, we scruple 
not to pronounce a mass of matter the same, where we find so trivial an alteratioa""3 
Hume's meaning here is potentially ambiguous. The accurate thinking Hume refers to is 
not just the judgement that change in something strictly destroys its identity. It also refers 
to the mental effort required to act on such observations. This keys in with Hume's 
proclaimed system in which resemblance has a dual action. Hume notes that we may well 
'find so trivial an alteration'. However, we rarely make the mental effort to focus on such 
alterations specifically, nor consider their general implication. Similarly he continues "The 
passage of the thought from the object before the change to the object after it, is so smooth 
and easy, that we scarce perceive the transition".514 Again 'scarce' is ambiguous. We barely 
perceive the change, i.e. it is on the fringes of perception, and we rarely i.e. infrequently 
make the effort to observe the difference. Hence Hume can make his customary conclusion 
and insist we "are apt to imagine, that 'tis nothing but a contin'd survey of the same 
object."113 Hume's purpose has been served. He has demonstrated how the imagination 
works in very similar fashion when perceiving an unchanging series of perceptions and 
when perceiving a slightly changing series of perceptions. 
It might be objected that this still does not explain why Hume chooses this example. Partly, 
it is merely slavish adoption of part of Locke's argument.516 The main reason, though, is to 
provide a touchstone for Hume's project. I f Hume is to argue that we come to think of the 
identity of a river in the same way we think of the identity of a rock he will need to 
illustrate every mid-point between steadfast inertia and perpetual flux and demonstrate that 
this is (at least to the mind) some sort of continuum. Hume's own theory of time has ruled 
out the observation of any Perfect Identity. He is, therefore, obliged to offer a thought-
experiment to establish his bedrock. He offers a manner in which we may conceive what 
we cannot observe, a perfectly unchangeable object. This is why just as Locke had talked 
of the parts of a mass being "never so differently jumbled"317 Hume allows for "whatever 
motion or change of parts we may observe".518 The mass' perfect lack of change is 
guaranteed by the identity of its constituents, not the arrangements of its parts. Relying on 
the arrangement of the parts would be dangerously close to Scholasticism. It is merely the 
313 Treatise 256:2-4 (I, IV, VI, VHI) 
514 Treatise 256:4-6 (I, IV, VI, VIII) 
513 Treatise 256:6-8 (I. IV, VI, Vm) 
5 1 6 See Essay 329:8-9 (Bk. II, Ch. XXVII, §2) and 330:14-20 (Bk. IL Ch. XXV7J, §3) See Hall (1974) for 
further details of Hume's use of Locke. 
517 Essay 330:18 (Bk. TJ, Ch. XXVII, §3) 
518 Treatise 255:34 (I, IV, VI, VUJ) 
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aggregate of parts, however arranged, that constitutes a mass for Locke and Hume. In this 
way Hume demonstrates how easily we confuse this notion of a steadfast object with 
something which does change its constituent parts, even i f only very slightly. 
Not unsurprisingly this argument occurs at the beginning of a sequence of conditions Hume 
suggests enable us to attribute identity to things which are variant and interrupted. Hence 
he suggests that i f a change is in proportion it is easier to overlook.5" This is more so i f the 
change occurs "gradually and insensibly".510 What is more in the case of artefacts (such as a 
ship)521 and living things ("animals and vegetables")522 we can assume their parts to have a 
"common end"™ and "sympathy"."4 In each case Hume urges the effect these have on the 
imagination. They variously result in "the uninterrupted progress of the thought"525, its 
"easy passage"5" and "easy transition".527 As a consequence the mind "at no particular time 
perceives any interruption in its actions."528 This means the mind is not obliged to form a 
new perception and with it the notion of diversity.52' 
Having shown how these factors prevent us perceiving diversity, Hume discusses occasions 
when despite perceiving a diversity we still persist in attributing identity. This occurs when 
"tho' we commonly be able to distinguish pretty exactly betwixt numerical and specific 
identity, yet it sometimes happens, that we confound them, and in our thinking and 
reasoning employ one for the other."530 
Hume's examples here are less than convincing. He suggests that we confuse separate 
sounds in a sequence (e.g. a fog horn's blasts) as numerically the same even though "there 
is nothing numerically the same, but the cause, which produc'd them."531 This simply seems 
wrong. Hume also says we treat artefacts as numerically identical even through entire 
519 Treatise 256:9-24 (I, IV, VI, IX) It is in this passage that Hume's controversial use of'Imperfect' occurs. 
520 Treatise 256:28,256:25-35 (I, IV, VI, X) 
521 Treatise 257:9-15 (I, IV, VI, XI) Hume clearly has the Ship of Theseus Problem in mind here. 
522 Treatise 257:20 (I, IV, VI, XH) 
523 Treatise 257:5-15 (I, IV, VI, XT) 
524 Treatise 257:16-31 (I, IV, VI, XII) Hume remarks particularly on the strength of this relation Treatise 
257:23 (I, IV, VI, XH) 
523 Treatise 256:22-23 (I, IV, VI, EX) 
526 Treatise 256:31 (I, IV, VI, X) 
52' Treatise 257:14 (I, IV, VI, XT) 
528 Treatise 256:32-22 (I, IV, VI, X) 
5 2 9 Hume notes the importance of this in his original definition of identity. See Treatise 201:29-34 (I, IV, II) 
esp. 201:33-34. 
530 Treatise 257:33-258:1 (I, IV, VI, XTtl) Until this point Hume had resisted suggesting that we confound 
numeric and specific identity, despite the fact this would be obviously useful in bis early discussion of identity. 
If Hume had suggested that all identity statements arose as a result of confounding numeric and specific 
identity he would not have been able to explain those occasions on which we do distinguish the two. Hume 
must avoid saying that specific identity causes us to attribute numeric identity. This would not allow for the 
exercise of reason to prevent us from making the easy associations the imagination would indulge in. 
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changes of components (e.g. a church re-built with different material in a different style).3" 
Interestingly here Hume comments this is enough to make us "denominate"313 the buildings 
the same and we do so "without breach of the propriety of language."314 Hume speaks of 
"the same method of reasoning, [ . . . ] , which has so successfully explain'd the identity of 
plants, and animals, and ships, and houses, and all the compounded and changeable 
productions of either art or nature"353 This very much suggests that Hume does not 
distinguish between the identity of natural and non-natural objects.336 Yet, the identity we 
attribute to the church is merely a denomination. This does not seem as strong as the kind 
of fiction that normally accompanies an identity claim and so renders it "not merely a 
dispute of words."35' Similarly Hume continues his discussion of cases where we confuse 
numeric and specific identity by discussing a river.358 Hume remarks that "the change of 
parts [should] be not sudden or entire, in order to preserve the identity".33' However, this is 
not necessary "where the objects are in their nature changeable and inconsistent".340 This 
appeal to what is "natural and essential"541 in objects to explain why we attribute identity to 
them suggests a covert reliance on a distinction between natural and non-natural identities. 
Hume's failure to explicitly discuss this distinction is a weakness in his account (especially 
compared to Locke's). 
However, it is a minor point, and Hume substantiates his major point: that all identities 
consist of sequences of perceptions united by the imagination. He does this by extending 
his original account of identity and without any need to soften his principles or introduce a 
different notion of identity. The only task left is for Hume "to explain the nature of 
personal identity, which has become so great a question in philosophy, especially of late 
years in England, where all the abstruser sciences are study'd with a peculiar ardour and 
application."541 
331 Treatise 258:4-5 (I, IV, VI, XIIT) 
351 Treatise 258:6-13 (I, IV, VI, XHI) 
353 Treatise 258:13 (I, IV, VI, XIH) compare Essay 348:21-15 (Bk. JJ, Ch. XXVII, §29). 
314 Treatise 258:6-7 (I, IV, VI, XIII) 
353 Treatise 259:5-9 (I, IV, VI, XV) 
3 3 4 Though, of course it could merely mean that one method of reasoning stands behind two separate 
explanations, one for natural objects and one for artefacts. 
537 Treatise 255:6-7 (I, IV, VI, VH) 
558 Treatise 258:25-29 (I, IV, VI, XIV) 
339 Treatise 258:21-23 (I, IV, VI, XTV) 
340 Treatise 258.23-24 (I, IV, VI, XTV) emphasis added. 
541 Treatise 258:29 (I, IV, VI, XTV) 
342 Treatise 259:1-4 (I, W, VI, XV) 
131 
V I I 
HUME'S EXPLANATION OF PERSONAL IDENTITY 
As has already been stated Hume distinguishes between the problem of the mind's identity 
and personal identity. However, he does see the two as being intimately related. This is an 
obvious consequence of holding a version of the Compositional Account. I f a person is 
composed of a mind and a body establishing the identity of the mind is clearly a crucial 
issue. Nonetheless, Hume does not identify the mind and the person. It is, therefore, 
necessary to go to some lengths to point up the subtleties of Hume's account. Without this 
effort it is easy to come to the conclusion that Hume does identify the mind and the person. 
This is at great cost to the cogency of Hume's account. Of course, as Hume's account is 
normally regarded as an interesting failure many writers have not troubled themselves to 
present it in its strongest form. 
Hume begins by urging that personal identity will be explained in a manner continuous with 
the identity of bodies. The previous passages had prepared the ground for this by 
explaining how the same theory that explained the identity of stable material objects could 
explain the identity of more changeable objects, as diverse as living things, tunes, rivers, 
ships and churches. Hence Hume writes: 
The identity, which we ascribe to the mind of man, is only a fictitious one, and 
of a like kind with that which we ascribe to vegetables and animal bodies. It 
cannot, therefore, have a different origin, but must proceed from a like 
operation of the imagination upon the objects.543 
Hume's discussion here, confessedly, concerns the mind. This is no way implies, though, 
that Hume identifies the mind and the person. All it suggests is that Hume feels he will 
have to explain the identity of the mind before he can move on to explain personal identity. 
There seems little doubt that the ordering of the discussion has influenced many readers into 
thinking Hume is about to identify mind and persoa However, two things count strongly 
against this. First, it is possible to develop a cogent account of Hume in which he doesn't 
identify the two. That is to say, the identification of mind and person is no way intrinsic to 
Hume's account. Secondly, and maybe more conclusively, i f it is Hume's intention to 
543 Treatise 259:9-13 (I, IV, VI, XV) 
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explain personal identity as the identity of the mind one would expect him to declare as 
much.544 This he does nowhere.545 
For the moment, though, mental identity is Hume's topic. Explaining it is the denouement 
in Hume's account of identity. Hume must attempt to explain a great paradox (the very one 
that comes to haunt him in the Appendix). The mind is made of many perceptions. Hume is 
clear that all we perceive are perceptions. Yet we also experience the fiction of the mind 
being perfectly identical and simple. Hume remarks on this difficulty: 
'Tis evident, that the identity, which we attribute to the human mind, however 
perfect we may imagine it to be, is not able to run the several different 
perceptions into one, and make them lose their characters of distinction and 
difference, which are essential to them.546 
Yet 
[Notwithstanding this distinction and separability, we suppose the whole train 
of perceptions united by identity547 
This 'supposition' of identity means "a question naturally arises concerning this relation of 
identity".548 Fascinatingly Hume chooses to pose this question twice, once in first-person 
terms, once in third-person terms. 
[W]hether it be something that really binds our several perceptions together, or 
only associates their ideas in the imagination. That is, in other words, whether 
in pronouncing concerning the identity of a person, we observe some real bond 
among his perceptions, or only feel one among the ideas we form of them.54' 
5 4 4 He nowhere, for example, says "I am nothing but a 'personal' bundle of perceptions" as Stroud (1977) p. 
132 suggests. This is to run together Hume's theory of personal identity and his bundle theory of mind. Each 
of us owns a personal bundle of perceptions (our minds) but we also have perfectly real bodies as well. So we 
are not merely our minds, and therefore not merely our personal bundles. 
5 4 5 He does on one occasion use the phrase "mind or thinking person" at Treatise 260:24-25 (I, IV, VI, XVJJ). 
However, this is entirely consistent with the Compositional Account. The phrase occurs at a crucial point in 
Hume's discussion as he starts to shift from his account of mental identity to personal identity. The phrase, 
therefore, is a bridging one, and means "compositional person qua mental being". There is nothing about 
'thinking person' which necessarily excludes the corporeal. It might be objected that if Hume doesn't mean 
'mind' by the phrase 'thinking person' he must have a definition for 'unthinking person'. Contrarily, if 'mind' 
and 'thinking person' are equivalent 'unthinking person' becomes obligingly meaningless. However, Hume 
does have a meaning for this: the unthinking person is the body. In the next sentence but one Hume uses the 
far more comfortable phrase "mind or thinking principle" Treatise 260:30 (I, IV, VI, XVm). Therefore, this 
phrase in no way proves that Hume identifies mind and person. For more see discussion below. 
546 Treatise 259:17-21 (I, IV, VI, XVI) 
547 Treatise 259:25-27 (I, IV, VI, XVI) 
548 Treatise 259:27-28 (I, IV, VI, XVI) 
549 Treatise 259:28-34 (I, IV, VI, XVI) 
133 
This repetition is not an idle amplification of a point.550 It is the beginning of a systematic 
treatment of personal identity in both first-person and third-person terms. This will be 
returned to shortly. For the moment it is necessary to absolutely clarify what Hume thinks 
the rest of the naturally arising question concerns. 
It is clear Hume feels the question is whether we observe a real connection in personal 
identity or not. It is also abundantly clear that Hume answers that we do not: 
This question we might easily decide, i f we wou'd recollect what has been 
already prov'd at large, that the understanding never observes any real 
connexion among objects551... from thence it evidently follows, that identity is 
nothing really belonging to these different perceptions, and uniting them 
together; but is merely a quality, which we attribute to them, because of the 
union of their ideas in the imagination, when we reflect upon them551... it 
follows, that our notions of personal identity, proceed entirely from the smooth 
and uninterrupted progress of the thought along a train of connected ideas553 
Hume only wishes to explain our notion of personal identity. The true and uniting principle 
of personal identity is not his subject. 
Realising this is the case renders obsolete a whole school of Humean criticism. Hume's 
theory cannot be inadequate because he fails to explain how persons are actually bundled 
together.554 Hume is not indulging in this metaphysical task. Hume is merely explaining 
how we come to believe in persons when they are not present in our perceptions in the way 
be believe them to be. There is no difference between his task here and his task in 'Of 
Scepticism With Regard to the Senses'. Just as he asserts there that it is vain to ask whether 
or not body exists, here it is vain to ask whether there are persons or not.555 As with external 
objects, Hume's question is one of how we come to hold the belief. At this point Hume 
5 5 0 Something Hume can hardly ever be accused of, unlike Locke, who one rather wishes had removed as much 
from the Essay as he added. 
551 Treatise 259:34-260:1 (I, IV, VI, XVI) 
55J Treatise 260:3-7 (I, IV, VI, XVI) 
555 Treatise 260:17-20 (I, IV, VI, XVI) emphasis added. 
5 5 4 Stroud is typical of this approach asking "Is it simply the resemblance in a sequence of perceptions that leads 
us to think of them as constituting or belonging to one mind?" Stroud (1977), p. 124 and "Even if a causal 
chain would 'tie' the perceptions together in our minds in a way that was missing from a bundle formed by 
mere resemblance, it is not clear that that would be enough to lead us to think of it as one mind." Stroud (1977), 
p. 125. The condition Stroud is insisting on is too strong. Hume is only looking at our notion of personal 
identity not what actually constitutes persons. Clearly our notion of personal identity can be grounded on 
weaker imaginative principles. Of course, Hume in the Appendix comes to worry that he cannot discover 
stronger conditions for personal identity. Stroud's complaints would have more weight here if Hume is 
committed to thinking that the principles that form our imaginative notion of personal identity are the same 
ones that actually constitute persons. But further argument is needed to show Hume thinks this, especially as 
this would be at odds with his usual scepticism. 
3 5 5 Or, more properly, in vain to ask whether their be mind or not, and as persons are composed of a mind and a 
body, in vain to ask if there are persons or not. 
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sees no problem with treating personal identity as he has treated all other identities, as a 
fiction of the imagination. In the Appendix Hume states: 
Philosophers begin to be reconcil'd to the principle, that we have no idea of 
external substance, distinct from the ideas ofparticular qualities. This must 
pave the way for a like principle with regard to the mind, that we have no 
notion of it, distinct from the particular perceptions."6 
It is in this light that one must understand Hume's account of personal identity. When this 
account is clear Hume's confusions in fas Appendix become more obvious. Therefore, for 
the moment Hume's second thoughts will be put aside. Hume's account of our notion of 
personal identity will remain our present subject. Shortly the "three relations""7 of the 
imagination and the use Hume puts them to will be examined. The role they play, it will be 
argued, can only be understood in terms of the split between first-person and third-person 
concerns Hume has already hinted at.538 Most commentators have ignored the role of the 
third person in Hume's account, or given it short shrift,33' preferring to concentrate on the 
first-person implications.340 The balance, however, will be redressed when one realises how 
seaming Hume is about the usefulness of first-person observations in acquiring our notion 
of personal identity. This will be discussed next. 
334 Treatise 635:10-14 (App. X) 
337 Treatise 260:9 (I, IV, VI, XVI) 
338 Treatise 259:28-34 (I, IV. VI, XVI) 
3 3 9 Stroud, for example, notes "Hume's penchant for talking about other people, not himself' and insists the 
problems are best understood when translated into first-person ones! See Stroud (1977) p. 129-130 
3 4 0 This is indicative of the contemporary trend to regard third-person problems of personal identity as somehow 
metaphysically dubious or secondary. This results from a confusion between the problem of self-knowledge 
and the problem of personal identity. Related as the two are it is not obvious that the solution of the former is 
the necessary route to the solution of the latter. 
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V I I I 
T H E F A I L U R E O F INTROSPECTION 
Hume's asks "From what impression cou'd this idea [of the self] be deriv'd? [...] 'tis a 
question, which must necessarily be answer'd, if we wou'd have the idea of self pass for 
clear and intelligible.""1 Knowledge of the Metaphysicians' Self should be derived from 
perceptions. As Hume reminds the reader "It must be some one impression, that gives rise 
to every real idea"361 Hume has already explained how we can arrive at a notion of Perfect 
Identity by use of reason. As we know every idea must arise from an impression, we can 
infer what sort of impression would be needed to perceive something perfect and simple. 
Hume, then, is looking for a single impression that satisfies the suggested notion of a self, 
i.e. a unitary, simple entity. This is not to be found. Instead Hume says, "For my part, 
when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular 
perception." However, Hume takes the claim further than merely claiming that he finds 
particular perceptions when he looks in upon his self for "I never can catch myself at any 
time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception."363 It is 
certainly the case that Hume believes that the self being made up of a manifold of 
perceptions means that any idea we have of ourselves cannot be of the Metaphysicians' 
Self, saying "[SJensations succeed each other, and never all exist at the same time. It 
cannot, therefore, be from any of these impressions, [...], that the idea of self is deriv'd; and 
consequently there is no such idea"364 
Hume's claim, then, is not just that he can not catch the Self without a perception, but that 
he can only catch the perceptions. The perceptions obscure, necessarily, any attempt to 
access the Metaphysicians' Self. One cannot catch the self with a perception, the way one 
can catch a thief with his swag. It is clear that Hume feels that the notion of the 
Metaphysicians' Self demands this possibility. Self is "that to which our several 
impressions and ideas are supposed to have a reference.">a But as Hume claims "'tis 
intelligible and consistent to say, that objects exist distinct and independent, without any 
Treatise 251:18-23 (I, IV, VI, H) 
Treatise 251:23-24 (I, IV, VI, JO) 
Treatise 252:15-17 (I, IV, VI, IH) 
Treatise 252:1-5 (I, IV, VI, • ) 
Treatise 251:25-26 (I, IV, VI, IJJ) my italics 
common simple substance or subject of inhesion.""5* This restates the attack on substance 
Hume has maintained in the chapters prior to 'Of Personal Identity'. 
Hume is not alone in wanting to avoid believing in bare particulars. But this does not make 
it necessary to be a sceptic about the self. Hume goes further claiming the relation of 
perceptions to any supposed self would be irrelevant for "When my perceptions are 
remov'd for any time, as by sound sleep; so long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be 
said not to exist."367 Hume's point here is double edged Even i f one was a soul or further 
entity, when one has no perceptions one is not aware of this further fact. The 
Metaphysicians' Self cannot be constituted by something of which we are not aware.368 It is 
something "we are every moment intimately conscious of'. 3 6 ' Also, though, as we are just 
our perceptions, when we have no perceptions, then we truly cease to exist. Conceived of 
as a purely psychological entity, Hume insists that the self must have an intermittent 
existence. 
It is curious, though, that when Hume himself remarks on the intimate consciousness we 
have of ourselves he never fails to stress that we are always so conscious. This appears to 
result in a stark contradiction for Hume. I f all we are intimately conscious of is perceptions 
then it is hard to understand what is left to be intimately conscious of when all one's 
perceptions are removed. Waxman solves this dilemma by suggesting that Hume does not 
believe the mind has an interrupted existence.370 Waxman minks the mistake arises by 
"confusing discontinuous existence with discontinuous memory".371 Hume does think our 
identity extends beyond what we can remember, however, this does not seem to answer his 
problem. His point is not that we do not always remember what we think when we sleep. 
His point is that sound sleep removes our perceptions. 
However, there are two ways Hume can be saved from this apparent contradiction. One is 
to limit the scope of 'always' in the phrase 'always intimately conscious'. On this reading 
Hume is merely insisting that when we are conscious we are always mtimately conscious to 
ourselves. His comment is about the experience of consciousness, not about the 
metaphysics of mind. As such it is merely a re-expression of the Transparency Thesis. 
Understood this way Hume is not obliged to claim that the mind always thinks. This can be 
366 Treatise 634:19-22 (App. V) 
367 Treatise 252:17-19 (I, IV, VI, ffl) 
3 6 8 Or at least Hume finds this ridiculous. Compare with Locke's arguments that thinking that always remained 
unknown, even to itself, is nonsensical; Essay 109:31-116:15 (Bk II, Ch. I, §11-19) 
369 Treatise 251:4-5 (I, IV, VI, 0 
3 7 0 Waxman (1994) p. 323«19 
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combined with the second possibility, though it need not be. This is fortunate because I 
suspect it doesn't capture Hume's intention. Hume really does think we are intimately 
conscious of ourselves at all times. 
Hume insists that a deep sleep removes our perceptions but insists that it would take death 
to remove all our perceptions and, further, "nor do I conceive what is farther requisite to 
make me a perfect non-entity".371 Clearly there is nothing controversial in Hume's claim 
that sleep and death are not the same thing. However, the distinction suggests that sleep, 
even deep sleep, does not remove all of our perceptions. It would appear, therefore, that 
Hume veers towards believing that we always think in some capacity. This could put Hume 
in opposition to Locke, who goes to great lengths to show that the soul does not always 
think.5" However, this is only so if Hume is urging that this intimate consciousness is 
purely intellectual. Both Locke and Hume allow that some parts of 'thinking' occur 
partially in the body. Death would remove the continuity of this sort of activity, whereas 
sleep would not. Hume could be appealing to a continuity of this kind. 
Hume's phrasing of the discussion does provide support for this reading. He states, "And 
were all my perceptions remov'd by death, and cou'd I neither think, nor feel, nor see, nor 
love, nor hate after the dissolution of my body, I shou'd be entirely annihilated."514 The 
question of course arises as to what form this perceiving takes which goes on even in a deep 
sleep. Obviously it is not thinking on a fully-conscious level.5" However, Hume could 
allow for continuity of perceptions at a very low-level. He for example allows that a 
creature might have only one perception.5" On this principle all Hume needs is for us to 
have an ongoing succession of very minor perceptions. It seems reasonable to claim we do 
have constant sensory perceptions even when asleep. How else could loud noises or bright 
lights come to wake us i f sleep excluded being aware of them? There is a problem for 
Hume because we are not seemingly transparently conscious of these perceptions. 
However, Hume can counter that all this means is we do not remember many of the 
3 7 1 Waxman(1994)p.323nl9 
5.2 Treatise 252:22-23 (I, IV, VI, Hi) Note Hume's use of 'perfect' here. It is, of course, impossible to be an 
' imperfect non-entity'. The role of 'perfect' as a qualification here is purely literary. It has no role other than 
to parody those philosophers who believe in soul, substance or some other substrata. Hume characterises such 
underproppings as quite unintelligible. This literary or qualifying usage of 'perfect' should be compared with 
Hume's various usage of terms (attributed, imperfect, improper, etc.) in combination with identity. 
5 7 3 See Chapter II, §V in this thesis. 
374 Treatise 252:19-22 (I, IV, VI, IH) Emphasis added. 
3 . 3 Though, Hume doesn't commit to defining the distinction between sleeping and waking in these terms. 
Sleeping could be a purely physical state in which we might find ourselves fully conscious (a hypnotic state 
maybe). However, Hume says nothing further about the nature of sleep (as far as I'm aware) so speculation on 
this point is not very helpful, fascinating as the general topic is (especially considering Locke's comments, and 
the importance of the distinction to Descartes). 
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thoughts we have when sleeping. Hume's insistence that we can extend our identity beyond 
what we can remember, therefore, takes care of periods while we sleep along with waking 
periods we don't remember. 
This doesn't entirely settle what Hume means by being always intimately conscious. For 
present purposes, though, it serves to demonstrate further the failure of introspection on 
Hume's view. Hume claims our introspective self is intermittent. This does not imply that 
the person is intermittent, because Hume does not think introspection can discover the 
person. This should not surprise when we recall Hume's own distinction between personal 
identity as it regards the imagination and personal identity as it regards the passions. The 
imagination demands full consciousness, the passions do not. Hume, therefore, can claim 
that the person is always intimately conscious to us because the person contains both the 
conscious thoughts of the imagination, reason and the passions. The former of these are 
intermittent and contrary. The passions, in contrast, are constant. The passions, of course, 
depend upon the body. Hume is involved in no contradiction here if he makes use of the 
Compositional Account. In short, Hume's analysis of the role of the imagination is as clear 
an argument against a psychological account of personal identity as one could hope to find. 
Given the failure of introspection, Hume has to look elsewhere for the source of our notion 
of personal identity. This is why he introduces, and lays so much emphasis upon, third-
person examples. Our notion of person is a synthesis of the identity we observe in others 
and the identity we observe in such an unsatisfactory and limited fashion within ourselves. 
Treatise 634:28-31 (App. VH) 
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I X 
T H R E E RELATIONS 
Hume suggests there are three relations that convince us that the self is identical, perfect 
and simple and not merely a succession of perceptions. These are contiguity, resemblance 
and causation, though Hume has little to say about contiguity.377 The positivist and 
constructivist view of Hume presumes these three to be responsible for creating personal 
identity at a metaphysical level. This interpretation arises from the positivist doctrines 
foisted upon Hume by latter day empiricists. They regard persons as logical constructions, 
and interpret Hume as offering mechanisms by which this construction takes place (adding 
memory to the list). This is, as has already been argued, not Hume's project at all. 
Hume elects to put contiguity to one side. Although he provides no reason for this in the 
chapter 'Of Personal Identity' itself, his reasoning is given clearly in the previous chapter 
'Of The Immateriality of the Soul'. There Hume has argued that "some beings exist 
without any place","8 examples of such beings being tastes, smells and thoughts. Hume 
concedes that "in this view of things we cannot refuse to condemn the materialists, who 
conjoin all thought with extension".57' However, this does not commit Hume to idealism, 
but to a dualism,580 for some perceptions, namely those of sight and touch can be properly 
regarded as extended. This is because sight and touch contain the idea of extension and "To 
say the idea of extension agrees to any thing, is to say it is extended."5" 
Contiguity can only play a role in the relating of perceptions i f they can be said to exist in 
space. As Hume has excluded many perceptions from being located in space contiguity will 
not play a significant role. Further, even i f a person had a sensory array limited to touch 
and sight it would not be clear how this would confuse them into mistaking a succession of 
perceptions for a simple self. Observing things close together is no more likely to produce 
the smooth flow of perceptions that tricks the mind than is observing distant points. In as 
much as Contiguity does have a role here it is as a secondary species of resemblance. As 
such it has no identifiable independent role. 
5'7 Treatise 260:22-261:32 (I, IV, VI , X V H - X I X ) Stroud (1977) p. 260«1 chastises Hume for not better 
explaining his decision. Stroud's criticism is not without point, but ultimately Hume's rejection of contiguity 
makes little difference to his overall theory. 
578 Treatise 239:6-7 (I, IV, V) 
379 Treatise 239:19-20 (I, IV, V) 
5 8 0 Or a dualism of kinds. For extensive discussion of Hume's possible use of neutral monism see Flage (1982) 
381 Treatise 240:1-2 (I, IV, V) 
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Contiguity in time, of course, can play no role for Hume. Our experience of time is 
produced by the succession of perceptions so any attempt to claim that the smooth flow of 
perceptions through time causes us to regard the self as simple would be doomed to 
circularity. All in all Hume is right to disregard the role contiguity might play. 
Causation, resemblance and memory are intertwined in Hume's account, so it is necessary 
to unravel the role each is meant to play. Hume does regard causation as providing the 
metaphysical underpinning for the succession of perceptions that makes up the bundle of 
perceptions: 
we may observe, that the true idea of the human mind, is to consider it as a 
system of different perceptions or different existences, which are link'd 
together by the relation of cause and effect, and mutually produce, destroy, 
influence, and modify each other. 
For the moment it clear that the mind is a succession of perceptions, one caused by another. 
However, we have no true knowledge of this connection. Hume wishes to find how it is 
that we experience this chain of causation, and mistake it for a simple self. 
The answer for Hume is clear "As memory alone acquaints us with the continuance and 
extent of this [causal] succession of perceptions, 'tis to be consider'd, upon that account 
chiefly, as the source of personal identity."'" This could be read as Hume claiming that 
connections of memory produce personal identity, but the textual evidence is clear that 
Hume does not give memory this role. Instead he says "memory does not so much produce 
as discover personal identity, by shewing us the relation of cause and effect among our 
different perceptions."584 Hume is in fact conducting an attack on those who would claim 
that memory "produces entirely our personal identity".5" These authors cannot explain how 
we can extend our identity "beyond our memory".586 
However, there is one comment that might lead one to think Hume does give some role in 
the production of personal identity to memory. Hume writes "the memory not only 
discovers the identity, but also contributes to its production, by producing the relation of 
resemblance among perceptions."587 This comment occurs before the claim that memory 
discovers rather than produces personal identity. The apparent confusion only arises i f one 
Treatise 261:9-13 (I, IV, V I , X I X ) 
Treatise 261:33-35 (I, IV, V I , X X ) 
Treatise 262:16-18 (I, IV, V I , X X ) 
Treatise 262:19-20 (I, IV, VI , X X ) 
Treatise 262:21 (I, IV , V I , X X ) 
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fails to realise that at this preliminary stage Hume is only discussing how memory goes to 
produce resemblances between perceptions and consequently the false idea of a perfectly 
identical self. Hence Hume's comment is Limited to "this particular"388, i.e. the production 
of the false impression of identity. Memory does not produce personal identity, only 
identity. This also explains why Hume comments directly after that "The case is the same 
whether we consider ourselves or others".389 Memory being equally responsible for first and 
third person bundling rests easier with memory producing the impression of identity than it 
does with memory producing (even i f partially) personal identity. I f memory produced 
personal identity there would be no point in commenting on this symmetry. It would be a 
trivial truth because all persons are surely similar in this respect.390 However, this symmetry 
is worth commenting on i f the impression of personal identity is formed the same way for 
first and third-person cases. It is just this that Hume is commenting on. 
Hume's discussion of memory begins at the same point the distinction between third and 
first-person cases begins. This, in itself, marks a crucial turning point, for it is here that 
Hume leaves behind discussing merely the identity of the mind, and begins to discuss 
personal identity. Memory allows us to acquire the notion of causation. The notion of 
causation allows us to develop two further notions, those of the mind and the person. Now, 
it is clear that Hume thinks it is equally true that our notions of the mind and the person 
have to be acquired in the same fashion. Neither one is found in the senses, or directly by 
reason. Each is present only in the imagination. By careful direction of the reason the 
philosopher can expose how we acquire these notions and that neither is native or the result 
of a simple impression. However, this doesn't mean that Hume thinks that the mind and the 
person are one and the same. Bringing out the distinctions Hume makes by separating first 
and third person discussions will demonstrate how Hume distinguishes between the mind 
and person. 
38' Treatise 261:4-7 (I, IV, VI , XVm) 
388 Treatise 261:4 (I, IV, V I , XVuT) 
389 Treatise 261:7-8 (I, IV, V I , X V I I I ) 
3 9 0 Further, Hume would not want to emphasis that our own and other minds are analogous. This is a 
presumption of Hume's argument, hence his earlier comment that what follows he confidently asserts to be true 
of "the rest of mankind" Treatise 252:32 (I, IV , V I , IV). 
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X 
T H E T R U E IDEA O F T H E HUMAN MIND 
When Hume declares 'The case is the same whether we consider ourselves or others"5" I 
take this to mean that we perceive ourselves to be identical on the same principles that we 
observe others to be identical. Of course, this observation of others would presume some 
sort of Compositional Account of personal identity, because we can only observe others' 
bodies."2 Hume is perfectly aware that the minds of others are private. For this very reason 
he begins his first discussion of the role of resemblance by asking us to 
[S]uppose we cou'd see clearly into the breast of another, and observe that 
succession of perceptions, which constitutes his mind or thinking principle.5" 
The faculty which most assists in producing resemblances and therefore the "smooth and 
uninterrupted progress of thought"5'4 is, of course, memory which Hume remarks "'tis to be 
consider'd, [...] chiefly, as the source of personal identity."5'5 
The reading presented here is justified because it first provides an extremely strong version 
of Hume's theory of personal identity.596 Further, it allows one to make good sense of 
Hume's second thoughts in the Appendix. However, this reading does claim Hume 
presumed, to some extent, the Compositional Account. This presumption needs to be 
justified. This is especially so as other explanations of Hume's choice of terminology are 
available and other authors have either interpreted these phrases differently, or found it 
viable to ignore them altogether. 
5 , 1 Treatise 261:7-8 (I, IV, VI , XVIH) 
5 9 J I therefore find Green's following comments utterly mistaken "Hume assumed that personal identity over 
time is equivalent to the identity of a person's mind over time. He paid no attention at all to the possibility that 
personal identity over time might consist in the identity of a human body over time." Green (1999) p. 104. I 
also find myself in specific disagreement with Baier, who comments on "One's body, which Book One's 
discussion of personal identity ignored" (Baier 1991, p. 130), and that "Book One was also virtually silent 
about our awareness of fellow persons" Baier (1991), p. 133. In general, though, Baier's account and my own 
are in sympathy. See Baier (1991), Chapter 6 'Persons and the Wheel of Their Passions'. 
591 Treatise p. 260: 28-30 (I, IV, V I , XVET) Waxman claims "Hume's account of personal identity involves a 
succession of uniform relations... external objects are at no point presupposed." Waxman (1994) p. 238. Other 
persons are surely external objects, so Waxman's claim must be wrong. Of course, it might well be part of 
Hume's later difficulties that he did not wish to presume the existence of external objects. However, his free 
discussion of other persons suggests his does make such a presumption. 
594 Treatise p. 260:19 (I, IV, VI , X V I ) 
595 Treatise p. 261:34-5 (I, IV, VI , X X ) 
5 9 6 The measure of strength here is the degree an interpretation relies on unembellished presentation of the text. 
Therefore, a strong interpretation credits a minimal number of errors and inconsistencies to an author and only 
attributes opinions obviously explicit in the text 
143 
The Compositional Account has the advantage of being a common-sense theory. Hume 
wishes to explain how vulgar opinions are arrived at. Therefore, one would expect his 
account to employ a common-sense theory. Hume, on this consideration, can hardly be 
thought to defend a Bundle Theory. There is nothing about a Bundle Theory which one is 
inclined to regard as naive or common-sense. Hume does hold that the emergence of our 
notions of identity via the imagination is a complex process. However, the products of the 
imagination are common-sense objects. In his initial account of identity Hume defends the 
vulgar belief in enduring external bodies. The same seems likely to be true of his account 
of personal identity. This is more likely to be a version of the Compositional Account as 
opposed to a version of a Constructivist Bundle Theory. What is more, there is 
considerable textual evidence to support this view. Hume repeatedly talks about persons in 
a manner that presumes they are merely human beings. This evidence will be examined 
shortly when Hume's second thoughts are discussed. 
For present purposes, though, this common-sense defence of the presumption of the 
Compositional Account stands counter to the most obvious competing explanation for 
Hume's use of both first-person and third-person terminology. One could merely assume 
that Hume's choice of terminology is a mere quirk of expression or literary device.5" The 
support for this is thin. Hume employs both the terms 'myself and 'ourselves' without 
complication. The plural merely serves to assert that what Hume finds in his own 
experience is, in fact, true of everyone else.5'8 I f Hume's use of third-person examples were 
merely a literary device it would surely be intended to serve just this purpose. Yet, as 
Hume is happy to assert generality using the first-person plural it seems unlikely he would 
introduce a second device. This seems even more likely as the firstVthird person shift is an 
unnecessarily complicated and confusing way to achieve this end. For this reason Hume's 
habit of phrasing problems in the third-person needs to be taken at face value. 
Clearly the present reading is committed to accusing commentators who do not remark on 
this feature of Hume's account of making an oversight. It therefore remains to look at those 
commentators who do make some use of the distinction and explore the other positions in 
logical space that might explain Hume's decision. 
Hume could intend a solipsistic idealist reading.5" Hume himself is a bundle of perceptions 
bound together by the connexions between his thoughts, and every other person (or 
This is what I take Stroud to do. See Stroud (1977) p. 129-130. 
Treatise 252:31-32 (I, IV , VI , IV) 
Stroud does seem to go someway to taking just such a possibility seriously ; Stroud (1977) p. 137ff 
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appearance of person) is also a bundle of perceptions bound together in Hume's mind. The 
only connexions in the world with any efficacy are those found in Hume's own mind. All 
apparent 'sub-bundles' are entirely illusory. There is only one solipsistic bundle (and this 
itself is a fiction). Observing regularities in our experience causes us to form (though 
erroneously) the idea of identity we then apply (again erroneously) to ourselves. This is 
surely just the sort of extravagant scepticism Hume frequently ridicules. Such a sceptical 
position is irrefutable within its own scope, but its extremity surely militates against it being 
Hume's own view. I f it were Hume's view, he would surely be more explicit about it. 
Therefore Hume's terminology should be read at face value. 
Hume's employment of the third-person perspective gives a central role to the person as an 
observed object. Both Bricke600 and latterly Ward601 take this implication of Hume's 
expression very literally. On this interpretation there are two sequences of perceptions that 
occur: one the sequence of perceptions in an observer and second the sequence of 
perceptions observed in 'the breast of another'. The regularity of perceptions in the 
observed person would therefore prompt a like sequence of perceptions in the observer. In 
pursuing this line both Bricke and Ward generate accounts of unusual complexity and 
difficulty. Primarily they find it unclear how the observer's bundle can be united as it itself 
remains unobserved while the criterion of union appears to be observed succession. 
This is only a difficulty for Hume on a Bundle Theory reading. It is the attempt to preserve 
the psychological purity of the bundle reading that drives Bricke and Ward to such 
awkward lengths when discussing Hume's assertion. I f Hume had intended such an 
analysis comparing the union of observed and unobserved sequences he would surely have 
been explicit about it. In the analogous discussion of object identity he is keen to urge the 
usefulness of the distinction between observed successions of perceptions and the 
interrupted objects. Bricke and Ward are right that Hume is acutely aware of the difficulty 
of observing the succession that makes up a persoa However, the difficulty is not the one 
they highlight.601 
The purpose of the discussion of the succession of perceptions in the breast of another 
should therefore be read at face-value. This is possible i f one presumes (with Hume) a 
Compositional Account of personal identity. First, Hume's request to "suppose we cou'd 
Bricke (1977) 
Ward (1985) 
Indeed, their discussion ultimately lapses into the extremes of the Strict Idealist Reading sketched above. 
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see clearly into the breast of another"M3introduces a thought-experiment.604 Hume has to ask 
us to suppose we could see another's perceptions for the simple and obvious reason that he 
acknowledges that another's thoughts are private. Hume's language consistently supports 
this reading. The succession we observe "constitutes his mind or ihinking principle".605 I f 
the person were constituted by just the mind it would be strange to talk about the mind 
being owned by anything (other than, trivially, itself). Hume, of course, doesn't mean this. 
Instead he is asking us to consider the part of a human being that thinks. This is why he 
uses the phrase "thinking principle.""This phrase he uses only on this occasion, its sole 
purpose being to emphasis that the mind is possessed by the person and does not alone 
constitute the person. It is not itself a technical term but a one-off elaboration of the 
meaning of'mind' in this context. 
The mind of a person would be endlessly varied //that mind lacked the faculty of memory. 
Hume's difficulty with mental identity is that the mind spontaneously exhibits no kind of 
regularity for the imagination to work upon.607 Hume appeals to a simple copy theory of 
memory to explain the resemblances that do arise for the imagination to unite into identity. 
For what is memory but a faculty, by which we raise up the images of past 
perceptions? And as an image necessarily resembles its object, must not the 
frequent placing of these resembling perceptions in the chain of thought, 
convey the imagination more easily from one link to another, and make the 
whole seem like the continuance of one object?608 
Hume then makes his famous declaration that "memory not only discovers the identity, but 
also contributes to its production"60* and urges that "The case is the same whether we 
consider ourselves or others."610 
One needs to ask what equivalence Hume is urging here. The identity that memory 
discovers is importantly not personal identity but the identity of the mind. The equivalence 
Hume is discussing is how we come to believe each person has an identical mind, when 
only one mind is available to our inspection. Hume would obviously be keen to properly 
explain the role of memory in personal identity, given the importance of memory in 
603 Treatise 260:28-29 (I, IV , VI , XVff l ) emphasis added 
6 0 4 As earlier with the mass of matter Treatise 255:30 (I, IV, VI , VIH). See §VI in this chapter. 
605 Treatise 260:30 (I, IV , VI , XVHI) emphasis added 
606 Treatise 260:30 (I, IV , VI , XVIH) 
607 Treatise 252:33-253:4 (I, IV, V I , IV) 
608 Treatise 260:34-261:4 (I, IV, VI , XVHT) 
609 Treatise 261:5-6 (I, IV, VI , XVTE) 
6 , 0 Treatise 261:7-8 (I, IV, VI , XVTtt) 
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contemporary discussions.6" His explanation is very neat. He gives a constimting but non-
causal role to memory in the production of mental identity. Memory produces 
resemblances that the imagination then combines. Therefore Hume shows why we might 
believe memory constituted personal identity while demonstrating that it only contributes to 
the production of identity. 
Hume's thought experiment shows that we can only realise this about the mind by 
considering it in third-person terms. The body is crucial in this. I f Hume merely asked us 
to imagine the mind of another he would be doomed to circularity. His definition of the 
mind is, therefore, grounded by the Compositional Account. It is only in this way that 
Hume can introduce the causal definition of mental identity that will allow him to introduce 
his account of personal identity. 
Hume states: 
[T]he true idea of the human mind, is to consider it as a system of different 
perceptions or different existences, which are link'd together by the relation of 
cause and effect, and mutually produce, destroy, influence, and modify each 
other. Our impressions give rise to their correspondent ideas; and these ideas in 
their turn produce other impressions. One thought chaces another, and draws 
after it a third, by which it is expell'd in its turn.612 
In none of this is there any mention of the person. Commentators have by and large chosen 
to ignore this fact. However, the reason seems quite simple: Hume is offering us the 'true 
idea of the human mind'. 
The passage following is frequently presented as Hume's definition of personal identity. 
In this respect, I cannot compare the soul more properly to any thing than to a 
republic or commonwealth, in which the several members are united by the 
reciprocal ties of government and subordination, and give rise to other persons, 
who propagate the same republic in the incessant changes of its parts. And as 
the same individual republic may not only change its members, but also its laws 
and constitutions; in like manner the same person may vary his character and 
disposition, as well as his impressions and ideas, without losing his identity. 
Whatever changes he endures, his several parts are still connected by the 
relation of causation.613 
6" Treatise 262:15-21 (I, IV, VI , X X ) 
412 Treatise 261:9-17 (I, IV, V I , X I X ) 
6 , 3 Treatise 261:17-28 (I, IV, VI , X I X ) 
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This passage is a frustrating conundrum for many reasons. Prime among these is Hume's 
lapse into metaphor at such a crucial moment in his discussion (a lapse prefigured in his 
comparison of the mind to a theatre614 earlier). This lack of transparency cannot easily be 
remedied, although it can be explained. 
Hume's mention of the 'soul' seems paradoxical. The soul is berated as a fiction on a par 
with self and substance.613 However, there is a precedent for Hume's apparently approving 
use of the term. Earlier, while commenting on the variability of our perceptions, Hume 
writes "nor is there any single power of the soul, which remains unalterably the same, 
perhaps for one moment."616 Hume maintains that the exact constitution, materials and 
powers that make up the mind are all equally unknown. Hume can consistently berate and 
employ the notion of the soul if what he objects to about the soul is its supposed 
explanatory role. This explains why Hume employs metaphor. By his own lights Hume 
cannot say what the mind or soul actually are. He can only explicate them, therefore, 
metaphorically. Only metaphor can avoid metaphysical commitment on this delicate 
matter. It is in this decidedly Lockean spirit that Hume develops a causal account of mental 
identity and then projects this to provide a causal account of personal identity. These two 
mentions of the soul are also typical of the deflationary way Hume occasionally employs 
his opponents' terms. Hume indirectly equates the soul and the person here, the effect 
being to deflate the notion of the soul into the Humean notion of person. Likewise the 
earlier mention of the powers of the soul deflated these mysterious entities into Humean 
perceptions. 
However, one is not yet out of the interpretative woods. Comparison and metaphor are not 
definition. Therefore Hume's assertion that a person's identity may survive certain changes 
in a like manner with a republic does not imply an exhaustive definition of person. Two 
factors point towards this metaphor not being the full extent of Hume's definition. 
Firstly Hume reminds us of the earlier distinction he had drawn between "personal identity, 
as it regards our thought or imagination, and as it regards our passions or the concern we 
take in ourselves."617 He writes: 
And in this view our identity with regard to the passions serves to corroborate 
that with regard to the imagination, by the making our distant perceptions 
4 Treatise 253:4-7 (I, IV, VI , IV) 
5 Treatise 254:21 (I, IV, V I , VI) 
6 Treatise 253:2-4 (I, IV, VI , IV) 
7 Treatise 253:19-21 (I, IV, V I , V) 
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influence each other, and by giving us a present concern for our past or future 
pains or pleasures.418 
Secondly the republic metaphor does not suggest that the extension of identity beyond our 
memory to "times, and circumstances, and actions, which we have entirely forgot, but 
suppose in general to have existed""' is a purely psychological matter. 
The passions belong to the body and to the whole person. Personal identity as it concerns 
the passions presumes the Compositional Account. As Baier notes, "To become 
recognizable, persons must become incarnate, and in Book Two they are treated as ordinary 
persons of flesh and blood, whose self-concern includes concern about their offspring, their 
address in dancing, their strength and vigor, their communicable diseases, as well as about 
their reputation, their wit and virtues.""0 Hume draws the reader's attention to this division 
once again to remind us that the account of personal identity he is presenting is 
systematically incomplete. His interest is with how persons are known in thought, not how 
persons actually are. Hume fully presumes the metaphysical person to be a human being 
composed of a mind and a body. The account of personal identity as regards the 
imagination, though, is one view"1 of the composed person qua 'thinking being'. Hume is 
mounting an attack on introspection as a source of personal identity, and putting in its place 
an account that will premise the discussions of Book EL 
The metaphor of the republic is by Hume's own admission incomplete. He remarks that ' I 
cannot compare the soul more properly to any thing than to a republic or commonwealth', 
suggests that although the comparison is the best available it is not perfect. Given Hume's 
propensity to comment on the completeness, perfection and entirety of relations his failure 
to do so on this occasion further suggests his ultimate dissatisfaction with the metaphor. 
The republic metaphor should also be compared with Hume's earlier metaphor of the mind 
as theatre.4" There Hume urged that "The comparison of the theatre must not mislead us."4" 
The theatre metaphor suggests we might know the location and composition of the mind, 
and Hume is quick to remind us of our perfect ignorance in this matter."4 
618 Treatise 261:28-32 (I, IV, VI , X I X ) 
4" Treatise 262:6-7 (I, IV, VI , X X ) 
4 M Baier (1991) p. 131 
"' Recall Hume noted identity itself is prone to the view we take of it in his original account. Treatise 201:21 
(i, rv,n) 
6 , 1 Treatise 253:4-14 (I, IV, VI , IV) 
6 U Treatise 253:10 (I, IV, VI , IV) 
414 Treatise 253:12-14 (I, IV, VI , IV) 
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Likewise the republic metaphor is suggestive of the composition of persons. Hume's 
emphasis in the metaphor is clearly on organisation of a person's "parts" as he terms 
them6" He describes "reciprocal ties"4", that "propogate"6" and "give rise"6" to each other. 
The republic achieves this by "laws and constitutions"6" the person by "character and 
dispositioa"630 This description is conspicuously Lockean in its emphasis on continuity and 
deliberate agnosticism about the exact nature of the 'parts' involved. Hume's only addition 
is to insist of a person that "Whatever changes he endures, his several parts are still 
connected by the relation of causation."6" 
There is nothing in all of this to suggest a purely psychological constitution of persons. 
Hume again comments it is memory that without which "we shou'd never have any notion 
of causation, nor consequently of that chain of causes and effects, which constitute our self 
or person."632 Nowhere in the Treatise does Hume suggest that only psychological entities 
have causal efficacy, so there is nothing about Hume's definition that excludes the physical 
from his understanding of person. 
In the passage that discusses the extension of identity beyond memory Hume emphasises 
not just the supposition of forgotten "thoughts"633 but repeatedly of forgotten "actions".63'' 
The natural way to understand action here encompasses corporeality. Hume's use of the 
Lockean distinction between self and person in this passage reinforces this impression: 
Or will he affirm, because he has entirely forgot the incidents of these days, 
that the present self is not the same person with the self of that time; and by that 
means overturn all the most establish'd notions of personal identity?633 
The Lockean momentary self is constituted by whatever substances coincide at that 
moment. These are united over time into one person. In this way Locke (and Hume) can 
have us completely self-aware at a time while allowing for diachronic amnesia without 
compromising personal identity. Like Locke, Hume has explained how we arrive at the 
The republic's 'parts' Treatise 261:22 are compared with the person's parts Treatise 261:27 (I, IV, VI , X I X ) 
Treatise 261:19a, IV , V I , X I X ) 
Treatise 261:21 (I, I V , V I , X I X ) 
Treatise 261:20 (I, IV , V I , X I X ) 
Treatise 261:23-24 (I, IV, VI , X I X ) 
Treatise 261:25 (I, IV, VI , X I X ) 
Treatise 261:26-28 (I, IV, V I , X K ) 
Treatise 261:36-262:2 (I, TV, VI , X X ) 
Treatise 262:10 (I, I V , VI , X X ) 
Treatise 262:6,262:8, 262:10 (I, IV, VI , X X ) 
Treatise 262:11-15 (I, IV, VI , X X ) 
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notion of believing that the experience we have currently of ourselves is identical with 
experiences in the past, and those yet to happen in the future. 
In this manner Hume feeLs he avoids overturning 'the most establish'd notions of personal 
identity'. I f this is Hume's aim it seems utterly implausible that his aim is to establish a 
revisionary metaphysical account of personal identity such as the bundle theory. Nor is it 
likely the 'establish'd notions' Hume alludes to are those of philosophy. Philosophy he 
finds vague and elusive. Instead they are the principles of common-sense and the 
imagination. Hume's explicit aim is to provide an account of personal identity consistent 
with common belief. This common belief is of a person being perfectly identical and 
perfectly simple. The imagination is naturally disposed to create the illusion of the 
introspective Metaphysicians' Self. This naturally biases us to believe we are constituted 
by something ethereal and mental, such as a soul or self."4 This is merely an accident of the 
imagination itself being a mental process. However, Hume shows that this fallacy is 
dependent on the observation of other corporeal beings, and itself systematically presumes a 
causal chain dependent on the physical. Hume himself remarks we must explain "that 
identity, which we attribute to plants and animals; there being a great analogy betwixt it, 
and the identity of self or person.""' The natural fiction of identity we all experience, then, 
is properly truly causal at basis and based on both psychological and physical regularities. 
In other words, Hume takes the most established notion of personal identity to be the 
Compositional Account. 
I f one merely relied on the chapter 'Of Personal Identity' to establish the grounding role of 
the Compositional Account the evidence would always appear oblique. Hume's words 
allow a great number of interpretations to be foisted upon them. This is why there are 
almost as many opinions of Hume as there are commentators. However, the role of the 
Compositional Account can be further secured in a manner other readings cannot. Firstly, 
only by presuming the Compositional Account can one explain Hume's doubts in the 
Appendix in a suitably straightforward and satisfactory manner. Secondly, only the 
Compositional Account chimes in easily with Hume's aims in Books I I & HJ. Thirdly, and 
most interestingly, only by adopting this strategy can Hume's exclusion of personal identity 
from his later writings be adequately explained. The next two sections will flesh this out. 
The first will demonstrate the inadequacy of existing explanations and establish what 
" 6 Though, belief in the soul is not inevitable. Belief in an identical self, however, is. Hume urges both the 
importance and degree of these variant fictions at Treatise 254:11-255:5 (I, IV, VI , VI) & 262:32-36 (I, IV, VI , 
VI) 
637 Treatise 253:23-25 (I, IV, V I , V) 
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should constitute a useful strategy for solving this conundrum in Humean scholarship. The 
second will demonstrate the role of the Compositional Account in Hume's second thoughts 
in the Appendix and trace these themes in the Enquiry. 
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X I 
HUME'S MISSING THIRD PRINCIPLE 
For Hume the search for a satisfactory account of personal identity proved an impossible 
one. He laments in the Appendix that " I cannot discover any theory which gives me 
satisfaction on this head.""8 A considerable amount of philosophical effort has gone into 
trying to explain why Hume casts doubt over his own theory. Cause of so much of this 
effort has been Hume's allegedly obscure statement of his own doubts. 
It would seem that in attempting to understand a text good practice would demand one 
accept an obvious reading over an obscure one. The very nature of the Appendix, though, 
tempts the abuse of this simple practice. Hume's initial account is itself difficult. Many 
readers find it the source of a multitude of absurdities, suggestive errors, paradoxes and red 
herrings. When Hume expresses his own discontent the temptation to project one's own 
misgivings onto the text has proved overwhelming. Hume tempts this because the 
Appendix presumes a careful reading of the original text. This is a presumption Hume 
sadly cannot afford. Regrettably a tradition has emerged that Hume has failed to make 
himself clear. This further encourages flights of fancy. The Appendix is taken as a 
declaration of open season on any part of Hume's original account. 
The chapter 'Of Personal Identity' has frequently been misread because its role as a part of 
Book I is not fully appreciated (not to mention the relationship with Books I I & ITJ). 
Equally the Appendix passages, short as they are, have received a very selective reading. 
In the Appendix Hume puts forward two principles that he claims he is unable to make 
consistent: 
that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences 
and 
(hat the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences."9 
Now it is clear (as many have been at pains to point out)640 that the two principles are not 
inconsistent with each other. It must, therefore, be some further principle that Hume finds 
these inconsistent with. 
"8 Treatise 636:2-3 (App., X I ) 
459 Treatise 636:6-8 (App., XII) 
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Hume does not then list this third principle with equal clarity. It is this state of affairs that 
promulgates endless Humean archaeology and has produced more than a little Humean 
alchemy. This poses a simple question, which is almost never asked. Hume goes to the 
effort of adding an Appendix to the Treatise that contains the candid confession of the 
inadequacies of his previous theories. This would be a remarkable act by an insignificant 
philosopher. It is a monumental one for a major philosopher, especially one as supposedly 
concerned with public appearances as Hume. Given this effort of calling attention to a 
difficulty, it seems hardly tenable to believe Hume would find himself unable to state the 
problem. Hume complains he can find no 'theory' to satisfy him. He does not complain 
that he cannot articulate his problems. Therefore, one should prefer to believe that Hume 
did clearly state his problem. Considerable and overwhelming evidence is needed to justify 
any contrary conclusion.*" 
Despite the heavy weather that has been made of this Hume is, in fact, very clear as to what 
his problems are. In the paragraphs previous to the two principles Hume does not feel "it in 
my power to renounce"642 he outlines his difficulties. 
The opening paragraphs of the Appendix restate Hume's contention that all perceptions are 
separable. Hume principally, though, draws attention to the parallels in his philosophy 
between the identity of bodies and the identity of mind: 
I HAD entertain'd some hopes, that however deficient our theory of the 
intellectual world might be, it wou'd be free from those contradictions, and 
absurdities, which seem to attend every explication, that human reason can give 
of the material world.643 
Philosophers begin to be reconcil'd to the principle, that we have no idea of 
external substance, distinct from the idea ofparticular qualities. This must 
pave the way for a like principle with regard to the mind, that we have no 
notion of it, distinct from the particular perceptions."* 
6 4 0 Stroud (1977) p. 128, Scarre (1983) p. 218, Garrett (1997) p. 167. 
6 4 1 1 find Garrett's solution, despite its inventiveness, unsuccessful merely on grounds of its complexity and 
degree of removal from Hume's statements in the Appendix. See Garrett (1997) p. 180-185. Garrett argues 
that his account deals with each element of Hume's description of the problem and describes what should have 
been a real worry for Hume. However, I feel Garrett misses some of Hume's clear statements of his problems, 
and the worry he describes to in fact be one Hume would not have worried about. Briefly, Garrett asserts that 
Hume has a problem with possible co-ownership of perceptions. In fact the Humean notion of intimacy 
absolutely guarantees against this possibility. 
441 Treatise 636:5 (App., XJJ) 
643 Treatise 633:10-14 (App. I) 
644 Treatise 635:10-14 (App., X) 
154 
It is these two statements that are the crux of Hume's confusioa The scepticism Hume can 
tolerate about knowledge of bodies he cannot tolerate about persons. The argument 
progresses as follows. 
Hume's initial account is defective on two fronts; it does not "explain the principle of 
connexion, which binds them together",643 nor what "makes us attribute to them a real 
simplicity and identity".646 
The main aim of the original chapter 'Of Personal Identity' was to explain the propensity to 
believe the mind was a simple substance. The Appendix laments the lack of explicit 
positive theory about the nature of the successions of perceptions Hume felt were wrongly 
described as simple. 
The effect of his account, Hume suggests, is to allow that "thought alone finds personal 
identity".647 Hume notes that "[h]owever extraordinary this conclusion may seem, it need not 
surprise us"648 because "[m]ost philosophers seem inclin'd to think, that personal identity 
arises from consciousness".649 Hume too accepts that the idea of personal identity arises in 
consciousness. However, he finds it difficult to accept that personal identity is produced by 
consciousness, or constituted by consciousness. 
The crux of the problem then is a simple one. Hume can give an account of personal 
identity that works for others and for ourselves when we think of ourselves as others see us. 
This public person can be discovered. However, this means that a thinking being does not 
know itself. This appears to be a sceptical leap too far. Hume can accept that bodies, being 
only sporadically and partially present to us, are constructed by the imagination. Hume can 
also accept that there is a sense in which personal identity is like this. However, he cannot 
shake the ghost of the Metaphysicians' Self, that the self should be intimately known in 
introspection. This is the paradox of The Humean Insight. Hume rejects the 
Metaphysicians' Substantial Self because it is unknowable and mysterious like all 
substances. However, Hume's empirical urge that the person should be easily 
comprehensible is not satisfied by his own theory. Hume continues to search within himself 
for an answer, despite his own best arguments that he will find nothing this way. 
Introspection is a natural mode of thinking, practised by the vulgar, but it is one Hume finds 
Treatise 635:17-18 (App., XT) 
Treatise 635:18-19 (App., XI) 
Treatise 635:27 (App., XT) 
Treatise 635:30-31 (App., XI) 
Treatise 635:31-33 (App., XT) 
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himself unable to defend as he might wish. His pleading the privilege of the sceptic has for 
once the tone of exasperation, even desperation. 
This reading has the virtue of being simply and obviously present in the text. It is also 
pitched at the right level. Hume is clearly aware where his problem lies, but is unable to 
provide a solution to it. An interpretation of Hume is entitled to intuit what Hume's 
solution (or problem) might have been. This does permit the attribution of extra unstated 
beliefs to Hume. However, these should be minimal in number, and justified by the text. 
The Humean Insight is one such extra belief However, it is a minimal addition, and is 
widely justified by the text, as it synthesises Hume's concerns about introspection. It is 
also, crucially, compatible with the complaints Hume does express. It ignores none of 
them, and does not foist extra ones upon Hume. No other treatment of Hume's Appendix 
does so little violence to Hume's text while providing such a powerful insight into his 
philosophy. 
Clearly my interpretation is in sympathy with the one offered by Kemp-Smith. Kemp-
Smith makes particular use of Hume's treatment of the self in Book I I , especially this 
passage: 
'Tis evident, that the idea, or rather impression of ourselves is always 
intimately present with us, and that our consciousness gives us so lively a 
conception of our own person, that 'tis not possible to imagine, that any thing 
can in particular go beyond it." 0 
Kemp-Smith suggests that the Appendix is Hume's confession of the tension between this 
intimate presence and the lack of any one impression of the self Hume insisted upon in 
Book I . Where my interpretation differs from Kemp-Smith is in the detailed reliance on the 
Compositional Account. However, objections to Kemp-Smith's solution might also 
threaten my account. Garrett objects that "there simply is no inconsistency between Book I 
and I I to be the object of Hume's concern. He is quite entitled to write in Book I I of both 
an idea and an impression of 'ourselves'.""1 Garrett is correct to note that Hume does allow 
there is an impression of the self. Hume's dispute is merely about what we gain from this 
impression and how it arises. Garrett himself points out Hume gives other examples of 
impressions that violate the Copy Principle (time, space, the missing shade of blue). Garrett 
is mistaken, though, to assert that this is an objection to the spirit of Kemp-Smith's claim. 
Hume does sense a tension between the intimacy we have of ourselves, and the manner of 
Treatise 317:26-30 (II, I, XI) 
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our awareness of ourselves as spelt out in Book I . That is to say, Hume recognises the 
tension between his analysis of the failure of introspection and intimate consciousness. 
Introspection, not an impression of the self, is the real crux of Hume's difficulty. The 
following will build on this, in the spirit of Kemp-Smith, despite Garrett's misgivings.6" 
Hume emphasises that his dissatisfaction stems from the relative failure of his account to 
explain the intellectual world compared with the material world. In part this might amount 
to an analogous failure to explain the mind as an object. Material objects are external and 
observable, whereas the mind must observe itself. Once again this is connected to the 
failure of introspection. This problem is resolved in my interpretation by taking the mind to 
be part of something material and observable, that is a human being. Hume can be argued 
to settle for this solution, although it does not entirely allay his fears about the failure of 
introspection. 
There is, however, a school of interpretation that rests the entirety of Hume's difficulties on 
the failure of the self to be properly an object to itself.4" I f the mind is a bundle, it is 
argued, it cannot be an active self. A bundle contains only perceptions and cannot itself 
believe, will, act, remember and so forth. Instead it only contains beliefs, volitions, 
memories and so forth as members. Clearly this is no difficulty for the Compositional 
Account as it is the human being that remembers, wills and acts. However, for those who 
mistake Hume as holding a purely psychological theory, such an answer is not available. 
This approach is right to point out that Hume shows that the self cannot be expansively 
present to itself because all that can be known at any one time are certain perceptions. This, 
however, is Hume's very point. The denial of introspection is a central plank of Hume's 
analysis, and one he does not abandon. It can be argued that Hume should have held a 
different theory of introspection, and this is why his initial account failed. However, it 
cannot be argued that his problem in the Appendix is how a bundle introspects. 
An allied school emphasises Hume's disappointment at not finding the true relation that 
binds perceptions. This interpretation is particularly popular with those who are impressed 
6 3 1 Garrett (1997) p. 168 
m Garrett also objects that on Kemp-Smith's analysis Hume should reject Book I's account, but in fact 
continues to express his satisfaction with it. However, this does not carry much weight at all. Hume's 
confession makes more sense because he maintains his belief in Book I's account of the self. Otherwise Hume 
would have been able to write a simple recantation of Book I in the Appendix, and this he does not do. Further 
Hume can be satisfied that Book I's account is sound ay far as it goes. Hume's stated problem is that the 
system which explained the material world does not explain the intellectual world to his satisfaction. Book II 
exposes a shortfall in Book I's ambitions. Hume's problem is not that the Books conflict (as Garrett suggests 
Kemp-Smith must maintain) but that they do not adequately support each other. There is nothing about the 
latter problem that demands Hume must reject one account in the favour of the other. 
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with the constructivist tones in Hume's writing. In its weak form Hume is taken to express 
dismay as to how bundles are held together.654 In its strong form Hume is taken to flounder 
by explaining where one bundle begins and another ends.6" This line of enquiry contains a 
basic insight, but is far from being Hume's main worry. The true nature of causal bonds 
Hume contentedly maintains is mysterious. He is equally sanguine in accepting that we do 
not know the materials of the mind. Hume does not expect to explain these things. 
Therefore any solution which rests on Hume allegedly expressing dissatisfaction with 
resemblance and causation as bonds is quite mistaken.656 Hume never rejects this analysis. 
However, Hume does have qualms about our mode of knowledge of ourselves given these 
limits. He feels it must have some special guarantee, hence his urging its intimacy. The 
solution to the Appendix lies with understanding the nature of this intimacy and what Hume 
feels it achieves. This intimacy is not, however, explained at all by examining the structure 
of the bundle of the mind. There is nothing in the Appendix to suggest that Hume does 
reject his basic conception of the mind as a bundle of perceptions. Although he queries how 
far his account goes in explaining matters he does not reject the analysis of the bundle, and 
indeed relies on it in his explanation. 
None of these prevailing trends goes to the heart of Hume's worries. In the next section the 
preferred interpretation sketched above will be fleshed out further, and hopefully will go to 
the heart of Hume's worries. 
Robison (1974), Stroud (1977), Nathanson (1976). 
Beauchamp(1979) 
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X I I 
H U M E AND T H E COMPOSITIONAL ACCOUNT 
Confessedly the direct evidence for Hume's use of the Compositional Account in the 
chapter 'Of Personal Identity' is oblique. Primarily it rests on claiming Hume held our 
notion of a person to arise only because we assume that our third-person observation of 
persons must yield a notion consistent with our first-person experience. We observe other 
human beings, Humean and Lockean thinking beings, to be identical in the same manner as 
other objects. This identity we impute to ourselves as like thinking beings. It is by this 
analogy that we confidently extend our identity beyond experience and memory. One can 
fairly ask i f Hume gestures towards such opinions in other parts of his writings. 
The Compositional Account does in fact seem to be a presumption of the entirety of the 
Treatise. Hume does not indulge in a Cartesian project of scepticism. He does not confirm 
and re-establish the value of each of our senses and faculties as he progresses. Instead he 
assumes their presence. For example he stresses the role of the senses in acquiring new 
ideas and impressions: "To give a child an idea of scarlet or orange, of bitter or sweet, I 
present the objects"6" and observes the impossibility of acquiring certain ideas when "one is 
born blind or deaf'.658 
Later in the Treatise Hume goes much further towards embracing the Compositional 
Account. He relies on the physiology of the brain to explain the mistakes of the 
imagination. 
When I receiv'd the relations of resemblance, contiguity, and causation, as 
principles of union among ideas, without examining into their causes, 'twas 
more in prosecution of my first maxim, that we must in the end rest contented 
with experience, than for want of something specious and plausible, which I 
might have display'd on that subject. 'Twou'd have been easy to have made an 
imaginary dissection of the brain, and have shewn, why upon our conception of 
any idea, the animal spirits run into all the contiguous traces, and rouze up the 
other ideas, that are related to it. But tho' I have neglected any advantage, 
which I might have drawn from this topic in explaining the relations of ideas, I 
am afraid I must here have recourse to it, in order to account for the mistakes 
that arise from these relations. I shall therefore observe, that as the mind is 
endow'd with a power of exciting any idea it pleases; whenever it dispatches 
the spirits into that region of the brain, in which the idea is plac'd; these spirits 
always excite the idea, when they run precisely into the proper traces, and 
657 Treatise 5:5-6 (I, I, I) 
658 Treatise 5:24 (I, I, I) 
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rummage that cell, which belongs to the idea But as their motion is seldom 
direct and naturally turns a little to the one side of the other; for this reason the 
animal spirits, falling into the contiguous traces, present other related ideas in 
lieu of that, which the mind desir'd at first to survey. This change we are not 
always sensible of; but continuing still the same train of thought, make use of 
the related idea, which is presented to us, and employ it in our reasoning, as i f it 
were the same with what we demanded. This is the cause of many mistakes 
and sophisms in philosophy; as will naturally be imagin'd, and as it wou'd be 
easy to shew, i f there was occasion."' 
This passage makes it quite clear that Hume connects the very actions of the mind with the 
body. As already noted Hume follows Locke in trying to develop a notion of the mind that 
cannot be undermined by our lack of knowledge about the actual materials of the mind. 
Locke arrived at his notion of extended consciousness. Hume declares that our only true 
(i.e. incorruptible) notion of the mind is a bundle of perceptions. The true notion of 
personal identity is of such a mind as part of a thinking being, i.e. a human being. Hume 
continues his scepticism in the Enquiry where he remarks: 
The same difficulty occurs in contemplating the operations of mind on body -
where we observe the motion of the latter to follow upon the volition of the 
former, but are not able to observe or conceive the tie which binds together the 
motion and volition, or the energy by which the mind produces the effect.460 
Hume, of course, accepts that the mind and body do interact. He is merely sceptical about 
our hopes of ever understanding how this comes about. 
It is here that Hume's twin concerns of introspection and intimate consciousness meet. 
Hume insists, quite correctly, that we are aware of the contents of our own minds. What is 
more, this awareness is of a special order. Hume accepts freely that first-person experience 
is quite different to third-person experience. It is part of human nature to experience a 
peculiar relationship with only our own perceptions. This is what Hume hopes to capture 
by the notion of intimacy. Intimacy is neither deliberate or under our control. It is a basic 
fact of being a thinking being. Introspection, in contrast, is in our power. We notice 
introspection more than the ongoing intimacy of ourselves because introspection is under 
our control. However, introspection is not stronger than intimacy, but weaker. Without 
mental effort introspection can discover nothing. In periods of sleep introspection is quite 
inert. Despite its promise of penetrating understanding introspection cannot go beyond the 
Treatise 60:21-61:15 a , II, V) 
""Enquiry 74:2-7 (VII, II) 
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simple fact of intimacy. Hume cannot help but conclude that introspection is impotent in 
this way. However, he never quite accepts this outcome. 
I f Hume's worry was with the failure of introspection given the intimate consciousness we 
enjoy of ourselves one might expect these themes to reappear in the Enquiry. Notoriously 
the section on personal identity has no direct successor in the Enquiry. However, the 
themes and attacks are present in the manner one would expect if Hume had resolved his 
worries into a less thorough acceptance of the Compositional Account. 
The theme of intimate consciousness is reasserted. However, the person of Book I of the 
Treatise has now obviously become the Compositional person: 
It may be said, that we are every moment conscious of internal power; while we 
feel, that, by simple command of our will, we can move the organs of our body, 
or direct the faculties of our mind. An act of volition produces motion in our 
limbs, or raises a new idea in our imagination. This influence of the will we 
know by consciousness. Hence we acquire the idea of power or energy; and are 
certain, that we are ourselves and all other intelligent beings are possessed of 
power. This idea, then, is an idea of reflection, since it arises from reflecting on 
the operations of our own mind, and on the command which is exercised by 
will, both over the organs of the body and the faculty of the soul."' 
However Hume remains equally clear that "the energy, by which the will performs so 
extraordinary an operation...must forever escape our most diligent enquiry."*" Hume 
remains equally clear that introspection cannot reveal anything further either. The 
discussion of introspection, in the guise of consciousness, argues: 
[I]s there any principle in all nature more mysterious than the union of soul 
with body... ? [ I]f by consciousness we perceived any power or energy in the 
will, we must know this power; we must know its connexion with the effect we 
must know the secret union of soul and body, and the nature of both these 
substances; by which the one is able to operate, in so many instances, upon the 
other.663 
These things, of course, all remain secrets. The extent of consciousness runs no further than 
the exercise of the will and the contents of our thoughts. Hume continues this attack by 
noting other occasions when the interaction of mind and body produce effects we are all 
familiar with but in the dark as regards ultimate causes. We do not know how the soul 
Enquiry 64:13-24 (VII, I) 
Enquiry 65:5-8 (VII, I) 
Enquiry 65:9-22 (VII, I) 
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produces new ideas."4 We experience the interaction of soul and body as being limited, a 
limit we learn only by experience.465 Our 'self-command' varies with health and practice.*44 
Hume also is quite sure that humans are continuous with the animal kingdom. Thinking is 
something animals do. Hence his remarks in the Appendix: 
We can conceive a thinking being to have either many or few perceptions. 
Suppose the mind to be reduc'd even below the life of an oyster. Suppose it to 
have only one perception, as of thirst or hunger. Consider it in that situation. 
Do you conceive any thing but merely that perception? Have you any notion of 
self or substance! I f not, the addition of other perceptions can never give you 
that notion.667 
Hume's point is simple. Animals have perceptions in greater or lesser numbers. There is 
nothing about a creature (even a human) having many perceptions that adds anything extra 
to that creature's being. 
It is no surprise to find Hume remark in the Enquiry of the similarity of our thinking parts 
with that of animals. 
[T]he experimental reasoning itself, which we possess in common with beasts, 
and on which the whole conduct of life depends, is nothing but a species of 
instinct or mechanical power, that acts in us unknown to ourselves.468 
Hume also remarks on the analogy between like creatures, noting how "readily and 
universally do we acknowledge a uniformity in human motives and actions as well as in 
operations of body."669 Thus Hume establishes the principle by which we can predict claims 
about personal identity. The basis for such claims is our body of knowledge about Human 
Beings. Hume writes of man that "as we are otherwise acquainted with the nature of the 
animal, we can draw a hundred inferences concerning what maybe expected from him; and 
these inferences will all be founded in experience and observation."470 
It is in these remarks that Hume latterly dissipates his concerns about personal identity. The 
advantage of this reading is that it explains what became of Hume's worries while 
illustrating from where they emerged. 
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The Humean Insight brings together these concerns. Hume feels that personal identity 
should be well-grounded and easily known. Hume notes the intimacy each of us has with 
ourselves. However he cannot progress beyond asserting this as a primitive fact. 
Introspection would appear to be the faculty that would reveal more about personal identity. 
Hume, however, finds introspection lacking. Therefore he is left defending the most 
obvious account of personal identity, the Compositional Account. Hume, in providing an 
account of Human Nature unsurprisingly presumes the existence of human beings as the 
basis of his analysis. 
Noonan remarks of Hume that "The only problem that exists [for Hume] is the genetic one 
of specifying the psychological causes of the universal but mistaken belief in the existence 
of enduring persons."671 Noonan's observation is typical. It seems obvious that anyone 
adopting such an approach must be making an assumption about what persons are. Any 
other enquiry would be pointlessly circular. It seems equally obvious that one must 
conclude that Hume presumed a version of the Compositional Account. 
The Humean Insight finds ghostly and gnomic expression in one curious remark in the 
Enquiry. 
It is remarkable concerning the operations of the mind, that, though most 
intimately present to us, yet, whenever they become the object of reflexion, 
they seem involved in obscurity; nor can the eye readily find those lines and 
boundaries, which discriminate and distinguish them. The objects are too fine 
to remain long in the same aspect and situation; and must be apprehended in an 
instant, by a superior penetration, derived from nature, and improved by habit 
and reflexion.671 
Hume once again remarks on intimacy. However, he cannot abandon introspection. The 
exertions of the Treatise had persuaded Hume that introspection did not provide a reliable 
or pelucid route to self-knowledge. Consequently, it receives no systematic treatment in the 
Enquiry. However, Hume cannot bring himself to totally abandon introspection and the 
power of reflexion. Hence his hopes for a superior penetration into thought, furnished by 
nature and perfected by philosophy. It is this cherished hope that is the secret of Hume's 
confusions over personal identity. 
Noonan (1989) p. 78 
Enquiry 13:7-15 (I, I) emphasis added. 
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CONCLUDING POSTSCRIPT 
The previous chapters have established the historical' support for the Compositional 
Account. As already noted, there is an affinity between the Compositional Account and the 
present-day theory of personal identify known as Animalism. Both theories identify 
persons and human animals. However, Animalism prefers a biological understanding of the 
human animal. The Compositional Account, on the other hand, analyses the notion of a 
human being as a composition of a mind' and a body. As a consequence the Compositional 
Account is a broader church, capable of uniting metaphysics as diverse as those of 
Descartes, Locke and1 Hume. This postscript will explore the links between Animalism and 
the Compositional Account and also outline the strengths and value of both theories in 
contemporary debate about personal identity . The aim of this postscript is not to be 
definitive, but programmatic, and suggest what the Compositional Account brings to the 
personal identity debate. 
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I 
DIFFICULTIES IN FRAMING T H E P R O B L E M 
The problem of personal identity is the putative philosophical problem of what it is to be 
and remain the same person over time. On the presumption that each of us thinks we are a 
person it is also, therefore, a problem of what it is to be the sort of thing that we are. This is 
central to the difficulty of pursuing the philosophical problem of personal identity. It is 
only on a presumption of how to answer the question 'what are we?' that debate can 
proceed. Yet, of course, this is to deeply prejudice the debate. 
Two immediate possibilities confront us. One is to assert that persons represent a primitive 
and irreducible category. There is nothing philosophically dubious about this position. 
However, such quietism should only be adopted i f all other possibilities have been 
exhausted. The other alternative is to adopt the most obvious answer to the question and 
take this as a starting point for our enquiry. The most obvious answer to the question 'what 
are we?' is to answer that we are human animals. This may itself turn out to be a primitive 
fact. However, the notion is clearly open to philosophical analysis. We assume ourselves 
to be persons, and we also assume ourselves to be human animals. Our enquiry then turns 
to reasons for denying an identification of the two categories. 
Two basic objections arise. First, one may object that the identification is not necessary. 
This objection itself has two forms. The identification may be too narrow. That is, there 
may be persons that are not human animals. Secondly, the identification may be too broad. 
That is, there may be human animals that do not qualify as persons. The second objection is 
that the identification is not sufficient. Being a human animal is not in itself sufficient to 
substantiate a claim of personhood. 
All these objections arise because it appears possible to find differences between our pre-
philosophical notions of persons and human animals.673 It is instructive to try to establish 
why this pre-philosophical cleave occurs, and further why we regard it as important enough 
to warrant philosophical grounding. 
6 7 3 Some people object to the idea of being called an animal altogether. These people normally feel that being 
human by definition is not to be an animal (and vice versa). However, by animal all that is meant is something 
biological. Very few people object to the claim that we are not in some sense biological, even if this is only a 
matter of contingent embodiment. By Human I mean a member of the species currently represented by Homo 
Sapiens. 
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As we see ourselves as paradigmatically persons the answers to the questions as to what it is 
to be human and what it is to be a person must be compatible. Otherwise humans are 
excluded from being persons. This presents a dilemma On the one hand we wish to escape 
giving an account of personhood that is nothing more than a description of what it is to be a 
human person. There is something philosophically jejune about giving a merely descriptive 
account of surface qualities. Nor would it be particularly satisfactory to give an account 
that allowed non-human persons honorary status as persons in as much as they could be 
shown to be 'like us'"4. This would fail to make 'person' the right sort of taxonomic 
distinction to have any useful role6". Personhood must be defined in suitably neutral terms. 
On the other hand, such neutrality risks excluding some (or even all) humans from being 
counted as persons. At the very least this would seem self-defeating and absurd, at the 
worst pernicious. There is further attendant risk of admitting entities that one would not 
wish to regard as persons at all. Such liberalism threatens both absurdity and triviality. 
The philosophical procedure adopted in response to these legitimate pressures has been to 
abstract part of what is seen as being typical of human existence and take this as being 
essentially constitutive of personhood. Hence all humans will have this capacity (at least 
potentially), and other non-human entities can (or conceivably might) have it as well. 
Human persons have mental and physical qualities. Theories of personal identity have been 
developed in terms that assume this mind-body distinction. Any doubts readers might have 
entertained about this presumption should have been allayed in this thesis. The 
Compositional Account itself presumes the mind-body distinction. The previous chapters 
have argued for its historical influence. The point of interest here is to explain why the 
psychological aspects of human experience have been emphasised in recent theories of 
personal identity to the exclusion (already commented on in the introduction) of corporeal 
existence. 
The reason is seems simple and obvious enough even i f its consequences have been neither. 
Gross corporeality is ubiquitous and abundant in our earthbound experience.676 Mental 
activity, in comparison, is scarce and exotic. In our experience it is only living entities 
exhibit mental characteristics. Further only human beings exhibit high-order mental states. 
The sheer commonness of physicality makes it appear a very unpromising place to start 
looking for a definition of personal identity. The uniqueness of sophisticated mental states 
' For a discussion of this approach see Smith (1989) 
'For arguments I take to be definitive on this issue see Lowe (1991b) 
s Of course, in the greater part of the universe matter is scarce. Planets are uncommon local concentrations. 
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to human animals, our paradigm persons, makes it seem the ideal grounding for such a 
project.4" What is more, i f one encountered something that was not human but still 
exhibited high order mental states then one would be inclined to count such a thing as a 
person.678 Whereas mere are common examples of objects that appear to be human animals 
but which we may well not want to call persons, e.g. the severely brain-damaged and 
corpses. 
Clearly, though, just choosing any characteristic unique to human persons would not 
provide a suitable criterion for personal identity. As we have seen both Descartes and 
Locke brusquely, and correctly, derided the philosophical value of human persons being the 
only rational animals and the only featherless bipeds. Something more than being a unique 
feature of human persons recommends high-order mentality as the qualifying criterion of 
personhood. High-order mental states are thoughts about such things as ethics, past events, 
meanings, chess, art, science and philosophy. We do not just value the fact that human 
persons have high-order mental states because they are unique to us. We value them 
because they are integral to the very experience of human existence. 
Yet it is not clear that what we value about ourselves is any better guide to what constitutes 
personal identity than what is unique. Human persons all need hearts to survive, but many 
people are conspicuously cavalier about the condition of their hearts (especially those 
devoted to more cerebral lifestyles). Surely whims about what we value about ourselves 
should not decide what constitutes personhood. What we value seems determined by our 
experience of the human condition not what is essential to being human. I f we had a more 
intimate connection to our biology (say we could introspect states of physical health in a 
manner which normally requires an x-ray) we might well value that aspect of our existence 
more highly.67' 
Consequently the personal identity debate has a profound dissonance at its heart. We 
experience ourselves as corporeal beings, yet our embodiment seems philosophically 
mundane. Instead philosophical efforts have been concentrated on our psychological 
6 , 7 A relatively recent and much celebrated example of just this is Frankfurt (1971) 
6 7 8 At least this intuition is appealed to by supporters of the psychological criterion. It is not obvious that 
everyone shares this intuition. Even if everyone did, treating a rational parrot as a suitable partner for 
conversation and an object of respect would not mean that one is treating the parrot as a person. 
6 7 9 The impulse to insist that conditions of personhood are not malleable is, nonetheless, peculiarly 
philosophical. Outside of philosophy, in disciplines such as anthropology and sociology the notion of person is 
taken to be some sort of social or logical construct On this view what is valued can be the basis for 
personhood. One cannot deny that different cultural perceptions of personal identity exist, e.g. those cultures 
that believe in a personal afterlife and those that do not. Clearly to believe one could survive bodily death will 
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capacities. What is more a legion of examples suggest that our mental and physical beings 
are distinct entities. One can easily be shown to continue without other. In recent debate 
this has come to be expressed as the distinction between a person and the human animal 
each coincides with. This is the New Dualism.680 The relationship one has to one's material 
part is like the relationship between a statue and the copper that makes it up. The statue can 
come to be composed of different pieces of copper, or even a different material altogether. 
Likewise a person might come to have a different body. Indeed persons seem even more 
robust than statues. It has been suggested that persons can survive as information records in 
computers, as disembodied spiritual entities, or as non-biologically embodied beings. I f one 
is not persuaded by these fanciful suggestions of persons' longevity then one need only 
consider cases where a person seems to not survive for as long as their coincident body. 
The senile, those is vegetative states and the dead all seem to have bodies. Many find these 
cases persuasive in demonstrating that the person and the human animal are distinct. 
What makes this dissonance so frustrating is that there seems to be no way of resolving it 
that does not prejudge our answer to the question at hand. Once the distinction has been 
accepted between person and body writers are forced to choose between the two answers. 
Thought-experiments and 'intuition-pumps' vie for our attention. However, the primitive 
status of our pre-philosophical notions of both person and human animal forces 
presumptions onto the arguments. The very way we frame and describe the problem cases 
presumes the theory one is trying to prove.681 The only way to overcome this impasse is to 
dissolve the dualism upon which it is predicated. 
significantly alter how one feels. The philosopher, however, maintains that these different views of 
personhood must, in fact, be different views of common and shared phenomena. 
6 8 0 The term is adopted from Burke (1997b). Similar arguments are found in van Inwagen (1997) and Olson 
(1997a). 
6 8 1 This is one reason why one might argue against the worth of thought experiments. See Wilkes (1988) for 
length discussion of this issue. For cautionary comments about thought experiments I find myself in great 
sympathy with see van Inwagen (1997). 
168 
II 
DISSOLVING T H E N E W DUALISM 
The central debate for personal identity, therefore, turns on the legitimacy of the New 
Dualism. Harold Noonan in a recent provocative paper has sketched five possible 
solutions.682 
1. Reject the existence of human beings 
2. Reject any possibility of a divergence between personal identity and animal 
identity 
3. Reject the claim that animals are ever thinking intelligent beings 
4. Accept that the concept of a person is not a sortal concept at all 
5. Accept that the utterer of T need not be identical with the referent of T 
Noonan rightly rejects (1). (3) is associated with Shoemaker and there are good reasons for 
rejecting this as well. One is obliged to adopt this curious position if one wishes to insist 
that being a thinking intelligent being is sufficient for being a person. I f a person thinks 
with the brain of a spatially coincident human animal then surely the animal can also be 
said to think. In this case it too is surely a person. This is known as the paradox of the two 
thinkers.485 This paradox does have to be avoided, but (3) is both drastic and absurd. It is 
therefore not to be preferred as a solution. 
5 embraces the New Dualism. Noonan bills this as the Neo-Lockean solution and it is the 
answer he prefers to Animalism (as Noonan construes it). Noonan's version of Animalism 
is expressed in (2). Although Noonan's definition captures the central drive of Animalism 
there are many ways of cashing out the details of this assertion. These will be explored 
below. Noonan rejects 4 because it "involves the radical claim that the topic of personal 
identity is strictly speaking non-existent".484 In fact, 4 is worth considering despite its 
radical appearance. Personal identity is treated, following Locke and Hume, as a special 
problem. This is not without good reason as the problem cases are uniquely complex and 
Noonan (1998) p. 317 
See van Inwagen (1990), Garrett (1998), Burke (1997b) 
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intriguing. Further, given that philosophers are all persons there is a peculiarly intimate 
fascination with settling these issues. However, i f the New Dualism is now the 
battleground for personal identity denying that one half of the dualism exists is a legitimate 
way of dissolving it. To this end the following sections will explore the links between 
different brands of Animalism, the New Dualism, and the possibility of eliminating the 
philosophical problem of personal identity. 
Noonan(1998) p. 318 
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Il l 
Two T Y P E S OF ANIMALISM 
Noonan asserts that Animalism must reject any possibility of a divergence between personal 
identity and animal identity. However, it is possible to develop versions of Animalism 
which are both weaker and stronger than the version Noonan provides. 
First, though, it is worth considering why an embodiment thesis is not a version of 
Animalism. Although Neo-Lockeans believe the person is distinct from the human animal 
the prevalence of materialism in contemporary philosophy means that Neo-Lockeans 
invariably also believe a person must be instantiated by some material object. Disembodied 
existence is typically regarded as implying the existence of 'Cartesian Egos' 
(notwithstanding that such entities are a metaphysical caricature as has been discussed in 
Chapter 1). It is consequently discredited and rejected out of hand.685 
Neo-Lockeans diverge on how strict these conditions of embodiment must be. Our typical 
example of embodiment will of course be a human animal. Neo-Lockeans can appeal to 
few empirical examples of non-human personal embodiment.6" Instead the literature 
proliferates with thought experiments which, of course, presume the possibility of non-
human embodiment they are meant to prove. It may be easy to imagine metamorphosing 
into a giant insect, as Kafka did and the motion picture The Fly so vividly illustrates. 
However, despite the thoroughness of these artistic thought experiments, and the 
clarifications and ramifications philosophers feel they have added, such unnatural 
metamorphoses do not occur. What is more it seems clear the act of the imagination is only 
made possible by the premise that the person is not identical with its original human body. 
However, a Neo-Lockean who was unconvinced by these and more lavish arguments about 
Brain Zap Machines687 and Psychological Blueprints688 could insist that persons must be 
embodied by human animals. This is clearly in sympathy with the assertion of Animalists 
6 8 3 Strawson (1959) is famously permissive about the possibility of disembodied existence. 
6 8 6 Locke's rational parrot is meant to be one such example. However see Chapter 2, §IV above for a contrary 
interpretation. 
Shoemaker & Swinburne (1984) p. 87 
6 8 8 This is a presumption of the 'teletransporter machine' as exploited in Parfit (1984). The source of this 
thought experiment is the Science-Fiction world of Star Trek. Parfit claims we must distinguish between 
thought experiments which are deeply impossible and those which are only technically impossible. For 
comprehensive and conclusive arguments that the teletransporter is deeply impossible see Krauss (1996). I join 
van Inwagen in his sentiments that so-called 'logical possibility' is frequently spurious and unrevealing. See 
van Inwagen (1997) p. 308 
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like Paul Snowdon, who comments that "Animalism does not simply claim that we are 
animals; it also says that we are animals of a certain human kind."689 This restricted version 
of the embodiment thesis might appear to be a form of Animalism. It is not, though, 
because the identity is not primarily animal identity. The Neo-Lockean can still permit, on 
this account, that the person might only emerge after the animal begins to exist, and may 
dissolve before the animal does. Nor can the embodiment thesis be turned into Animalism 
by asserting that whenever a human animal is present a person is present, and vice versa. 
Such a constant coincidence would merely be a sort of pre-established harmony. Personal 
identity would still be constituted by something other than the human animal, even though 
the human animal might always represent reliable evidence for the presence of a person. 
Embodiment cannot close the gap between the Neo-Lockean and the Animalist because 
embodiment is a weaker condition than constitution.6"1 
The weakest possible form of Animalism would regard it as a contingent fact about our 
world that only human animals are persons. This position itself has degrees. This 
contingency may have a merely temporal limit. In due course other species may emerge as 
persons as well. The contingency might be merely spatial. It might be a contingent fact of 
the evolution of Earth's flora and fauna that only humans are persons. On some distant 
planet a very different type of animal, or even plant, might exhibit personhood.691 In a 
stronger version it is only in another possible world that non-human persons exist. All these 
positions are of little interest because they collapse into the New Dualism.692 Any 
concession that persons and human animals might be distinct is enough to justify the New 
Dualism. 
Noonan is therefore correct in insisting the Animalist must reject these weaker versions and 
reject all possible divergences between persons and human animals. Animalists have 
developed a battery of arguments to this end. Olson best captures the thrust the Animalist 
must take in the paper-title 'Is Psychology Relevant to Personal Identity?'693 When we talk 
of what we value most in life we often talk of our 'hopes and dreams'. Hopes and dreams 
• 
6 8 9 Snowdon (1998) p. 73. As will become apparent Snowdon's insistence may be unwarranted. 
6 9 0 Wiggins, as I understand him, does think embodiment is like constitution, which is why he is often taken to 
be a kind of Animalist. For my reasons for denying Wiggins is an Animalist see the Introduction, especially 
note 11. For discussion more sympathetic to Wiggins see Snowdon (1996). 
6 9 1 This claim is not what David Lewis dubs the 'telescope' (mis-construal) of possible worlds in Lewis (1986). 
This planet might be something literally viewable by a telescope in the way Mars and Venus are. Its discovery 
would be an empirical matter. 
6 9 1 Their only appeal is as a heuristic device to establish that the absence of real examples non-human persons 
means that being a human is, within well stated constraints, a guarantee of being a person. This is why Weak 
Animalism needs some consideration. However, it remains of little interest to the more metaphysically 
motivated philosopher. 
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are psychological phenomena The Neo-Lockean bases the appeal of their thought-
experiments and intuition pumps by appealing to this (quite natural) concern for our 
psychology. The Animalist must work to undercut the strength of these intuitions. 
The Animalist agrees that life without a fully-functioning mind would be unbearable. The 
Animalist agrees that prenatal and neonatal children have very few psychological 
characteristics. Animalists fear senility and decay of the mind as much as anyone (as they 
are philosophers and professional thinkers maybe more). Yet none of this obliges the 
Animalist to accept the Neo-Lockean's arguments. 
First, the Animalist points out that although each of us was once a foetus we became adults. 
A Psychological Criterion of personal identity must deny that a foetus is person because it 
lacks sufficient psychological activity. The adult is a person, and so cannot be identical 
with the foetus. The Psychological Criterion has the bizarre outcome that starting to think 
is not a process of development for a neonate, but its cessation. What is more, every adult 
alive was never in fact a baby. Each of us was never carried in our mother's womb. The 
Animalist asserts that this consequence is absurd. If the Neo-Lockean feels obliged to pay 
this philosophical price for some other gain elsewhere, the Animalist insists the price is far 
too high.694 
The Animalist can also point out that only on their presupposition can we make sense of our 
fear of senility. One should fear becoming cerebrally enfeebled only if one will become the 
afflicted future person. On the Animalist's account whatever psychological deterioration 
afflicts one's body one continues to exist. This explains our fear. On the Psychological 
Criterion the future cerebrally enfeebled human is not a person. We do not have to fear 
becoming such a person because we will always cease to exist before this occurs. Of 
course, one can still fear the point where one becomes insufficiently psychologically 
endowed to exist as a persoa This would be one's death. Our intuitions are torn by this 
example because the Psychological Criterion offers solace, yet only Animalism explains a 
common fear. 
However, the Animalist can appeal to a version of the Two Thinkers' Paradox to 
demonstrate the absurdity of the Neo-Lockean position. If one can die, then one is a living 
thing. Surely, though, the remaining human animal is also a living thing. Each of us in life 
is, according to the Neo-Lockean, therefore not one living thing, but two. The Neo-
Olson (1994). The arguments of this paper are revisited in the chapter of the same name in Olson (1997a). 
This argument is found in Olson (1997b) and revisited in the chapter of the same name in Olson (1997a). 
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Lockean may claim that cessation of psychological capacity is not death. Animals die, 
persons cease to exist. However, this implies that no-one dies. This hardly seems 
satisfactory, as it also implies no-one lives. The Neo-Lockean may want to embrace the 
Two Lives' Paradox, but it is to be avoided for the same reasons as the Two Thinkers' 
Paradox. It should be rejected as a strategy for reasons parallel to those that led above to 
the rejection of (3). 
Finally, the Animalist can insist that only animals provide the sort of robust metaphysical 
grounding that persons need. A collection of examples have grown up to supposedly 
demonstrate that more than one thinker may occupy the same body. Split Brain6'5 cases and 
cases of Multiple Personality696 supposedly demonstrate that mental unity does not coincide 
with physical unity. For an entity to be identical it must be possible to identify it both 
diachronically and synchronically. Intimately related to this are conditions of unity. A 
unity condition should determine whether a possible part of something is or is not actually a 
part of it. For example, an ice cube placed in warm water will start to melt. A unity 
condition for the cube will provide some principle to determine whether a particular water 
molecule is or is not still part of the cube.6" Likewise a Neo-Lockean account of personal 
identity should be able to provide unity conditions for being a person. The difference 
between Split-Brain and Multiple Personality cases is only one of putative underlying 
causes, one physical the other psychological. For this reason only Multiple Personality will 
be investigated. The same considerations provide the Animalist's answer to Split-Brain 
cases. 
It is clear that Multiple Personality is defined as a problem only because it offends the 
standard situation where one human being exhibits one personality. The Psychological 
Criterion, in turn, uses this presumption of a single personality to justify the New Dualism, 
equating personality to person. According to the Psychological Criterion a person is a 
unified maximal psychological entity. Hence if a personality is a person those who hold the 
Psychological Criterion assume that personalities are unified maximal psychological 
entities. While being a maximal unified psychological entity is a good definition for a 
metaphysical category like 'person' it is not clear it is a good definition for a non-
metaphysical, folk-psychological term like 'personality'. Separating these two will both 
6 , 5 These were first philosophically exploited in the context of personal identity in Nagel (1971). 
6 9 6 Two full length studies of these cases are Hacking (1995) and Braude (1995). See also discussion in Wilkes 
(1988). 
6 9 7 Alternatively i f the conditions are indeterminate the bounds of this indeterminacy should be expressed. 
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explain why cases of Multiple Personality are so described, and show that Multiple 
Personality presumes the identity of a human animal. 
In cases of multiple personality personalities are not defined as incommunicable 
consciousnesses as in the way Locke did in his related but quite distinct thought experiment. 
A personality is more akin to a loosely coherent set of beliefs and desires. It is obvious that 
many people, not just Multiples, have subsets of beliefs and desires that are internally 
coherent, but mutually antagonistic. One's set of beliefs about being a parent might conflict 
with one's set of beliefs about a career, for example. In cases of Multiple Personality this 
antagonism is starker and personalities form that have almost no common elements. These 
personalities are not incommunicable, indeed personalities are frequently aware of each 
others beliefs and despise or approve of each other accordingly. 
In the normal case a person exhibits a set of beliefs which can be summed into a maximal 
psychological entity. Although the Animalist asserts that this definition is wrong, for the 
moment it will be granted that this definition could easily tempt. Also in the normal run of 
things each person will only exhibit one broad personality. The conflict in beliefs each of 
us has will not prompt our personality to fragment. This state of affairs is upset in the case 
of the multiple. The beliefs are fragmented enough to justify delimiting different 
personalities. This fragmentation of personality seems to provide problems for the maximal 
psychological entity that the person is supposed to be. The Psychological Criterion tempts 
one to say that there is not only more than one personality, but also more than one person. 
The problem emerges because the Psychological Criterion cannot separate personality and 
person properly. The Animalist can do this. The Animalist can accept that personalities are 
coherent subsets of beliefs, and that each person has a maximal set of psychological events 
and these all belong to one animal. The Animalist accepts the intuition that all of our 
beliefs belong to us, without making this constitute personal identity. The Psychological 
Criterion does not do this. Psychological continuity and connectedness are not merely a 
typical manifestation of personal identity, but have to constitute personal identity as well. 
This insistence causes the confusion between personality and person. The Psychological 
Criterion ends up committed to saying that each apparent set of beliefs (which should 
merely constitute a personality) is actually a person. The AnimaUst can appeal to a non-
psychological connection to ground our mental lives. This allows the Animalist to properly 
distinguish between the person and personalities. The Animalist can draw support from the 
fact that this supports our intuition that each of us can exhibit different personalities without 
threat to personal identity, and that Multiples are not another species of being, but 
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fragmented and mentally distressed persons. None of this is available to the Psychological 
Criterion. It will also be clear from this that cases of Multiple Personality clearly presume 
and rely on an Animalist account to underwrite their presumption that unified personalities 
are the norm. This is clear both from the practice of treating the human being as the patient, 
hot each individual personality as an individual patient. It is also philosophically clear that 
the edifice of personalities presumes a metaphysically sound account of personal identity 
that only Animalism can provide. 
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IV 
DEFLATIONARY ANIMALISM & T H E COMPOSITIONAL ACCOUNT 
It is presumption of both sides of the debate that Animalism asserts an identity between 
persons and human animals. This preserves the belief that there is something peculiar about 
humans that justifies their claim to be persons. This anthropocentrism is inevitable given 
both the way the problem is usually framed and conceived. Yet, it is also philosophically 
undesirable. Neo-Lockeans do not find themselves burdened with such chauvinism and 
regard this as a strength of their position. Therefore, if Animalism can ameliorate this 
objection it should do so. 
The Animalist states that personal identity is nothing more than the identity of a human 
animal. Humans are just another mammalian animal and their identity conditions are surely 
the same as for other mammals. This implies that there is no difference between the 
conditions for squirrel identity and for human identity. Transitivity then demands the 
Animalist accept there is no difference between squirrel identity and personal identity. As 
squirrels are not persons this conclusion would seem prima facie absurd. However, this 
absurdity can be avoided by embracing the radical agenda Noonan rejected as the 
consequence of 4. That is, we should deny the existence of persons, and in doing so, 
eliminate the problem of personal identity. 
This elimination does not imply that all talk of persons must also be eliminated. It does, 
however, imply the elimination of persons as a metaphysical category. Instead, strictly 
speaking, we should only talk of animal identity. Talk of persons is only shorthand used to 
isolate certain kinds of behaviour typically exhibited by certain kinds of animal. This could 
be reduced to talk of certain kinds of behaviour. This clearly avoids anthropocentrism 
because personal identity is no longer explicitly linked to humans. 
However, the Animalist must move carefully or accidentally surrender to the Neo-Lockean. 
The Neo-Lockean will suggest that all the Animalist has produced is a list of typical kinds 
of behaviour with the notion of an animal at the core. Unless the AnimaUst can provide 
reasons why these lists of typical behaviours must only belong to animals the New Dualism 
can simply reassert itself. 
The Animalist can block this argument. While accepting that these lists can be constructed, 
the Animalist can insist that no list of behavioural qualities can ever constitute a 
metaphysical category. Persons cannot be rebuilt. The only metaphysical category that can 
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sustain the weight of personal identity is the category of animal. So-called 'personal' 
behaviour is ontologically dependent on the existence of animals. Hence the Neo-Lockean 
is unable to establish the distinction they require between person and animal. 
It is in these uncharted areas of the personal identity debate that the Compositional Account 
finds contemporary application. Animalism expressed in its biological form is 
metaphysically robust but fails to capture common intuitions. The Compositional Account 
offers what one might call a folk metaphysical position. Persons are the kind of entities that 
are composed of minds and bodies. Folk metaphysics' inherent parsimony is antagonistic 
to theories of coincidence (and hence paradoxes of doubling like the Two Thinkers' 
Paradox). Therefore the best metaphysical category to identify with these composites is 
that of animal. The notion of a mind and a living body are clearly as fundamental as our 
notion of a person. This agrees with the Compositional Account's folk metaphysical 
sympathies. It provides a deflation of personal identity that is primitive yet open to 
analysis. Further the Compositional Account can avoid the charge of being anthropocentric 
or even privileging animals. Any entity that met the conditions of being a self-sufficient, 
-living body-in union-wim a complex enough-psychological-strueture to-warrant the-title of a-
mind could be regarded as person-like. This seems correct. These would be the conditions 
we would look for in alien beings if we were to treat them the way we treat other members 
of our own species. 
Neo-Lockeans like Noonan are wrong to balk at the radical implications of abandoning 
person as an abiding sortal term. The future challenge in the personal identity debate is to 
explore demystify these previous radical positions. The Compositional Account can play a 
very interesting role in exploring these. What is more, the traditional philosophical heroes 
(and villains) of the personal identity debate, Descartes, Locke and Hume, have already 
provided a rich framework of ideas and arguments to adopt, adapt and rediscover. 
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